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CHAPTER 1 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
The development of an international moving strategy, nowadays, is one of the main 
challenges faced by the companies and its management staff. The global market offers new 
perspectives and opportunities. Nevertheless expanding to new markets is a decision that 
involves not only benefits, but also costs and risks. Penetrate a new market usually means 
facing environments and situations that are out of the companies’ control or knowledge, and 
at this point the international expansion strategy can be vital to the company and its products 
survivor.  
As more and more firms start to do business internationally, multinational rivalry has 
naturally emerged as a field of interest among researchers in different disciplines (Ghoshal, 
1987). Consequently, a large body of work has explored topics such as market entry (Buckley 
and Casson, 1998), foreign direct investment (FDI) (Hennart and Park, 1993; Knickerbocker, 
1973), location (Dunning, 1998) and cultural distance (Kogut and Singh, 1988; Hofstede, 
1989). Despite the important insights provided by prior studies, our understanding of the main 
relations in the International Business is still limited     
One of the objectives of researches on the Strategic Management is to understand and 
offer to the companies and its managers/directors/investors explanations of why some 
companies succeed and others fail when investing in foreign countries. That’s why most of 
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the studies on international diversification concentrate their efforts on explaining the effects 
of the international diversification on firm performance. These studies have used a diversity 
of theoretical approaches, from the finance theory of portfolio diversification (e.g. Kim et al, 
1993), to the resource-base view (e.g. Kotabe et al, 2002), and to organizational learning 
theory (e.g. Ruigrok and Wagner, 2003), to predict this relationship, however as many authors 
have noted (e.g. Ruigrok and Wagner 2003, Hitt et al, 1997), the findings have been 
conflictive and disappointing (Hennart, 2007).  
Nevertheless, is it enough to the company knowing if the diversification performance 
is positive or negative? The relevant question shall not be if more or less diversification 
conduces to the best results, but which internationalization strategies can improve the 
companies’ performance. Taking those arguments into consideration, the international 
strategy can be decomposed into two fundamental decisions: 
a) Where to expand or the location decision: if a company will move to a more 
related market or region, more similar to its domestic market, or if a company 
will move to an unrelated market or culturally distant region; 
b) How to expand or the entry mode decision: that’s the ownership decision or if 
a company will expand with its own resources or with resources from another 
companies.  
Both fundamental decisions has generated a numbers of studies in the International 
Business literature (Hennart and Park, 1993; Harzing, 2002; Rugman and Brain, 2003; Flores 
and Aguilera, 2008), however none of those studies have properly analyzed the 
interrelationship between them. Despite the decisions are jointly made by the companies 
(when a company decide where to go, must also decide the ownership mode, and conversely, 
when a company decide how to expand, must also decide in which market must sell its 
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products), the existence of an endogeneity effect between both decisions has never been 
examined.   
In that sense, we combine both streams of researches to analyze the joint effect of 
those decisions and its interdependence, especially in the case of the European Market and the 
regional integration. In this context, as pointed out by Rugman and Verbeke (2005), regional 
integration is not driven just by the strategic intent of governments and powerful economic 
actors to increase or consolidate economic exchange within a region, but it also reflects the 
efforts from companies who wish to expand their geographical business horizon, guided by 
immediate opportunities that are geographically close and associated with lower transaction 
costs, as well as a high potential for agglomeration economies.  
Apart from that, shall be also relevant to the companies the comprehension of which 
are the underlying factors of those decisions, like relevant firm characteristics important in the 
international movement, or the surrounding environment posed by industry structure or 
country characteristics. Firms must deeply understand the role that their firm specific 
advantages play, and its applicability and transferability to new environments. They must also 
comprehend the key aspects of the host country where they plan establishing a foreign unit, 
like the country specific advantages, the institutional environment, cultural distance, 
infrastructure, etc.   
Based on that, our investigation rests on some key considerations:   
1. The intense globalization of markets and the high level of international 
competition; 
2. The increasing managerial and academic interest on deeply understanding how 
works the International Business; 
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3. The increased integration of regional markets, especially the European market, 
changing the configuration of the international diversification process, and the 
absence of a considerable number of studies that investigate the International 
Business from the perspective of the EU, despite its relevant economic position in 
the world economy. 
4. The inexistence of a theory that integrates the International Business in all its 
stages, considering antecedents, moderators, and results; 
5. The fact that many multinational enterprises disclaim which aspects must be taken 
into account when moving out of its borders 
1.2 OBJECTIVES 
Considering the reasoning presented above, the main purpose of this dissertation is to 
analyze the internationalization strategies of European firms, developing a framework that 
comprises the main aspects of the internationalization strategy (the entry mode and the 
location decisions), as a result of various interrelated decisions. Apart from that, the entire 
thesis is developed with a special focus on the regional effect of the internationalization 
strategy, applied to the European Market. 
Specifically, our objectives are: 
1. Assess the relation between international diversification and firm performance, 
taking into account the benefits and costs of the international diversification, 
analyze this relation under all conflictive forms found in the literature (linear, 
quadratic and cubic relation); 
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a. Deeper analyze this relation, assessing if the previous results are affected or 
not by the level of regional diversification a firm has; 
2. Examine the antecedent factors that explain the entry mode choice; 
3. Examine the antecedent factors that explain the location decision; 
4. Investigate the existence of an endogenous relation between entry mode and 
location decision, highlighting the importance of some antecedent factors of both 
location relatedness decision1 and entry mode choice. 
5. Analyze the joint impact on performance from the entry mode and location 
decisions, or if there is any optimized pattern between them that conduces to 
enhanced performance. 
                                                 
 
1 On this dissertation will adopt this concept to differentiate the Eurozone firms’ expansions within the 
European Community (related means homogeneous markets, or simply regional expansion) and 
outside de EC (unrelated means global or non-regional expansion). Those definitions are explained in 
detail on Chapter 4. 
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1.3 ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
TABLE 1.4 – Organization of the study 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Chapter 6 – Discussion and Conclusions 
 
Following this introduction Chapter, this study is organized in five additional chapters. 
Chapter 2 briefly introduces the main theoretical perspectives applied in the international 
business and a few conceptualizations. Chapters three to five (resumed in the next paragraphs) 
are organized as three individual essays, all related to the central objective of this thesis. 
Those essays are all linked in terms of theory, each one growing in its contribution and 
complexity, complementing the knowledge from the previous chapter. The final objective is 
to construct a framework that will improve our knowledge of the main pillars of the 
international diversification literature: the entry mode choice, the location decision and its 
Chapter 1 – Introduction / Objectives 
Chapter 2 – Conceptual and Theoretical Framework 
 
          Regional Diversification 
 
Chapter 3 – International Diversification                               Performance 
          
      Chapter 5 – Entry Mode 
                 Performance 
           Location Decision    
Chapter 4 – Entry mode 
 
     Location Decision  
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underlying factors. Finally, on Chapter 6, we present the main conclusions of this study 
detailing our findings. Chapter 6 also provides a discussion of the limitations of the study and 
outlines an agenda for future research.  
On Chapter 3 we further analyze the gains in performance of international diversified 
firms applied to the Eurozone, taking into account the impact of the interactive effect of both 
product and international diversification on firm performance. Those variables have long been 
of interest of researches from both strategic management and international business, 
nevertheless, despite the heavy volume of research focusing on international diversification, 
product diversification, and performance, those studies have provided limited understanding 
and conflicting results. This chapter is motivated, initially, by those conflicting causal 
relations between international diversification and firm performance.  
To further investigate those previous relations explored in the literature, we test all of 
them (linear, quadratic and cubic relations), and analyze which of them are the most complete 
approach, regarding the international diversification-performance relation. Interesting results 
comes from this chapter.  
Initially, the empirical findings suggest that there exists an S-curve relation between 
international diversification and firm performance, being this approach the most complete, 
comparatively to studies that advocate for a linear or quadratic relation between those 
variables. Companies with low levels of internationalization tend to present reduced 
performance, mainly because the liability of foreignness and as a consequence of their 
inability to fully exploit the benefits of internationalization (like economies of scale and 
scope, bargaining power, learning opportunities and local resource exploitation), 
characterizing the first slope of the S-curve. With increasing international experience, 
development of new capabilities, diminishing costs of being new and foreign, and expansion 
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of the international operation, the firm starts to benefit from the international expansion, 
characterizing the second stage of the S-curve. However, when this expansion starts to grow 
to more and more countries and subsidiaries, the costs of governance and coordination rises 
up to a point that the costs involved supplant its benefits, as an indicative a the existence of a 
threshold of internationalization.  
Our investigations on the S-curve also indicates that the U-curve from previous studies 
is industry specific, and this can at least partially answer past conflicts on this relation, as 
detailed on Chapter 3.  
Further, we deeply investigate the S-curve and the past conflicting results combining 
the S-curve discussion with the actual regionalization debate. The debate of the regional 
characteristic of firm international expansion is hardly motivated by a challenging study from 
Rugman (2000), where he affirms that the globalization is a “myth”. According to this 
discussion, most multinational firms are regionally-oriented, and because of that, the strategic 
management of international business should be regionally focused, and not globally focused. 
That’s why we investigate if the impact of the international diversification on performance is 
influenced by the level of firm’s regional orientation.  
Empirical findings suggest that the most regionally oriented a firm is, the lesser will be 
the negative effect of the liability of foreignness and the more it can benefit from international 
expansion. Another important contributions of Chapter 3 are: i) the fact we take into 
consideration not only account based measures of performance, but also market based 
measures; ii) different from previous studies, our sample is multi country and European; iii) 
we take into account not only manufacturing or service firms exclusively, but both together.  
Chapter 4 of this thesis is dedicated to build a new framework in the FDI literature. 
Drawing on the regional discussion of firm foreign expansion and on the entry mode literature 
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(specifically the acquisition/greenfield choice) we deconstruct the idea that the entering firm 
has the option to choose any entry mode in a given country.  
Critical choices are to be made when a firm decides to internationalize, and the most 
prominent of those decisions are the entry mode strategy and in which markets (countries) the 
firms will make those investments (the location decision). However, despite the amount of 
studies dealing with those variables, especially the entry choice, and the similarity between 
the antecedents found on the literature of both entry mode and location decisions, none of 
those studies examined the interaction or reciprocity between them. In fact, one limitation of 
both research streams (entry mode and location decision) is that they examine the two 
decisions in isolation, and further, the literature of entry mode decision assumes that the 
entering firm has the option to choose any entry mode in a given country (Andersen, 1997).  
That’s the aim of this Chapter: investigate if a manager can really adopt an entry 
decision without considering the relatedness of the location decision (related – to home-
regional markets, and unrelated – to global markets) and its idiosyncrasies, and similar, if it is 
possible to a manager to opt for an international location without consider the constraints or 
underlying factors that makes a firms choosing this or that mode of foreign expansion.  
Specifically, using simultaneous equation estimation (3SLS), we investigate the 
existence of a reciprocal relationship between entry mode and location relatedness decision 
from Eurozone firms. The simultaneous model supports our prediction that there is an 
endogenous relation between entry mode and location decision: acquisitive entry mode favors 
expansions to more unrelated markets, and greenfield entry mode, in turn, favors expansions 
to more related markets. Conversely, our results suggest that firms expanding to more 
unrelated markets are more likely to expand through acquisitions, and firms expanding to 
more related markets are more likely to favor greenfield investments.  
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Chapter 5, as already suggested, is developed based on the sum of contributions of the 
previous Chapters. The discussion on this Chapter basically rests on the findings of Chapter 4 
and also the Dunning’s OLI tripod (ownership, location and internalization): if each leg is 
supportive of the other, and the stool is only functional if the three legs are evenly balanced 
(Dunning 1998), assuming that the firm has already decided to internalize an activity, it’s to 
expect that the performance implication of the two remaining legs (ownership and location) 
shall not be treated in isolation. So, taking into account this proposition and the findings from 
the last Chapter, we investigate the performance implication of the entry mode and location 
decision, considering the endogenous relation between entry mode and location relatedness 
(home-regional or global markets).  
However, considering that neither a strategic mode itself, nor the combination of two 
strategies should conduce to enhanced performance, since diverse combinations of entry 
mode and location decision clearly profit and survive for extended periods within the same 
industry2, we take into account in this analysis the fit or coalignment between both decisions, 
in a way that we expect that if a firm decision is closer to an optimized pattern (or patterns) it 
might perform better than firms which decisions are suboptimal in terms of this coalignment.  
Empirical results suggest that the more distant the firm is regarding the optimal 
decisions (the combination of entry mode choice and location relatedness decision), the worse 
will be its financial performance. This chapter not only sheds light in the performance 
implication of the alignment of firms’ international diversification decisions, but also is an 
important extension and serves to corroborate the main framework explored in this thesis: the 
endogeneity between entry mode and location relatedness decision. 
                                                 
 
2 In the literature this assertion received the name of fit and equifinality. 
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Definitively, this doctoral thesis looks for improving the knowledge of the 
international business literature, exploring important relations, some of them neglected in 
previous studies, like the case of the endogenous relation between entry mode choice and 
location relatedness decision. Apart from that, we seek to further understand the regional 
effect of firm expansion, considering its antecedents and performance implications, with 
special attention to the Eurozone firms, a current debate that is still in the beginning and must 
be more investigated.  
In sum, this study provides value to strategic management researchers and managers 
involved or wishing to be involved on international business in many ways. First, revisiting 
the S-curve hypothesis under the Eurozone context, and also taking into account the current 
regional expansion debate; second, developing a framework unexplored until now in the 
strategic management literature: the interdependent relation between the two main pillars of 
the international business literature, viz the entry mode choice and the location decision; third, 
further investigating this interdependence model, assessing the performance implication of the 
alignment (or fit) of both decisions; fourth, exploring those relations taking into account the 
underlying factors of those decisions in the regional/global context; fifth, our measure for 
global orientation control for the regions GDP distribution, offering a much more reliable 
measurement; sixth, we developed a continuous measure of fit to capture the coalignment of 
firm entry and location decisions.  
As a final point, all this thesis and its frameworks were analyzed under the perspective 
of the Eurozone, until now rarely studied comparatively to US or Japanese MNEs, despite its 
enormous importance to the world economy. 
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Our expectation is that this thesis can add some contribution to the current debate, and 
together with other contributions, be the root (seed) for the construction of new theories in the 
field of the Foreign Direct Investment and the regional international expansion. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
2. CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
2.1 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK  
2.1.1 Global trends in the international economy  
“The end of World War II ushered in a new era in international trade. New institutions 
were put in place at post war conferences which, while they have been considerably altered 
over time, still provide the framework within which international trade takes place. (…)While 
the influence of these organizations has grown or declined over time, they have presided over 
the greatest increase in international commerce ever seen”(Kerr and Perdikis, 1995: 6). 
The world trade in goods and services has grown rapidly since the end of World War 
II, mainly because of two post war phenomena: (1) the rise in real incomes and demand in the 
world leading economies and, (2) a general reduction in the restrictions imposed on trade 
(Kerr and Perdikis, 1995). Porter (1986: 2-3) adds to those phenomena other trends in the 
international markets that boost this world trade growth, as the growing similarities of 
countries, in terms of available infrastructure, distribution channels, and market approaches; 
the fluid global capital markets, characterized with a large flow of funds between countries; 
the falling tariff barriers, because of successive bilateral or multilateral agreements; the 
technological restructuring, because of industry technological revolution and growing 
competition; the integrating role of technology, reshaping the industries and making them 
work together, contributing to the countries’ straight relation; and the rising of new global 
competitors, specially from east Asia. As a result, the global economic integration is a reality 
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for most of the world economies. Each day, the world economy are more distant from a model 
where the national economies were relatively isolated via barriers that impeded the commerce 
and international investments, being each day closer to an economy where the national 
economies mix itself with a global and interdependent economic system. This phenomenon is 
actually known as globalization (Hill, 2001).   
Foreign direct investments (FDI) flow has been increasing in all the mayor country 
groups in the last years, specially due to the strong economic performance and increasing 
profits of many countries in the world, reduction of trade barriers, and other specific factors 
such as currency movements, stock exchange and financial market developments and high 
commodity prices (UNCTAD, 2007) – See TABLE 2.1 and FIGURE 2.1. Over the past 20 
years, the total volume of world trade has grown far more rapidly than the annual growth rate 
in world gross national product (Economist, 1997). 
At the same time this intense inflow and outflow of FDI characterize a strong global 
economic integration, the movement towards a global economy has also been bolstered by 
regional developments such as the lowering trade barriers and economic integration in the 
European Community (EU), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), or the 
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). In this scenario of increasing FDI and regional economic 
integration, the European market acts as one of the main destiny of FDI inflow. FDI flows 
into the Eurozone surged by 51% in 2006, to US$325bn, almost one-quarter of the world total 
(EIU – The Economist Investment Unit, 2007). Still according the EIU (2007), Western 
Europe will continue to be the world’s largest recipient of FDI. The main motive for the 
majority of foreign companies investing in the region will continue to be the better access to 
one of the world’s largest and wealthiest markets of the world and the region attractiveness 
because of the presence of dense industry clusters. Projected annual average FDI inflows into 
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the region in 2007-11 will be above 3% of GDP—a historically high level and above the 
world average. Those data highlights the importance of testing and understanding the 
multinational enterprise (MNE) theory under the perspective of the European Unit (EU). 
 
FIGURE 2.1 - Global cross-border M&As, value (US$ Bn) and growth rate, 1987-2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: UNCTAD, cross-border M&A database. 
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TABLE 2.1 – FDI inflows (US$ bn) 
 1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
World total 1,113,8 1,408,3 851,1 618,1 563,4 730,2 971,7 1.335,1 
% change, year on year  56,2  26,4  -39,6  -27,4  -8,8  29,6  33,1  37,4 
Developed countries  853,0  1,125,0  563,4  421,1  354,6  379,5  546,8  824,4 
% change, year on year  72,7  31,9  -49,9  -25,2  -15,8  7,0  44,1  50,7 
% of world total  76,6  79,9  66,2  68,1  62,9  52,0  56,3  61,7 
Emerging markets  260,9  283,3  287,8  197,0  208,9  350,7  424,9  510,7 
% change, year on year  19,1  8,6  1,6  -31,5  6,0  67,9  21,1  20,2 
% of world total  23,4  20,1  33,8  31,9  37,1  48,0  43,7  38,3 
North America  308,1  380,8  171,6  96,6  60,6  122,0  128,4  252,7 
Western Europe  527,6  718,3  373,6  296,7  277,0  212,6  455,5  554,8 
 EU15  505,9  688,8  357,3  287,4  252,0  202,5  433,6  496,5 
% of world total  45.4  48.9  42.0  46.5 44.7 29.1  46.9  41.6  
% change, by year 87.5  36.2  -48.1  -19.6 -12.3 -23.3  114.3  21.8  
Eastern Europe  29,1  29,5  30,0  36,0  35,1  66,9  77,1  105,9 
Asia-Pacific  124,2  165,9  121,8  116,1  110,9  186,0  144,1  238,6 
 Developing Asia  107,3  142,6  102,6  88,2  93,9  138,6  174,1  212,4 
Latin America & the 
Caribbean  
108,8  98,3  131,2  54,7  46,9  105,0  106,3  102,5 
Middle East  4,9  6,6  6,5  5,5  14,2  18,7  30,4  46,2 
North Africa  2,2  3,2  2,7  3,4  5,2  7,8  14,8  22,3 
Sub-Saharan Africa  9,0  5,7  13,6  9,0  13,4  11,3  15,2  12,2 
Source: Adapted by the author from Economist Intelligence Unit  
 Additional to the fact that the EU holds a relevant economic position in the world 
economy, nowhere in the world was the movement toward a regional economic integration so 
successful. With almost 500 million consumers, the EU created a common currency, a 
complex political structure, and important institutions and bodies (include the European 
Commission, the Council of the European Union, the European Council, the European Court 
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of Justice, the European Central Bank, and the European Parliament).  The Euro is the official 
currency of 16 of the 27 member states of the European Union. The states known collectively 
as the Eurozone are Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain. The 
currency is also used in a further five European countries, with and without formal 
agreements and is consequently used daily by some 327 million Europeans, being today the 
second largest reserve currency and the second most traded currency in the world after the 
U.S. dollar.    
 The implications of this common market to the companies and the managerial 
practices are enormous. According to Hill (2001), apart from the gains to the member 
countries, because of the free movement of goods and investments, other factors will benefit 
the European companies, as listed below: 
 The lower costs of making business inside the UE, because of the common standards 
of products and services and the simplified system of taxes; 
 The possibility to centralize the production in the best locations to the company (in 
term of costs and local abilities), and serve the full market from a single location; 
 The economies of scale of making those business in such a big consumer market; 
 The end of commercial and administrative barriers enhanced the competence inside 
the European market. In a short term it means that some of the companies will have 
to abandon the market. However this increased competence will compel the firms to 
become more efficient and more skilled to compete for the global market with US or 
Asian rival companies. 
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 The common currency means savings since there is no need to incur in costs of 
money exchange, and also represent less risk generated by currency fluctuations.   
All those political, economical and managerial factors, in conjunction, the increased 
importance of the UE in the world economy and the unique environment developed for trade 
in this market reinforce the need to review the theories of the international business under the 
perspective of the European Union. Most of the studies done up to this date, deal with US 
companies, not only because the US market is the bigger consumer market in the world, but 
also because of the low interference of the government compared to another developed and 
developing countries, and high availability of data of US companies.     
2.1.2 MNE and the International Business: a concept 
But, first of all, what really is a Transnational or Multinational Enterprise (MNE)? 
Caves (2007: 1), for example, define a multinational enterprise as an enterprise that controls 
and manages production establishments (plants) located in at least two countries. For him, a 
MNE is simply one subspecies of a multiplant firm. The same definition is adopted by Hill 
(2001). Very similar, Dunning (1992: 3), defines a MNE as an enterprise that engages in 
foreign direct investment (FDI) and owns or controls value-adding activities in more than one 
country.  
However, as highlighted by Caves (2007), what constitutes “control” over a foreign 
establishment is a judgmental issue, because a MNE sometimes chooses to hold only a minor 
fraction of the equity of a foreign affiliate, and the countries normally differ in the minimum 
percentage of equity ownership that they count as a direct investment abroad, as distinguished 
from a portfolio investment, in their international-payments statistics. Additionally, Dunning 
(1992:3) identified from the literature several criteria to identify the degree of multinationality 
of an enterprise, including: 
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I. The number and size of foreign subsidiaries it owns or control; 
II. The number of countries in which it engages in value-added activities; 
III. The proportion of its global assets, revenue, income or employment accounted 
by its foreign affiliates; 
IV. The degree to which its management or stock ownership is internationalized; 
V. The extent to which its higher values activities (for e.g. R&D) are 
internationalized; 
Those multiple measures of the degree of enterprise multinationality only add force to 
the idea that the definition of what is and in which extent an enterprise shall be considered a 
MNE is ambiguous – or is a multidimensional concept. To Dunning (1992) it is also an 
arbitrary criterion. Based on that, we’ll adopt the broad definition adopted by Hill (2001), 
more in accordance to the scope of this study, which defines a MNE as any enterprise with 
production activities in two or more countries.   
As internationalization process or simply international diversification we will adopt a 
broader definition offered by Calof and Beamish (1995), also in accordance with the scope of 
this study, where they define the internationalization as the process of adapting exchange 
transaction modality to international markets, including so the two most important dimension 
of the internationalization process: the entry mode decision, and the location decision.   
2.1.3 Foreign Direct Investment and the Regional Framework 
The process of internationalization of MNCs and the rationale of their foreign location 
choice are at the core of International Business (IB) research. However, the reason that leads 
MNCs’ foreign location choices have change in the last two decades as well as the reasons for 
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choosing some countries over others as destinations of MNC activities remains inconclusive 
and requires more systematic analysis (Flores and Aguilera, 2007). Additionally, a recent call 
from Dunning (1998) for more IB scholarly attention to the change in the geographical spread 
of MNCs’ activities in light of the global-scale transformations in the last few decades allied 
by the new developments by regional theorists specially inspired by Rugman’s (2000) 
proposition that most multinational firms are regionally-oriented, is a claim to the necessity to 
revisit the international business theory in light of the new business and country 
environments. 
According to Rugman and Verbeke (2004), much economic activity takes place in 
clusters of the broad “triad” regions of North America, the European Union (EU), and Asia, 
and most of the 500 largest MNEs operate regionally based, with the majority of their sales 
concentrated in their triad home-region (Rugman 2005). As a conclusion of those studies, 
most of these companies are not global in the sense of having deep and broad penetration 
across all regions in the triad (Sukpanich, 2005). 
To best understand this phenomenon, let’s first understand the changing locational 
determinants of FDI in the last decades. First of all, the UNCTAD’s World Investment Report 
(1998) review the location-specific determinants of FDI, to analyze how these have changed 
in a liberalizing and globalizing world economy. According to this report, the relative 
importance of different location-specific determinants depends on at least four aspects of 
investment: the motive for investment (e.g. resource-seeking or market-seeking FDI), the type 
of investment (e.g. new or sequential FDI), the sector of investment (e.g. services or 
manufacturing), and the size of investors (small and medium-sized or large TNCs), being the 
relative importance of those determinants variable, as the economic environment evolves over 
time. The determinants are resumed on TABLE 2.2, below.  
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However, to better understand the regional phenomenon, we must go further on this 
analysis, and for a better understanding of this changing scenario from the last decades, we 
must combine the UNCTAD (1998) analysis with Dunning’s (2003:284) analysis of the 
changing locational variables affecting the FDI in the decades of 1970–80 and 1990–2000 
(TABLE 2.3).  
A first look on TABLE 2.3 reveals interesting motivations for a regional expansion in 
the last decade, specially analyzing from the perspective of the scope of this study – the 
European Market and the Eurozone. To Dunning (2003) the main changing variables 
affecting FDI in industrial countries are more asset-augmenting and horizontal efficiency-
seeking FDI, more M&A’s and strategic alliances, integrated MNE operations, emphasis on 
business facilitating variables, availability of creative assets, and agglomerative economies. 
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TABLE 2.2 – Host country determinants of Foreign Direct Investment 
Source: Adapted from UNCTAD - World Investment Report (1998:98)  
 
I. Policy framework for FDI 
 
• economic, political and social stability 
• rules regarding entry and operations 
• standards of treatment of foreign affiliates 
• policies on functioning and structure of markets (especially competition and M&A 
policies) 
• international agreements on FDI 
• privatization policy 
• trade policy (tariffs and NTBs) and coherence of FDI and trade policies 
• tax policy 
 
II. Economic determinants 
 
A. Market-seeking  
• market size and per capita income 
• market growth 
• access to regional and global markets 
• country-specific consumer preferences 
structure of markets 
 
B. Resource/ asset-seeking  
• raw materials 
• low-cost unskilled labor 
• skilled labor 
• technological, innovatory and other created assets (e.g. brand names), including as 
embodied in individuals, firms and clusters 
physical infrastructure (ports, roads, power, telecommunication) 
 
C. Efficiency-seeking  
• cost of resources and assets listed under B, adjusted for productivity for labor 
resources 
• other input costs, e.g. transport and communication costs to/from and within host 
economy and costs of other intermediate products 
membership of a regional integration agreement conducive to the establishment 
 
III. Business facilitation 
 
• investment promotion (including image building and investment-generating activities 
and investment-facilitation services) 
• investment incentives 
• hassle costs (related to corruption, administrative efficiency, etc.) 
• social amenities (bilingual schools, quality of life, etc.) 
• after-investment services 
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TABLE 2.3 – Changing Locational Variables Affecting FDI, 1970–80 and 1990–2000  
 
 1970–80 1990–2000
1. Industrial country-industrial country  
 Firms’ motives and strategies  
 
 
 
 
 
 Host country determinants  
 
 
 Mainly market-seeking and horizontal efficiency-
seeking FDI  
 Mixture of greenfield FDI (or expansion of same) 
and M&As  
 
 
 Many domestic MNE operations  
 Predominantly FDI policy and economic 
determinants affecting market efficiency-seeking 
FDI 
 
 More asset-augmenting and horizontal efficiency-
seeking FDI  
 More M&As and strategic alliances  
 Integrated MNE operations  
 Emphasis on business facilitating variables  
 
 Availability of creative assets  
 Agglomerative economies  
 
2. Industrial country-developing country 
 Firms’ motives and strategies  
 
 
 
 Host country determinants  
 
 Mainly market resource-seeking  
 Greenfield and joint ventures 
 Many domestic MNE operations  
 
 Predominantly FDI policy and economic 
determinants, especially regulation of incentives in 
relation to FDI 
 
 
 More vertical efficiency-seeking FDI and 
subcontracting  
 
 
 Emphasis switched to using FDI to upgrade domestic 
competitive advantages  
 More attention given to economic policies and 
business facilitation  
3. Developing country-industrial country  
 Firms’ motives and strategies  
 
 Host country determinants  
 
 
 Little FDI  
 
 As for (1) above  
 
 
 Some market-seeking and asset-seeking FDI  
 
 Market size and growth  
 Availability of technology, organizational capacity  
4. Developing country-developing country  
 Firms’ motives and strategies  
 
 Host country determinants 
 
 Almost entirely market resource-seeking 
 
 Many domestic MNE operations 
 As for (2) above
 
 As for 1970–80, but an increasing amount of 
efficiency-seeking and some asset-augmenting FDI. 
  As for (2) above 
Source: Dunning, 2003:284 
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Additionally, the UCTAD’s report (1998) suggest that the overall impact of regional 
integration frameworks on FDI determinants depends on whether the regional policy 
framework for FDI contemplates a trade policy, if it liberalizes the movement of capital 
(including FDI capital), and depends on how restrictive are the capital movement and 
investment regimes between the member countries, for example.  
Regarding the economic determinants, the market size (regional market size) and 
growth are the FDI economic determinants that are most affected by the implementation of a 
regional international framework. So, that means that regional integration and the removal of 
the barriers from trade and other barriers increases the geographical scope and size of 
“effective” markets to their members (UNCTAD, 1998). This way, the market size is uniform 
to all members and the companies can access the whole market from a single location. This 
will favor the economies of scale and scope; it favors also the access to specific resources 
(like skills, technology, and other assets) from other member countries located in different 
locations, and gives the companies the opportunity to locate their activities close to similar 
cluster of companies, favoring the access to region or sub-regional agglomeration economies. 
To enhance the arguments in favor of the regional integration, Motta and Norman 
(1996) argues that even if all trade and investment barriers between countries were removed, 
cultural, linguistic and other less obvious barriers to doing business would remain, so that 
means that it’s not only a matter of trade agreements, but also a matter of proximity to local 
consumers. According to Gomes and Ramaswamy (1999), several location choice studies 
suggest that in the initial stage of international expansion, a firm tends to expand its operation 
in locations or regions that are geographically and culturally close to its home country. 
Vernon (1966) suggests that the entrepreneur’s consciousness of and responsiveness to 
opportunity are a function of ease of communication, and ease of communication is a function 
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of geographical proximity: according to him, even if all the advanced countries in the world 
had equal access to scientific principles, that would not mean equal probability of the 
application of these principles in the generation of new products. He also suggests with his 
model that a firm will gradually expands from geographically and culturally familiar locations 
to geographically and culturally remote areas of the world.  
However, as observes Sukpanich (2005), this won’t necessarily means that a firm will 
have the regional scope of the locational firm specific advantages in its early phase of 
international expansion and then have the global scope of the locational firm specific 
advantages in the later stage of its international operation, because many firms will limit their 
expansion into only some regions, and not expand evenly in each region of the world. The 
FSAs play an important role in the decision of moving to a regional or global location. As 
point out Rugman and Verbeke (2004), only in locations where the MNE’s home region FSAs 
are valued by customers (like regional markets), because of its easier market penetration, the 
learning and adaptation process will be faster, in the sense of an incremental accumulation of 
host region experience. Additionally, to Rugman (2005), only firms with the global reach of 
FSAs and global scope of locational FSAs can be defined as global firms; however he 
suggests that most of the largest companies are regional firms in the sense of having the 
regional reach of FSAs and the regional scope of locational FSAs. This topic on the locational 
boundedness of FSAs and regional expansion will be dealt in detail in the fifth chapter of this 
thesis. 
2.1.4 The Entry Mode Choice 
Firms wishing to expand its operations overseas have several options to enter those 
markets, ranging from non-equity (contractual agreements and export) to equity entry modes 
(equity joint ventures and wholly owned subsidiaries) (see Figure 2.2).  
 28 
 
FIGURE 2.2 – Equity and Non Equity Choice of Entry Modes 
 Source: Pan and Tse (2000) 
According to Pan and Tse (2000), this conceptualization is attractive and more 
manageable to managers, since they have limited analytical capacity, and often decompose 
this complex decision into a hierarchical process, adopting a small set of critical variables to 
monitor at each level (Steinbruner, 1974). Additionally, there is a great difference among 
various entry modes and among the criteria of choice at each level (Gatignon and Anderson, 
1988), since the circumstances that are suitable for a greenfield operation differ dramatically 
from those that call for indirect export, being too different to be compared at the same level.  
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To Anderson and Gatignon (1986), control is the focus of the entry mode literature 
and also the determinant of both risk and return. High-control (equity) modes shall increase 
return and risk, and low-control (non-equity) modes minimize resource commitment and risk.  
According to Hill et al (1990), each of mode of entry has different implications for the 
degree of control that a MNC can exercise over the foreign operation, the resources it must 
commit to the foreign operation, and the risks that it must bear to expand into the foreign 
country, being the entry choice a critical determinant of the success of foreign operations. 
That’s clear that the level of control is lowest in the case of licensing and highest in the case 
of a wholly owned subsidiary. In the case of a wholly owned subsidiary, for example, the 
ultimate control always resides at the MNC's corporate office. In the case of a joint venture, 
the level of control is dependent on the ownership split and the number of parties involved.  
Regarding the resource commitment, equity modes require a major commitment in the 
overseas location than non-equity modes (Anderson and Gatignon, 1986; Hill et al, 1990). 
Those resources (physical plant, management know-how, etc.) cannot be redeployed to 
alternative uses without a cost. In the case of a license, for example, the company will not 
face most of the costs of installation and selling in the host market, being those costs assumed 
by the licensee company. Most of the costs involved in this modality of entry regard the 
personnel training and the monitoring costs, to avoid the contract violation. On the other 
hand, setting up an independent operation or acquiring a foreign company requires a more 
significantly investment on sunk costs, involvement of direct management in the 
establishment, a constant interaction with various local parties, and other coordination costs.  
Finally, with respect to the dissemination risk, it refers to the risk the firm incurs on 
having its know-how expropriated by another company or third party. According to Hill et al 
(1990), the greater the quasi-rents generated by a firm proprietary know-how, the greater the 
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possibility that the MNE will prefer a higher control entry mode, to protect firm specific 
knowledge. In other words, the risk of dissemination of the firm’s proprietary knowledge 
grows from non-equity to equity based entry modes, since if a company grants a licensee the 
rights to manufacture a product or run a development, it runs a significant risk of the licensee, 
or an employee of the licensee, disseminate that know-how, or use it for purposes other than 
those originally intended (Hill and Kim, 1988).  
In the case of a wholly owned mode, this risk might be reduced, since the internal 
organization fosters an atmosphere conducive to a congruence of goals and values between 
members of the organization, discouraging those kind of behavior (Hill et al, 1990). 
Additionally, in the case of an organization, the knowledge is often fragmented between 
people and departments, making difficult the expropriation of the full knowledge.   
Since the scope of this study is focused on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) (defined 
as investments that involve ownership and confer effective management control), we’ll center 
our attention on the equity modes of entry, and more specifically the wholly owned 
subsidiaries (greenfield and acquisitions). The basic difference from greenfield ventures to 
acquisitions is that the first means a new enterprise in the market, while the second don’t.  
Both risks and coordination costs affect the choice between acquisition and greenfield 
entry. To perform an acquisitive entry, the parent company goes into the market for corporate 
control and acquires equity shares in a going business, competing with other equity 
shareholders. According to Caves (2007), on that case, the rivals force the buyer to pay a 
price that would let a non controlling investor earn a normal or competitive rate of return. It 
likely pays a control premium in addition. However, if the MNE decide to starts a new 
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venture, it will avoid paying the going-concern value3 for an acquired business, which it may 
not value highly if it wants to install its own management practices. Still according to Caves 
(2007), despite the benefit of avoiding of paying the extra costs of an acquisition, the 
greenfield ventures with high start-up costs will penalize the outsider relative to a native 
entrepreneur, and so no previous supposition can be made from one mode in favor of the 
other.  
Nevertheless, many other factors can affect the attractiveness of an acquisition or a 
greenfield venture, and the balance of costs, risks and resource commitment can vary 
depending on a series of factors, like the stock of firm specific advantages, the barriers of 
entry, the location of the foreign investment (in terms of cultural distance, political issues, 
country risk, etc.), etc.  
In fact, according to Slangen and Hennart’s (2007) review on the determinants of the 
choice between greenfield and acquisition entry, many theoretical perspectives were used to 
determine the entry choice, however most of those findings are inconsistent. For example, 
only six of the 22 independent variables included in multiple studies from their review have 
been found to have a consistent significant effect on the choice of establishment mode. In the 
light of those inconsistencies, on this thesis we propose a new framework (see Chapter 4), 
were the entry mode decision is endogenously related with the location decision.          
2.1.5 The Relatedness of Location Decision 
Despite being one of two key decisions of the firm internationalization process, 
literature on geographic scope has never attracted such an attention, like the entry mode 
                                                 
 
3 The value given to a company in the terms of an operating business to another company or 
individual. The difference between a company's going-concern value and its asset or liquidation value 
is deemed goodwill and plays a major role in mergers and acquisitions. 
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choice. To Dunning (1998) it could be partly due scholars believes, where the principles 
underlying the locational decisions of firms within national boundaries can be easily extended 
to explain their cross-border locational preferences.  
Most of the studies dealing with the scope of international business centered the 
debate of firm multinationality on the benefits from foreign expansion, and how the balance 
between benefits and costs can affect business performance (Lu and Beamish, 2004; Hitt et al, 
1997; Tallman and Li, 1996; Geringer et al, 1989). In other words, previous literature 
concentrated their efforts on the consequences of firm international expansion, neglecting the 
antecedents underlying the decision making process (with exceptions like Tseng et al, 2007; 
Flores and Aguilera, 2007; Calof and Beamish, 1995).  
Decide where to place the multinational foreign activity is a crucial decision, even in 
(or especially in) the actual globalized environment. When moving abroad, managers must 
balance the benefits and costs (e.g. adaptation, institutional environment, government 
policies, etc.) of moving to one region or another of the globe, especially attentive to the 
similarities or differences between home and host country. That’s why it is so important to 
distinguish between related and unrelated geographic diversification.  
Vachani (1991), for example, suggested that geographic component of multinational 
diversity should be split into related and unrelated geographic diversification. To him, the 
relatedness of geographical diversification is the dispersion of multinational’s activities across 
countries within relatively homogenous (related) or heterogeneous (unrelated) cluster of 
countries. Vachani address the source of those similarities (or dissimilarities) among countries 
to institutional and economic factors like physical and cultural proximity, and level of 
economic development.  
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Goerzen and Beamish (2003), when examining how geographic scope is associated 
with firm performance, highlighted that the concept of geographic scope should not be treated 
as unidimensional, and split it into two related variables: international asset dispersion – or 
the spread of multinational assets across foreign countries – and country environment 
diversity – or the range of institutional and cultural differences among host and home 
countries.   
In fact, the impact (benefits and costs) of moving within regional or global markets 
can be completely different.  Multinational enterprises that expand regionally-based have the 
benefits to achieve all the economic advantages of scale and scope without the additional 
business risks of operating far from its home base. According to Rugman and Brain (2003), it 
will occur if the MNE sells the same product and/or service in the same manner within the 
home-triad region (North America, Europe, and Asia-Pacific, to those authors), which allows 
the firm gaining all the potential economies of scale and scope and/or differentiation 
advantages. Additionally, the additional scale, scope or differentiation advantages derived 
from expansions to unrelated markets are not sufficient to compensate for the enhanced risks.  
The presence of the company in multiple diverse environments can be critical to its 
governance, because of rivalry of competition in other triad regions, government influences 
and protection of domestic industries, buyer preferences for local products, cultural and 
administrative idiosyncrasies as compared to the home region, and knowledge transferability 
to distant locations. 
To conclude, when analyzing the host country factors determining foreign location 
choices of US multinationals, Flores and Aguilera (2007) highlighted the power of an 
integrative framework considering both economic and institutional-cultural arguments in 
explaining foreign location choice independently, as well as when they are taken 
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simultaneously. Apart from the contributions cited above, a number of other contributions 
have improved our knowledge of the importance of this strategic decision, most of them 
dealing with it like an independent choice. On the next chapters we start our analysis of an 
interdependent model for both entry mode and location relatedness decision and propose 
some testable hypothesis. 
2.2 THEORIES ON INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS  
In the last years, several scholars dedicated their efforts in discussing the geography of 
international business. Competing theories were used to establish why firms expand to foreign 
markets and their benefits and costs of those diversifications. In general, most of the 
explanation regarding foreign direct investment (FDI) is rooted on economic theory. That’s 
one of the reasons that the main explanatory variables rests on transaction costs. Below we 
synthesize the main theories on the international business.  
In general, the explanations on international business can be divided in two groups, 
being the first the theories or models that seek to explain why firms invest in the foreign 
markets or the existence of FDI (The Hymer’s Monopolistic Advantage Theory, The Product 
Life Cycle Model and The Evolutionary or Stages Model), and the second group concentrates 
the discussion on how those investments are made or why cross-border value added activities 
are organized in one way rather than another (The TC/Internalization Theory and The Eclectic 
Paradigm). Additionally, in this second group we also review alternative models like the 
Organizational Capability (OC), that question some of the fundaments of TC to explain the 
choice of firm entry mode.  
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2.2.1 The Hymer’s Contribution  
Stephen Hymer, in his 1960 Ph.D. thesis, published in 1976, provides an explanation 
for the existence of the MNE based on microeconomic foundations by bringing the focus 
from the nation to the firm using industrial organization theory (Sukpanich, 2005), and is best 
known for its application of an industrial organizational approach to the theory of foreign 
production (Dunning, 1992). To Dunning and Rugman (1985:228), the pioneering conceptual 
insight of Hymer was to “break out of the arid mold of international trade and investment 
theory and focus attention upon the MNE per se”. Hymer and his followers argued that MNEs 
have unique assets, sometimes called monopolistic advantages, such as new and/or 
differentiated products, which they transfer abroad in order to reap monopolistic profits 
(Hennart, 2007). He suggests that the MNE has firm-specific advantages developed in 
response to either goods or factor market imperfections. These advantages include scale 
economies, product differentiation, knowledge, information, and managerial and distribution 
skills (Rugman 1980 and 1982, Dunning and Rugman 1985, Grubaugh 1987, and Hennart 
2001).  
To Hymer, the MNE is a result of market imperfections, and the MNE possess the 
ability to use its international operations to separate markets and remove competition, or to 
exploit an advantage. Control over the use of assets transferred abroad is required by the 
MNE in order to minimize risks and to achieve monopolistic power (Dunning and Rugman, 
1985).  
The fundamental characteristic of FDI is that it involves no change in the ownership of 
resources or rights transferred, whereas indirect investment, which is transacted through the 
market, do necessitate a change in ownership (Duning, 1992:69) To Hymer (1976: 25), the 
control of a foreign subsidiary is a way to remove competition between that foreign enterprise 
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and enterprises in other countries, or to entirely appropriate the returns on certain skills and 
abilities. So, the existence of monopolistic advantages by the MNEs or its market power will 
permit those firms to develop it activities in a better condition, compared to its competitors.  
2.2.2 The Product Life Cycle Model 
Vernon (1966), rooted on economic theory, developed a theory to international 
business. To Vernon, the locational decision is consequence of the product life cycle – early 
stage or new product, mature product, and standardized product – giving special importance 
not only to costs but other locational variables (like patent protections, level of tariff 
protection anticipated for the future, labor costs, political situation of the country, etc.), that 
determine the foreign expansion of U.S. companies to advanced or less developed countries.  
Vernon argued that the ownership advantages of the US firms , specially their 
innovative capacity, was determined by the structure and pattern of US factor endowments 
and markets, moving its unit of analysis from the market imperfection to the firm and the 
location of its production (Dunning, 1992).  
Based on Vernon’s model, early producers of a new product will be located (produced 
and delivered) in the home country. According to Vernon (1966: 195),the unstandardized 
nature of the design at this early stage carries with it a number of locational implications like: 
(1) producers at this stage are particularly concerned with the degree of freedom they have in 
changing their inputs, (2) the price elasticity of demand for the output of individual firms is 
comparatively low, because of the high degree of production differentiation or the existence 
of monopoly in the early stages, and (3) the need for immediate and effective communication 
with customers, suppliers, and even competitors is especially high at this stage.  
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At a later stage, or maturing products, as the demand for a product expands, a certain 
degree of standardization usually takes place. The need for flexibility declines, certain product 
standardization opens up the possibilities for achieving economies of scale, concern about 
production cost begins to take the place of concern about product characteristics. According 
to Vernon’s reasoning, at this stage the products are exported to other countries most similar 
to the home country in demand patterns and supply characteristics.  
Finally, at the last stage, the standardized or mature product, the necessity to minimize 
the costs of value-adding activities, the pressure to ensure cost efficiency because of imitators, 
because of the increasing of price elasticity of demand as labor becomes more important in 
the cost composition or because the expansion of foreign market, firms are more attracted to 
sit its value-added activities in a foreign location. Additionally, Vernon argues that if 
conditions in the host country are right, the subsidiary could replace exports from the parent 
company or even export back to it (Duning, 1992).        
2.2.3 The Evolutionary or Stages Model 
From a different standpoint – a gradualist and evolutionary model – scholars from the 
Nordic Scholl developed a model for the internationalization process of the firm, having some 
of its main contributions in the works from Johanson  and Wiedersheim, (1975) and Johanson 
and Vahlne (1977; 1990). Those authors advocate for a gradual commitment in the foreign 
markets, as the companies increase their knowledge about those markets and operations. The 
basic assumption of this model is that the necessary knowledge for international expansions 
can be acquired abroad, and the absence of such knowledge is an obstacle to the development 
of international operations. 
The stages model of internationalization relies on the concept of psychic distance to 
explain why firms choose higher levels of international activity as their experience grows. 
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According to this view, the foreign entrance will occur in the country/market more 
psychologically similar to the country of origin, since it represents less uncertainty to the 
company (Rialp i Criado, 1999). Additionally, the more managers are exposed to parts of the 
world that are culturally different (psychically distant) from their home country, the more 
comfortable they become with operating abroad (Nitsch, 1999), being the internationalization 
process, according to this model, a gradualist process of learning based on the experience, and 
able to generating new opportunities and reducing the uncertainty and risks from foreign 
markets (Rialp i Criado, 1999), leading to a greater willingness to commit resources to those 
markets. Firms will thus choose increasingly higher levels of ownership in their international 
activities, beginning with no investment at all, and proceeding in stages to wholly-owned 
subsidiaries (Nitsch, 1999), being the international experience the principal determinant of the 
firm entry mode choice. 
2.2.4 The Transaction Cost/ Internalization Theory 
Since the first empirical work by Williamson (1975), the Transaction Costs (TC) 
theory has become one of the most popular theories of the firm, and also served as source for 
numerous studies in diverse areas, especially in the international business literature.  
The foundations of TC rests on two basics assumptions – bounded rationality and 
opportunism – and three dimensions of transaction – asset specificity, uncertainty and 
frequency – (Williamson, 1975, 1985). Bounded rationality refers to the limited human 
being’s capacity to resolve complex problems.  Williamson describes opportunism as the 
search for one’s own interests with astuteness, and assumes that, because someone can behave 
opportunistically and that kind of behavior is difficult or impossible to identify ex-ante, it 
conduces to transaction costs to prevent this possible behavior.   
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Transaction specific assets, as its own name says, are assets specifics to a certain 
transaction, which cannot be easily redeployed to a different application outside the 
relationship of the parties of the transaction. This investment will have lower or no value in 
alternative uses. According to TC, this asset specificity can generate an opportunistic behavior 
by one of both parties of the transaction, what will engender costs for contracts safeguarding. 
As uncertainty, we understand the inability of the parties of a contract to, ex-ante, predict all 
the relevant contingencies surrounding an exchange. This contingencies can be external, 
which connotes the inability of an organization to predict future events (Milliken, 1987), and 
it often results from the volatility of environmental conditions in a host country (Hill and 
Kim, 1988), or internal, which manifest itself in a firm’s deficient experience in a foreign 
market (Zhao et al, 2004). The last dimension, frequency, refers to the extent to which 
transaction recur. This dimension has had little attention in the empirical literature. 
This theory, despite its vast acceptance and applicability, has raised lots of criticisms, 
especially concerning the opportunistic behavior. The literature based on transaction costs is 
structured in terms of the degree of control each mode affords the entrant, and has a critical 
impact on the future of a foreign enterprise, being the most important determinant of both risk 
and return (Anderson and Gatignon, 1986).   
Its basic premise is that firms will internalize those activities that they can perform at a 
lower cost, but will subcontract those activities externally if other providers have a cost 
advantage. When firms subcontract part of their operation to others firms, they inevitably face 
transaction-related costs (Pan and Tse, 2000). According to Andersen (1997), most of the 
studies on foreign markets entry mode made some modification on the transaction cost theory, 
including non-transaction cost benefits, which implies that the assumption of transaction cost 
minimization is abandoned.  
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The TC/Internalization Theory4 (Buckley and Casson, 1976, 1985; Rugman, 1981, 
1986; Caves, 1982; Hennart, 1982; Buckley, 1988, 1990; Casson, 1986, 1992) is primarily 
concerned with identifying the situations in which the markets for intermediate products are 
likely to be internalized, and those in which firms own and control value-added activities in 
foreign markets (Dunning, 1992); in other words, the TC/Internalization Theory seeks to 
explain why the cross-border transactions of intermediate products are organized by 
hierarchies rather than the market. Despite its similarities with Williasson’s TC, according to 
Hennart (2001) it was independently developed by Buckley and Casson (1976) and Hennart 
(1977, 1982), himself inspired in the work of McManus (1972). Still according to him it 
differs in a significant way from Williansson’s (1985) work, especially concerning the asset 
specificity, that plays an important role in TC explanation and is less central to why a MNE 
expand abroad in the case of the Internalization Theory. The core prediction of this theory is 
that given a particular distribution of factor endowments, MNE activity will be positively 
related to the costs of organizing cross border markets in intermediate products (Dunning, 
1992: 75) 
The TC/Internalization Theory of the multinational enterprise rests on two general 
axioms: (1) Firms choose the least cost location for each activity they perform, and (2) firms 
grow by internalizing markets up to the point where the benefits of further internalization are 
outweighed by the costs (Buckley and Casson, 1988: 181-182). The relevant factors for 
internalizing a market, established by Buckley and Casson (1976) are the industry specific 
factors (product character and market structure), the region specific factors (social and 
                                                 
 
4 Because of its similarities and joint development, both theories are normally referred in the 
international business literature as Transaction Costs/Internalization Theory. Here, only for 
information purpose, we decided to separate the two explanations, one for the original Williasson’s TC 
approach and other to the TC/Internalization Theory. In fact, to Rugman (1986), the internalization 
theory shall be considered the Transaction Costs of the Multinational Corporation. In the following 
chapters those will be referred simply by Transaction Costs (TC).  
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geographical), (3) nation specific factors (fiscal and political relations), and (4) factors 
specific to the company (managerial ability in the organization of internal markets) (Ramírez, 
1997).  To Caves (2007), the most satisfying explanation to the existence of the multinational 
company is that a MNE requires, first, that locational forces justify dispersing the world’s 
production so that plants are found in different national  markets, and that there must be some 
governance or transaction-cost advantage to placing the plants under common administrative 
control. 
According to Buckey and Casson (1988: 182), the original objective of the approach 
adopted by Buckley and Casson (1976) was to use the concept of internalization of markets to 
develop a model of the growth of the firm, being this concept abandoned by subsequent 
writers who take technological capability and/or marketing skills and/or management skills as 
given. Internalization's focus is on explaining why firms engage in foreign investment 
(Rugman 1980,1985), not necessarily on how they choose to structure those investments. 
Acording to Dunning (1992), TC/Internalization theory is not sufficient to explain the level 
and structure of the production of a country’s own firms outside their national boundaries, or 
of the production of foreign owned in its midst. Buckley (1990) asserted that internalization 
needs to be combined with locational and market power considerations "to give a satisfying 
picture of the rate and direction of growth of multinationals" (p. 198). Buckley (1987) and 
Casson (1987) have also acknowledged the need to integrate location-specific variables with 
internalization variables to a more complete theory of the MNE activity. This complete 
picture is integrated in the Dunning’s Eclectic Paradigm, explained in details in the next 
paragraphs.  
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2.2.5 Dunning’s Eclectic Paradigm 
Another explanation to the existence of multinational enterprises comes from 
Dunning’s eclectic paradigm. The Eclectic Paradigm has its origins in the mid 50’s, where in 
his PhD thesis Dunning suggested the Anglo-American productivity differences were partly 
explained by location (L) and part by ownership (O) specific characteristics. Latter in the 
70’s, after reviews in his studies and influenced by other authors like Buckley and Casson 
(1976), he finally includes the internalization advantages (I) in his paradigm. Resuming the 
OLI tripod, ‘O’ means the transferable intangible assets of the parent companies; ‘L’ means 
the non-transferable characteristics of a country or economy, like specific resources 
advantages and others and ‘I’ is considered another set of choices available to firms, which 
related to the way the firms organize the generation and use of the resources and capabilities 
within their jurisdiction and those they could access in different locations (Dunning, 2001). 
The key propositions of the eclectic paradigm are: the (net) competitive advantages which 
firms of one nationality possess over those of another nationality in supplying any particular 
market or set of markets; the extent to which firms perceive it to be in their best interests to 
internalize the markets; the extent to which firms choose to locate these value-adding 
activities outside their national boundaries.   
2.2.6 The Organizational Capabilities 
Alternatively to Transaction Costs arguments, new perspectives have been introduced, 
to explain the entry modes on international environments. The Organizational Capability 
(OC) perspective is based on the notions of bounded rationality. Close connected to Madhok’s 
(1997) framework, the OC is based on the Resource Based View (RBV) (Penrose, 1959), and 
shares the emphasis on experiential knowledge as noted by Johanson and Vahlne (1977, 
1990). The Organizational Capability criticizes not only the opportunistic behavior 
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assumption from TC but also one of the main arguments of TC that affirms a firm exists due 
to market failure. According to this point of view, the assumption of opportunism is not 
needed, only the differential costs in the transmission of knowledge within the firm as 
opposed to between firms. Since the cost of transferring this knowledge differs among firms, 
it shall have an effect in the desirability to transfer technology within the firm or by license 
(Kogut and Zander 1993).  
Another important aspect of this perspective is the distinction made between cost and 
value in the management of firm’s know-how: since the TC talk about on cost minimization, 
the OC defines value in terms of the potential rent-generating abilities of an asset or know-
how. Additionally, according to Madhok (1997:40), while the internalization perspective 
focuses solely on the TC involved and market failure, the OC looks at the limits to firms’ 
capabilities, and hierarchical failure. Where the internalization perspective focuses only on 
exploitation of firm advantage, OC also looks at the development of such advantage. Where 
internalization focuses solely on cost minimization in transacting with a partner, OC also 
looks at the benefits of doing so.  
To Madhok (1997), the OC perspective views the firm essentially as a bundle of 
relatively static and transferable resources, which are then transformed into capabilities 
through dynamic and interactive firm-specific processes (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993) where 
individual skills, organization and technology are inextricably woven together (Nelson and 
Winter, 1982). Capability accumulation is a dynamic process and the firm’s knowledge base 
is developed and integrated into the functioning of the organization. This process is closely 
dependent on the relatedness of new flows of knowledge through current strategies to the 
existing stock of knowledge (Cool and Schendel, 1988; Johanson and Vahlne, 1977; Carlson, 
1973, 1974), and is largely idiosyncratic to the firm. These information management 
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capabilities are what make firms “repositories of embedded knowledge” (Badaracco 1991: 
129), the embeddedness of the underlying processes both limiting transferability and 
imitability and, consequently, providing sustainability of rents. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
3. INTERNATIONALIZATION AND FIRM PERFORMANCE: THE S-CURVE 
HYPOTHESIS UNDER THE EUROZONE CONTEXT 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Nowadays, the degree of economic interdependence among countries is growing 
enormously, an experience known as globalization.  This growth in interdependence is 
confirmed by increases in the cross-border flow of goods, services, capital, and knowledge 
(Hitt et al, 1999).  
By introducing a new set of competitors, local companies might face more disruptive 
competition. Those foreign companies, usually owner of significantly different sources of 
competitive advantage, increase competition in such a way that compels the domestic firms to 
rise a ‘world class’ level to remain competitive (Lucas, 1993; Bowen and Wiersema, 2005). 
On the other hand, despite this apparent advantage to the foreign firms such as cited above, 
local uncertainties are always present,  featuring to the international arena both opportunities 
and threats for firms seeking strategic competitiveness in global markets (Hitt et al, 1999).  
Based on this fickle environment, the best understanding of the relation international 
diversification – performance is fundamental. Managers and scholars must understand which 
variables most affect the firm performance behavior. Knowing that, firms can best determine 
how to apply their resources and capabilities efficiently. Additionally, firms must understand 
how those resources and capabilities can be a constraint to their increasing expansion to new 
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regional markets (regional diversification) and new product areas (product diversification), 
configuring this expansion in a way that best optimize this expansion, and: (1) improve their 
learning curve to reduce the low results in the first stages of internationalization, and (2) make 
compatible their expansion to their capabilities, to postpone or avoid thresholds of 
internationalization, where the costs surpass the benefits.  Governments can also benefit from 
this knowledge, since it can create favorable conditions to attract those multinational to their 
countries. 
Despite the large amount of researchers dealing with the international diversification – 
performance relation, and it has become one of the mayor topics of the management literature, 
a general consensus hasn’t been reached yet, reason for why this research stream is still 
moving so much efforts in the academic world. To Palich et al (2000), a research stream can 
be considered as mature when (1) a substantial number of empirical studies have been 
conducted, (2) these studies have generated reasonably consistent and interpretable findings 
and (3) the research has led to a general consensus concerning the nature of key relationships. 
Analyzing the main researches done up to date, we are able to see that the international 
diversification – performance relationship does not come up to scratch, since the last two 
criteria were not fully satisfied.  
Considering that, in this chapter we analyze the gains in performance of international 
diversified firms applied to the Eurozone, testing all those conflicting relations explored in the 
literature (linear, quadratic and cubic). We believe so much divergence is partly due to past 
studies’ samples (industry biased, capturing just part of an entire model), or the authors just 
ignored the possible existence of a more complete approach like the sigmoid model. We also 
believe that this recurrent conflict postpones the evolution of the international diversification 
theory.   
 55 
 
Furthermore, most of the bibliography developed, predominantly dealt with US 
samples (Rugman, 1976; Aggarwal, 1979; Ramaswamy, 1993; Tallman and Li, 1996 and 
others), with few exceptions (Mathur et al, 2004: Grant, 1987: Grant, et al, 1988 and others), 
what can lead to affect the generalization of the results, since US companies profile vary in 
size and behavior from European firms, for example, when decide to move out of its borders. 
Additionally, the samples of those studies, even the non U.S.’s, deals with single countries 
and does not incorporate the firm’s regional orientation in the discussion (with few exceptions 
like Li, 2005) . From the Eurozone perspective, we can depict the behavior of a large 
community with several countries, which regardless of the common currency and some 
common politics, has its own behavior and idiosyncrasies. 
Additionally, we will move a step forward on the relation, analyzing if those results 
are affected or not by the level of regional diversification a firm has, and more specifically, if 
the regional expansion within the European Community provide better performance to the 
Eurozone firms.  As already introduced, this study is performed under the Eurozone 
perspective, because of its position of one of the main actors in the international market and 
increasing importance in the global economy, nowadays competing in a stronger manner for 
the same markets than U.S. and Japanese companies. 
The discussion about the regional characteristic of firm international expansion has 
greatly evolved in the last years, basically starting from a challenging study from Rugman 
(2000), where he affirms that the globalization is a “myth”. Those ideas were latter discussed 
by Rugman and Brain (2003), and the main proposition of those studies is that only few 
multinationals are really global. According to them, most multinational firms are regionally-
oriented, and they conclude that the strategic management of international business must be 
regionally focused, and not globally focused. This, alone, is already a good reason to review 
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the behavior of this important relation between international and regional diversification and 
firm performance. Are the benefits and costs of regional and global expansion the same? How 
will it behave? 
At the same time that the Rugman and collegues’ view seems a radical view of the 
international expansion process, one can note an evolution in the regional trade agreements, 
like EUROPEAN UNION, NAFTA, ASEAN or MERCOSUR, what are, in sum, mechanisms 
to enhance the free movement of goods, services and factors of production, the establishment 
of common tariffs or currency, the adoption of a common commercial policy, the 
coordination of macroeconomic policies and harmonization of laws in the areas it applies. 
This, at the end, will result in a better environment for trade, boosting the regional commerce.  
Apart from those structural conditions that will facilitate the regional integration, the 
international expansion must be viewed, primarily from the firm’s perspective; in other 
words, the applicability of its resources in a new environment, the benefits of a new 
expansion and its costs. That’s why is so important to distinguish between related and 
unrelated geographic diversification, a concept highlighted by Vachani (1991) and not so 
explored in the literature. Vachani defines related geographical diversification as the 
expansion by multinational's activities across countries within a relatively homogeneous 
cluster of countries. In our case, those homogeneous countries refer to the regional expansion: 
considering a firm is expanding its core business and the resources and capabilities necessary 
to those expansions, expanding through regional markets will enhance the transference, 
applicability and adaptation of firm specific advantages, and shall also reduce the liability of 
foreignness in the first stages of firms’ expansion.    
Finally, we investigate the influence of the most explored moderator in the 
international diversification – performance literature: the product diversification. According 
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to Hitt et al (2006), product diversification as a corporate strategy has been considered more 
than a risk-reduction tool. It has been recognized as a means for increased market power (Hitt 
et al., 1994), capitalizing on economies of scale (Teece, 1982), using excess resources 
(Penrose, 1959), and reducing transaction costs (Amit and Livnat, 1988).  
In this chapter we take into consideration not only account based measures of 
performance, but also market based measures. Most of the diversification literature deals with 
accounting based measures to capture the firms’ performance. Despite this dominance of 
accounting based studies, Hoskisson et al (1993) call the attention to the risk of using solely 
accounting based measures, neglecting the market based measures, since accounting-based 
performance is oriented through the past, while market-based is oriented to expected future 
value. They found that market measures tended to be more highly intercorrelated than were 
typical accounting-based performance. At the same time, they defend the use of both 
measures, since accounting measures are the most applied in the literature and because of the 
large amount of literature that advocate for the use of those measures (e.g. Holzmann et al, 
1975). To Palich et al (2000), market-based measures can present greater consistence, since it 
can escape from the influence of managerial manipulations that may lead to short term 
distortions reflected in other measures of performance.  
This chapter is organized as follow: on the second section we review some important 
findings of previous literature and present the hypothesis; section three introduces the 
methodology; section four presents our empirical results and main findings; on section five 
we discuss the results found on the previous section; and finally on section six we provide a 
review of this chapter, commenting its main contributions, implications, limitations and 
possible future directions.  
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3.2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS 
3.2.1 Expanding Internationally – Advantages to the Firm 
International diversification is the primary international corporate-level strategy. It can 
be understood as a strategy through which a firm expands the sale of its goods or services 
across the borders of global regions into different geographic locations or markets (Hitt et al, 
1999).  Thus, one of the main motives for firm’s international expansion outside its borders is 
that international markets shall represent an important source of new opportunities, and 
exploiting those opportunities is a significant source of performance improving. Some of 
those key opportunities are: economies of scale and scope, learning (and innovation) 
opportunities, access to key resources, risk reduction, and bargaining power. As can be seen, 
most of those opportunities are derived from the resource-based view of the firm, since an 
international and product expansion gives the firm the possibility to explore the 
interdependencies between business units, fostering the development of new capabilities, 
improvement of existing ones, prompting innovation and competitive advantage.  We briefly 
resume those opportunities below:  
Economies of scope: expanding internationally favor the firm exposure to a wide 
source of new advantages, and the most known are the economies of scope and scale, above 
and beyond the potential of product diversification (Grant et al, 1988; Kim et al, 1993, Caves, 
1996). Economies of scope are the result of a common production factor (e.g.: specialized and 
indivisible physical assets, technological know-how, organizational know-how, brand names). 
It occurs when the costs of the joint production of two or more products are cheaper than 
producing each product individually. Another source of scope economies is greater returns on 
mayor capital investments in new product and process developments (Hitt et all, 1999). To 
Ghoshal (1987), the strategic importance of scope economies arises from an aptitude, when 
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comparing diversified firms with their not diversified counterparts: the ability to share 
investments and costs across the same or different value chains. According to Rumelt (1982), 
three conditions must be met if there are to be economies of scope: (1) increasing returns (or 
indivisibilities) to scale in the use of one or more essential factors of production, (2) 
transaction costs prevent an efficient market in relevant factors, forcing integration, and (3) 
there are limits on obtaining increased factor utilization by expanding the output of any single 
end-product.  
Economies of scale: occurs when a higher activity level increases the benefits through 
a higher production factor’s specialization (technological know-how, organizational know-
how, brand names). According to Ghoshal (1987), despite of being a static concept, the scale 
can foster dynamic benefits like experience and learning effect, when the higher volume that 
helps firms to exploit scale benefits allows it to accumulate learning and this leads to a 
progressive cost reduction. 
Learning (and innovation) opportunities: the diversity of national markets exposes 
firms to a variety of stimuli which provides firms with a broader learning opportunity and the 
ability to develop more diverse capabilities that can be deployed across the organization. 
Thus, international diversity fosters innovation and prepares firms to achieve good results in a 
dynamic environment (Kogut, 1983; Ghoshal, 1987; Kim et al, 1993).  
Access to key resources: another important source of opportunities to the 
internationally diversified firm is the possibility to access to the key resources of each 
location (country specific resources, technology, raw material, lower labor costs, etc.), 
configuring it in a way that minimizes the overall costs.  
Risk reduction: Hamel and Prahalad (1985) and Kim et al (1993) point out that market 
diversification provides a firm with multiple national market bases from which it can retaliate 
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against aggressive moves made by competitors, reducing the risk of aggressive challenges 
from its competitors.  
 Bargaining power: reduction of the effect of adverse changes in a country’s political and 
economical environment or demand fluctuation. Compared to their local counterparts or other 
local actors such as unions and governments, large multinationals can have more bargaining 
power due to their ability to move assets quickly between countries (Thomas and Eden, 2004)  
3.2.2 Expanding Internationally – Costs to the firm 
As depicted above, expanding into new markets and products presents several 
advantages, most of them arising from the resource based view, which affirms that 
international diversification will benefit from the use of international resources and 
capabilities to exploit market imperfections. 
Despite those benefits, performing operations across countries usually raise several 
new costs to the firm. According to Rumelt (1982), diversification occurs when a firm 
expands to make and sell products having no market interaction (zero cross price- elasticity) 
with each of the firm’s other products. In other words, the firm’s products are not substitutes 
of each other. Because of this lack of interaction, the firm must have its focus on the shared 
factor of production and organizational efficiency. Hence, the proper level of product 
diversity must make the balance of economies of scope and diseconomies of organizational 
scale. 
In general, the costs faced by the firm will vary depending on the experience of the 
firm in past international expansions. In other words, early internationalizers will face 
different costs from high internationalized firms. In the first stages of internationalization, the 
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main costs associated to the international expansion are those deriving from the liability of 
foreignness.  
Liability of foreignness can be understood as every cost a foreign firm incurs in an 
international market that their host counterparts will not incur. Those costs can arise from 
those related to the distance (transportation, coordination over distance and time zones, and 
others), from the unfamiliarity of the company with the local idiosyncrasies or from 
establishing the companies legitimacy abroad (Zaheer, 1995). The degree of those liabilities 
of foreignness that a firm will face will depend in part of the structural dimension of the 
foreign market this company is inserted (cultural values, levels of development or 
institutions), and their skills in managing past entries and operations in foreign markets (Hill 
et al, 2006). The ability in managing a company in a diverse country is a fundamental variable 
of success and the experience of the managers in previous diverse environment also influence 
this adaptation process.   
Despite the costs of being new and foreignness tend to reduce with increasing 
international experience, some new costs appears with increasing international diversification.   
From the TCE view, the geographic dispersion, up to a point, increases managerial 
information and processing demands. The coordination between units, essentially to the 
exploitation of economies of scope and scale, becomes much more difficult, and firms must 
develop a strong ability to manage the global needs. The distance from the sourcing decision 
can raise problems of coordination and information asymmetries among the subsidiaries. 
Tallman and Li (1996) suggest that the ability to manage this complex system of 
international subsidiaries at a low transaction cost level is the key capability of successful 
multinational firms, and adds that although international diversification may have governance 
cost limits to its scope, this limits can be expanded with the increasing of firm capabilities.  
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3.2.3 Geographic Diversification and Firm Performance 
Following the Rugman’s (1979) logic that a firm diversify its operations 
internationally to explore market imperfections, many empirical studies were developed in the 
sense of proving a linear and positive relation between geographic diversification and 
performance (Lu and Beamish, 2004). Not surprising and despite some mix results (Brewer, 
1981; Rugman, 1983; Aggarwal y Soenen, 1987, …), most of the studies found a positive 
relationship between international diversification and performance (Vernon, 1971; Aggarwal, 
1979; Ramaswamy, 1993, …).  
What is not considered in most of those studies, and vital to explaining the 
international diversification – performance relation is the fact that every diversification is 
affected by some costs, partially caused by product diversification. Product diversification, 
related or unrelated, in spite of its benefits of economies of scope, scale, share of R&D 
resources and others, favor costs generated by coordination and information.  
Taking this on reflection, researches start to consider in their studies the effect of 
product diversification, sometimes as a common independent variable and sometimes 
moderating the international diversification effect on performance (Miller and Pras, 1980; 
Grant, 1987; Grant et al, 1988; Geringer et al, 1989, Tallman and Li, 1996, …). As a result of 
those studies, non linear models were developed. 
The inverted u-form (Geringer et al, 1989; Hitt et al, 1997) calls attention to the 
existence of a threshold of internationalization. Hill et al (1997) indeed recognize the benefits 
of performing activities internally on the international diversification move (like economies of 
scale, scope, learning, …, all of them explored on the preceding items), but they believe there 
are significant costs associated to the international expansion that must be considered. To 
them, international diversification is complex and difficult to manage, and escalating 
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geographic dispersion can enormously enhance transaction costs and managerial information-
processing demands.  
As a result of the transaction costs and processing demands, the costs of international 
diversification will sometimes exceed the benefits of the diversification, suggesting an 
inverted U-shaped form between multinationality and performance relation. According to 
those authors, the point it happens (the threshold) will vary from firm to firm depending on 
the managerial skills contained in a firm.   
Less diffused but also consistent are the advocators of a regular U-curve. Lu and 
Beamish (2001), analyzing a sample of 164 small to medium Japanese enterprises (SMEs) 
found the opposite from Hill and colleagues, since for that sample, a regular U-shaped form 
relationship between international diversification and performance was established. To those 
authors, different from big and well internationalized firms (where the main concerns are 
related to the downward exerted on performance by increasing governance and coordination 
costs on high internationalization levels), to SMEs the primary concern is related to the 
liability of foreignness.  
Because of those liabilities, SMEs may not capture the benefits of foreign direct 
investment in the first stage of internationalization. At later stages, those liabilities can be 
reduced as firm increases it experience on FDI, and the effect on performance start to grow 
positively, configuring the regular U-form. The same U-form was found by Capar and Kotabe 
(2003) when testing for German service firms. According to them, in the first stages of 
international expansion service firms must undertake much higher investment than their 
manufacturing counterparts, which generally start their international expansion by exporting 
to host countries.  
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Other reasons presented by the authors to the declining initial performance of the 
internationally diversified service firms are: (1) host country restrictions and regulations in the 
service industries to the foreign involvements (e.g.: ownership restrictions, domestic 
preference policies, unfavorable tax treatments, …), (2) service firms must be more adapted to 
the client culture and language comparing to the manufacturing firms, since the service sector 
requires intensive customer contact and extensive customization, and (3) while in the 
manufacturing sector the goods are generally first produced and then sold and then consumed, 
in the service sector the product is first sold and there is an inseparability between the produce 
and consume stages. Because of that, very often the buyer must have intimate contact with the 
production process, what requires a local facility. 
Those apparent conflictive but in reality complementing results, conduced some 
researches to a three stage theory of international expansion, the S-curve. TABLE 3.1 
summarizes some empirical studies of the relationship between international diversification 
and firm performance.  
Lu and Beamish (2004), analyzing data from Japanese firms during a period of 12 
years, found a horizontal S-shaped relation between those variables. The same S-curve 
relation between international expansion and performance was found by Contractor et al 
(2003), when analyzing the service sector and recently confirmed by Chang and Wang 
(2007). The idea under the S-curve formulation is a combination of the arguments of both 
regular and inverted U advocators. In fact, as our results will demonstrate, those studies that 
suggest the regular or inverted U captured part of a complete model, being it the first or 
second stage of an S-curve, respectively.  
The reasons for this could be (1) the samples were industry or size biased, capturing 
just part of the entire model, since in the first U-case samples of large manufacturing firms 
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with past international experience were used to capture the effects and in the second U-case 
samples of small and medium enterprises was applied or (2) the authors just ignored the 
possible existence of a cubic term on their models.  
TABLE 3.1 – Empirical studies – International diversification x performance relation 
 Source: Author 
 
Author(s) and years Performance variable Relation
Vernon (1971) ROI, ROS Linear +
Aggarwal (1979) PER, Risk (β) Linear +
Errunza and Senbet (1981, 1984) excess return Linear +
Kim and Lyn (1987) excess market value, Tobin´s Q Linear +
Buhner (1987) ROA, ROE Linear +
Grant (1987) ROA, ROE, ROS Linear +
Grant et al . (1988) ROA, ROE, ROS Linear +
Doukas and Travlos (1988) degree of international operations Linear +
Haar (1989) ROA Linear +
Han et al.  (1998) ROE, asset turnover, profit margin Linear +
Delios and Beamish (1999) operating income/total sales, ROE Linear +
Brewer (1981) Stock return Linear -
Siddharthan and Lall (1982) Sales growth Linear -
Michel and Shaked (1986) Risk-adjusted return Linear -
Collins (1990) Total risk, debt to equity ratio, β Linear -
Geringer,Tallman&Olsen (2000) ROA, ROS Linear -
Denis, Denis and Yost (2002) Variation of excess value Linear -
Buckley et al . (1978, 1984) ROA no relationship
Morck and Yeung (1991) Market value no relationship
Sambharya (1995) ROE, ROA, ROS, FROA, FROS no relationship
Quian (1997) ROE U-shaped
Lu and Beamish (2001) ROA, ROS U-shaped
Capar and Kotabe (2003) ROS U-shaped
Ruigrok and Wagner (2003) ROA U-shaped
Daniels and Bracker (1989) ROA, ROS Inverted U-shaped
Geringer et al. (1989) ROA, ROS Inverted U-shaped
Sullivan (1994 a,b) ROA, ROS Inverted U-shaped
Hitt et al.  (1994) R&D intensity, ROA Inverted U-shaped
Ramaswamy (1995) ROA, ROS, ROVA Inverted U-shaped
Talman and Li (1996) ROS, ROA Inverted U-shaped
Hitt et a l.(1997) ROA Inverted U-shaped
Gomes and Ramaswamy (1999) ROA, ROS Inverted U-shaped
Kotabe et al .(2002) sales to operating costs ratio, ROA Inverted U-shaped
Contractor et al (2003) ROS, ROA S-shaped
Lu and Beamish (2004) ROA S-shaped
Thomas and Eden (2004) ROA, ROE, excess and average mkt value S-shaped
Chang and Wang (2007) Tobin's Q S-shaped
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Some of the main benefits of an international expansion are the exploitation of scale 
economies, learning and innovation opportunities, access to key resources, and bargaining 
power. On the other hand, at early stages of international expansion the firm faces liabilities 
of foreignness and (1) are not able to best explore the economies of scale and learning 
opportunities, (2) does not possess the ability to configure local key resources in a way that 
minimizes the overall costs, because of company’s unfamiliarity with the local idiosyncrasies 
and (3) has not the sufficient bargaining power, since it has not established its legitimacy in 
the host country. Summarizing, in the first stages of international expansion those liabilities 
will hinder the full exploitation of the international expansion benefits in such a way that will 
engender a declining of performance (see TABLE 3.2).  
With increasing international experience, development of new capabilities, 
diminishing costs of being new and foreign, and expansion of the international operation, the 
firm starts to benefit from the international expansion. But when this expansion starts to grow 
to more and more countries and subsidiaries, the costs of governance and coordination rises 
up to a point that the costs involved supplant its benefits. 
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TABLE 3.2 – The idea under the S-curve hypothesis  
Stage of 
internationalization First Stage: Second Stage: Third Stage: 
Firm 
Characteristics . Early internationalizers 
. Medium term 
international 
diversification 
. High international 
diversification 
Characteristics 
. Liability of foreignness    
.                                          
. Firm not able to best 
explore the economies of 
scale and learning 
opportunities                      
.                                          
. Firm does not possess 
the ability to best 
configure local key 
resources in a way that 
minimizes the overall 
costs, because of 
company’s unfamiliarity 
with the local 
idiosyncrasies                     
.                                          
. Firm has not the 
sufficient bargaining 
power, since it has not 
established its legitimacy 
in the host country 
. Increasing learning 
experience reduces 
liabilities of foreignness      
.                                            
. Development of 
capabilities                          
.                                           
. Exploitation of 
economies of scope and 
scale                 .                  
. Increased bargaining 
power                                   
.                                           
. Increasing international 
diversity fosters 
innovation and prepares 
firms to achieve good 
results in a dynamic 
environment 
. High transaction costs 
because of excessive 
multinationality                
.                                         
. Problems of  
coordination and 
information 
asymmetries among the 
subsidiaries           
Performance 
behavior . Diminishing results . Increasing results . Diminishing results 
Curve orientation 
      
 
Based on the aforementioned and taking in consideration our sample profile, we 
construct the S-hypothesis below: 
Hypothesis 1: The relationship between international diversification and firm 
performance is sigmoid, with the slope negative at low stages of geographic 
diversification, positive at moderate levels and negative at high levels of geographic 
diversification.  
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3.2.4 The Effect of Regional Diversification  
To further understand the relation between international diversification and firm 
performance, we need to further analyze the benefits and costs of those expansions, and most 
important, the geography of those expansions. In the last section we discussed the benefits 
and costs of geographical expansion, however at a macro level, not distinguishing its 
relevance or applicability in the regional expansion (within the European market). Can the 
firm regional orientation influence the impact of those benefits and costs in such a way that 
the influence the relation between international diversification and firm performance? In this 
section we will deal with this important question.   
Some of the already mentioned key opportunities from international expansions are 
the exploitation of economies of scale and scope, learning (and innovation) opportunities, 
access to key resources, risk reduction, and increasing of firm’s bargaining power. Those 
advantages derive mainly from Transaction Costs/Internalization Theory and the Resource 
Based View. Dunning’s (1977, 1980, 1988) and his eclectic paradigm synthesize  those 
theories and other FDI theories, and suggests that in addition to firm-specific advantages and 
internalization benefits, location advantages are also important underlying factors of a firm 
international activity, because of market opportunities and country-specific advantages.  
Despite not always explicitly, both internalization theory and the eclectic paradigm 
tend to argue that the need for leveraging firm-specific advantages underlies the propensity of 
a firm’s internationalization (Li, 2007), and are important factors in determining the 
performance of MNEs (Dunning, 1981; Rugman, 1981b). However, the technologies, 
organizational structures, and operating routines applied in the home-market are not fully 
transferable to a foreign location without significant modifications. So, raises the question: Is 
every firm-specific advantage fully transferable across borders? It’s an important question to 
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the international business literature, but only recently (Rugman and Verbeke, 1992, 2001, 
2003) those concepts were refined, to enhance our comprehension on how transferable are 
those FSA, or if those FSA present some location-boundedness5 (see Chapter 4 for an 
extensive review). Those questions are posed by Rugman and Verbeke (2005: 12) an in 
interesting way:  
“Why would most American, European, and Asian MNEs in a single industry have a 
concentration of their sales in their home region, if they (a) possess proprietary knowledge 
that is internationally transferable/exploitable, (b) can benefit from similar internalization 
advantages associated with FDI, building upon this proprietary knowledge, and (c) most 
importantly, face similar location advantages critical to successful market-seeking 
investment?” Rugman and Verbeke (2005: 12) 
The answer could be that the costs of moving to regional location are not the same of 
moving to non-regional markets. To Rugman and Verbeke (2005), the firm’s ability to link its 
FSAs with location advantages abroad will determine the scope of geographical expansion. In 
other words, the international performance is constrained by the firm’s ability to successfully 
adapt its existing FSAs to the Country Specific Advantages (CSAs). In that sense, they 
suggest that many non-location bound FSAs can only be exploited efficiently in the home-
region. At the same time, if the firms want to redeploy its location bound FSA developed in 
the home-region across the home-region, it is feasible since the costs of transference and 
                                                 
 
5 A non-location bound FSA may reflect a functional, production-related proprietary asset, typically 
technological, manufacturing or marketing knowhow, or it may refer to an organizational capability to 
efficiently coordinate and control the MNE’s asset base. Non-location bound FSA typically lead to 
scope economies and can be transferred abroad at low marginal costs and used effectively in foreign 
operations without substantial adaptation. There are also some kinds of FSA that can only be exploited 
by particular individual firms or group of firms in specific locations. Such advantage, referred as 
location-bound firm-specific advantages (LFSA), comes from firm-specific resources owned by firms 
operating in a particular location.  
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adaptation of those FSAs will be much lesser than if the same were done in a heterogeneous 
market.  
So, briefly comparing the main advantages from international diversification applied 
to the regional context, we can list: 
TABLE 3.3 – Comparative table from the benefits from Regional and Total International 
Expansion 
Benefits Regional Expansion 
Economies of scope As one of the main benefits from related product diversification, economies of 
scope shall be best exploited in the regional (related) context. The sharing of 
common production factors will be less costly if, for example (1) specialized 
physical assets can be transported at lower costs (lower distances), (2) 
technological know-how can be transferred and applied with less adaptation 
and costs, (3) organizational know-how is easily transmitted and 
comprehended, or (5) the ability to share investments and costs can be made 
in a common currency. This all can be achieved at reduced costs in the 
regional context, boosting the benefits o economies of scope in the regional 
environment.   
Economies of scale Enhanced in the regional context, because of the reduced necessity of 
adaptation and improved learning curve.   
Learning and innovation 
opportunities 
Enhanced in the regional context, since the knowledge transference will be 
more effective in situations of reduced cultural distance.  
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TABLE 3.3 (cont.) – Comparative table from the benefits from Regional and Total 
International Expansion 
Access to key resources Country specific resources, technology, raw material and other key resources 
can be best configured and exploited in the regional context, because of the 
easier flow of people, reduced trade tariffs, smaller physical distance. Product-
specific investment across borders is also favored by regional trade 
agreements, favoring capital, labor, and knowledge integration. 
Risk Reduction Similar from International diversification. The main drawback is that the firms 
are more exposed to the fluctuations in the regional economic environment.  
Bargaining power Improved in the regional context. Because of the regional agreements, firms 
are less exposed from adverse changes in a country’s political environment. 
Acting as regional “locals” provide the firms better conditions to negotiate 
with other local actors such as unions and governments, improving the 
bargaining power. 
 
Considering that reading, similarly to the benefits of regional expansions, the theory of 
costs of international expansion must be revisited, to be applied to the regional framework. If 
in the last section we identified the liability of foreignness6 as the main cost a firm will face in 
the first stages of internationalization, in the regional context the multinational companies will 
face a homologous cost, named liability of inter-regional foreignness. Concerning those 
liabilities, Rugman and Verbeke (2004) suggest that only in locations where the MNE’s home 
                                                 
 
6 Every cost a foreign firm incurs in an international market that their host counterparts will not incur. 
Those costs can arise from those related to the distance (transportation, coordination over distance and 
time zones, and others), from the unfamiliarity of the company with the local idiosyncrasies or from 
establishing the companies legitimacy abroad (Zaheer, 1995). 
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region FSAs are valued by customers (like regional markets), because of its easier market 
penetration, the learning and adaptation process will be faster, in the sense of an incremental 
accumulation of host region experience. As a result, the costs derived from the liability of 
foreignness (in that case, liability of inter-regional foreignness) will be reduced or earlier 
overcame, compared to non-regional expansions. Additionally to the transference of FSAs, 
other costs will be reduced in a regional context, like the costs of trading, tariffs, bargaining 
with governments or unions, transportations costs and coordination among different time 
zones.  
Taking all those arguments into account, it’s to expect differential performance of 
international diversification in the presence of the regional diversification. In other words, we 
expect that the most regional oriented a firm is, it will affect positively the relation between 
international diversification and performance, since the transaction costs and adaptation costs 
will be reduced to the regional expansion, as detailed above.  
Thus, we formulate:     
Hypothesis 2: Firms regional orientation will positively moderate the relation between 
international diversification and firm performance, in a way that the effect of 
international diversification on performance will be more favorable if a firm is more 
regional then global diversified. 
3.2.5 Interaction of Product and International Diversification 
 Product diversification is defined as the firm’s expansion into product markets new to 
that firm (Hitt et al, 1997), and has become one of the most investigated interactions in the 
diversification-performance literature. The impact of the product diversification on 
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performance, jointly with the international diversification construct, is a relation still far from 
consensus and the literature has examined this relation by several ways.  
Kim et al (1989) suggest that the impact of product diversification on performance 
may be contingent to the extent of a firm’s international market diversification. To Kim et al 
(1993), it is difficult to achieve a favourable performance with solely product diversification, 
being it related or unrelated, when controlling for the global market dimension. Sambharya 
(1995) also suggests that both product and international diversification are not profitable 
individually. On the other hand, the interaction of both variables would be beneficial to firm 
performance, since it can exploit advantages of both strategies, like globally economies of 
scale and scope, resource sharing and core competencies across business units, transfer skills 
across markets and products and gain from organizational learning.  
To Tallman and Li (1996), for one side, the relation among product diversity and 
performance is positive, significant and squared, which suggests a threshold of the benefits of 
product diversification on performance. By the other side, when examining the combined 
effect of international diversification and product diversity, they found only weak effects. 
Geringer and colleagues (1989, 2000), found no strong interactive effects of product 
diversification and international diversification on performance.    
Hitt et al (1994) suggest that international diversification is positively related to 
performance and positively moderates the relationship between product diversification and 
performance. To him, related and unrelated diversified firms benefit from internationalization: 
the first because it facilitates exploitation of business unit interdependencies and the last 
because it produces economies of scale and scope (Hitt et al, 2006).  
The long-term performance of internationally diversified firms may be based, at least 
partially, on their ability on developing product and process innovation (Hitt et al, 1997). 
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Based on that, to those authors, product diversification plays an important moderating role in 
their model. From a resource-based perspective, the experience with product diversification is 
a key on developing managerial capabilities. Those built capabilities will in the future provide 
the required ability to deal with complex challenges on the international business. Similarly to 
the international diversification strategy, some important reasons for a firm to assume both 
international and product expansion are the better opportunities to exploit the economies of 
scope and scale, learning and bargaining power, since prior experience in product 
diversification gives experience in the management of multiple product-markets, which can 
result on positive interactive effects of both product and international diversification (Hitt et 
al, 1997). Hitt and colleagues suggest that international diversification is negatively related to 
performance in non-diversified firms, positively related in highly product diversified firms 
and curvilinear in moderately product diversified firms.  
More recent studies like Chang and Wang (2007), in line with Hitt et al (1997), also 
considered product diversification as a moderator in the international diversification-
performance relationship, considering the greater opportunities to achieve synergies (or scope 
economies) as product diversified firms expand into multiple regional markets. Achieve 
synergies and economies in product and geographic markets simultaneously provide firms 
greater ability to compete efficiently in those markets (Hill et al, 1997).  They conclude for a 
positive influence of related product diversification strategy on the multinational firm’s 
performance, while unrelated product diversification strategy negatively moderates this 
relationship.  
Based on those arguments we formulate our next hypothesis considering that: 
managing an international business requires intense development of new capabilities and 
managerial skills; the development of those capabilities is enhanced by the exploitation of 
business synergies; different from single business firms, product diversified firms can explore 
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the inputs of multiple business (knowledge, physical and financial assets, managerial skills, 
…) to construct and develop internal capabilities;  international diversified firms that are also 
product diversified can use their experience and managerial skills in handle multi- product 
business to overcome some liabilities in a new and foreign environment.   
Hypothesis 3: Product diversification will positively moderate the relationship 
between international diversification and firm performance in a way that the effect of 
international diversification on performance will be more favourable under the 
presence of product diversification 
To capture the model and check if our hypothesis holds on different specifications, we 
test it under the three models: linear, quadratic and cubic. Our sample ranges from non-
product or non-internationally diversified firms to highly product and internationally 
diversified firms, is sector and size varied, and all composed by Eurozone firms. Doing so, we 
believe we can partially address in our study the sources of the empirical conflicting results 
from previous literature. To test if our results are sensitive to industry specific effects, and 
also check if there is a specific model to each sample, we also test subsamples of 
manufacturing and service firms independently.      
3.3 METHODOLOGY 
3.3.1 Sample 
Our hypothesis is tested using a sample of European firms, applying data from several 
Eurozone7 countries. Initially, our database was composed by 12 countries. Latter, 
Luxemburg, Portugal, Netherlands and Italia were removed from sample because of missing 
                                                 
 
7 In the period that comprises this study the Eurozone was composed by twelve countries: Austria, 
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Portugal, and 
Spain. From 2007 on, Slovenia was also included. 
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data. The source of our data comes from the Worldscope international database. The sample 
period ranges from 2001 to 2003.  
To overcome the temporal limitation in our study, and following previous researches 
(Geringer, Beamish and da Costa, 1989; Hitt et al, 1997), we decided to adopt a 3 years 
average for each variable in this study. We adopt this average (especially to the performance 
variable) to ensure that the account strategy decisions does not affect the results, since those 
decisions can make that in one year the performance variable changes excessively because of 
extraordinary benefits.  We also ensured that the international diversification profile remain 
unchanged during the period of study.  
The procedures cited above results in a sample of 500 firms, classified into sectors of 
manufacturing (SIC 20–39), service (SIC 15–17, 40–88) and others (SIC 01–14), in 
accordance with previous researches (Capar and Kotabe, 2003; Contractor et al., 2003; Chang 
and Wang, 2007). See Table 3.4. 
TABLE 3.4 – Subpopulation by country and industry group 
Country Manufacturing Service Others   Total 
Austria 12 7 0  19 
Belgium 17 16 3  36 
Finland 30 15 0  45 
France 46 45 1  92 
Germany 103 71 3  177 
Greece 16 6 3  25 
Ireland 6 8 0  14 
Italy 19 9 2  30 
Luxemburg 1 0 0  1 
Netherlands 19 17 0  36 
Portugal 5 10 0  15 
Spain 6 4 0   10 
Total 280 208 12   500 
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3.3.2 Variables 
International Diversification Measure  
As our measure of geographic diversification, we applied the Entropy Index. The 
diversification Entropy Index was originally created by Jacquemin and Berry (1979) to 
capture the relation between corporative diversification and growing. Since there, a wide 
range of researches of different areas have applied it into their studies. Hitt et al (1997) 
developed the entropy measure of international diversification to capture the extension of 
sales outside the domestic market. For this purpose and in presence of the lack of sales data in 
the country level, he used the sales of regional markets, thus capturing with his measure the 
regionalization. 
The entropy measure of international diversification is defined by: 
International Diversification =∑i [P i x ln(1/P i)], 
where Pi is the sales attributed to the global market region i and ln(1/Pi) is the weight given to 
each global market region. This measure takes into account both the number of global market 
a firm operates and the relative importance of each global market to total sales.  
 Regional Orientation 
The home regional orientation is measured with the ratio of sales in the European 
Union8 (including the European Free Trade Association – EFTA – countries) to total foreign 
sales (Li, 2005; Elango, 2004). The higher the proportion of foreign sales generated by the 
Eurozone firms within the E.U., the more the firm is home regional oriented. 
                                                 
 
8 Excluding domestic sales 
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Product Diversification Variable  
Following previous research (Chang and Wang, 2007; Hitt et al, 1997; Miller and 
Pras, 1980), we used the Entropy Index (Jacquemin and Berry 1979) to capture the firm’s 
product diversification 
்ܧ ൌ෍ ௜ܵ  lnሺ1 ௜ܵ⁄ ሻ
ே
௜ୀଵ
 
Where S_i is the share of a firm’s total sales in 4- digit SIC industry i and N is the number of 
4-digit SIC industries in which the firm operates. 
Performance Variables  
 Three accounting measures are most employed in the literature: Return on Sales 
(ROS), Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE), all of them with their 
advantages and disadvantages. Initially we test the ROA and ROS measures of performance, 
both presenting similar results. However, as point out Bettis y Hall (1982) and Hoskisson et al 
(1993), one important advantage of the ROA is that it keeps a connection closed related to the 
decision variables under direct control of the company management.  
Apart from that, as highlight Geringer et al (1989), the sales measure of performance 
could bias the results in favor of asset-intensive industries, what can be a problem in a sample 
like ours, composed by both service and manufacturing industries, with different sizes and 
characteristics. That´s why on this research we’ll adopt the Return on Assets (ROA) as our 
accounting measure and first dependent variable (Hitt et al 1997; Ruigrok and Wagner, 2003).  
To capture our market-based dimension we have chosen as our second dependent 
variable the Tobin’s q ratio, originally expressed as: 
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Tobin’s q= Market value (MV) of company/Replacement cost of assets 
    To Lang and Stulz (1994), the advantage of Tobin’s q is that it incorporates the 
capitalized value of the benefits of diversification. The Tobin’s ratio has raised several 
criticisms, and one of them is that it does not offer information about invested resources to 
generate value do the company and, in some cases, some markets can present inefficient 
behavior (Ramírez and Espitia, 2000). Despite the criticisms raised, it’s the most applied 
financial-market-based measure in the management literature and serves to the scope of this 
study.  
 The approach we used to calculate the Tobin’s measure is the simpler approximation 
developed by Chang and Pruitt (1994). The Chang and Pruitt q uses the sum of the market 
value of common stock, the liquidating value of preferred stock and book values of debt 
divided by the book values of total assets of the firm. Chang and Pruitt show in their study 
that at least 96,6% of the total variability in the Lindenberg and Ross Tobin’s q is explained 
by the approximated q.  
Control Variables  
 Additionally, we added to our model some control variables, recognized in the 
literature to affect firm performance: 
Firm size, measured as the natural logarithm of total sales, to control for differences in size 
from our sample companies; 
Leverage, measured as the ratio of long-term debt to total assets (%) (Grant et al, 1988; 
Tallman and Li, 1996; Hitt et al, 1997). We applied this measure because the literature has 
demonstrated that the financial structure of a firm may play a role in affecting the firm 
performance. It is also a key determinant of risk (Grant et al, 1988) 
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R&D intensity is measured as the ratio of R&D expenses to net sales (Delios and Beamish, 
1999; Lu and Beamish, 2004). To Kotabe et al (2002), firms with superior product design or 
innovative product process can achieve greater returns compared to its competitors; at the 
same time, international diversification can helps firm’s to generate resources (whatever 
greater returns or improved capabilities) for highly R&D investments (Hitt et al, 1997). 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP): we applied the gross domestic product in our regression 
since we are working with a multi country sample, and because the diversity-performance 
relationship is affected by the economic conjuncture. The macro-economic variable GDP is 
selected to capture the “country effect”, considering that because of incentives of the 
European Community, the smaller countries presented in the last years, in general, a growing 
tax proportionally superior than that of the biggest European countries. Another alternative to 
control for the country effects are the inclusion of a country dummy. The only issue is that the 
inclusion of a dozen of dummies variables always imply in a consumption of precious degrees 
of freedom.   
Growth, measured as the annual growth rate of total assets (%),  
Industry Group, measured by 2-digit industry sic group. According to Rumelt (1991) and 
Powell (1996), industry effect can explain up to 20% of the firm performance variance. To 
Palich and colleagues (2000), diversification is more strongly related to performance in 
studies that considered and controlled for the industry effects. 
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3.4 RESULTS 
 First we performed a correlation analysis to check whether our sample presents some 
noteworthy problem of multicollinearity. High collinearity among variables implies on 
unstable and low efficient estimation parameters. Table 3.5 reports means, standard deviations 
and correlations among all variables used in the study. 
We also performed the variance inflation factor (VIF) in our analysis, to evaluate 
major problems of multicollinearity.  Both calculations suggest no major problems of 
multicollinearity in our regressions. Exceptions are the linear, squared and cubic term of 
international diversification, for obvious reason, since these are variables generated by the 
transformation of a single term.  Apart from that, we run our regressions robust to 
heteroskedasticity, applying to all regressions the White’s heteroskedastically consistent 
covariance matrix estimator.  
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TABLE 3.5 – Means, Standard Deviations and Correlation Matrix 
  Mean S.D 1  2  3  4   5  6  7  8  9   10 
1. ROA 0,011 10,435 1,000                       
2. Tobin's Q 0,527 0,697 0,041  1,000                 
3. GDP 1,218 0,576 -0,184 *** 0,059 * 1,000               
4. International Div. 0,814 0,315 0,041  0,136 *** 0,010  1,000             
5. Regional Div. 0,240 0,144 0,081 *** 0,000  -0,082 *** 0,638 *** 1,000           
6. Product Div. 0,662 0,848 -0,060 ** 0,156 *** 0,011  0,151 *** 0,028  1,000         
7. R&D Intensity 12,412 15,016 -0,275 *** -0,151 *** 0,120 *** -0,203 *** -0,157 *** -0,287 *** 1,000       
8. Size 8,672 3,096 0,079 *** 0,444 *** 0,032  0,314 *** 0,014  0,343 *** -0,417 *** 1,000     
9. Leverage 16,579 9,270 -0,024  -0,153 *** -0,148 *** -0,048  0,022  -0,095 *** -0,087 ** -0,194 *** 1,000   
10. Growth 1747,426 1689,022 0,120 *** -0,320 *** -0,065 ** -0,143 *** -0,021  -0,256 *** 0,292 *** -0,388 *** 0,080 *** 1,000 
* p < .10                      
** p < .05                      
*** p < .01                      
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As can be seen, the regressions was performed to the three performance variables of 
our study: regressions 1 to 3 refer to the impact of international diversification on the account 
based measure of performance (ROA), and regressions 4 to 6 refer to the market based 
measure of performance (Tobin’s Q). Table 3.6 reports the regression analysis, where we 
compare and assess the best fit among the linear, quadratic and cubic model (hypothesis 1). 
Models 1 and 4 test the linear relationship. Our results suggest that geographic diversification 
analyzed by this was only significant to the Tobin’s Q model.  Models 2 and 5 test the impact 
of geographic diversification on performance using a quadratic model. Here again we found 
some differences between the ROA and the Tobins’s Q models. The second was not 
significant but the ROA model shows a positive quadratic relation between international 
diversification and performance.  
This result is in accordance with several studies that advocates for the quadratic 
relationship, but for instance, it’s just a primary result, since we are looking for a more 
complex relation among those variables. In fact, it may represent the first stage of the curve, 
as postulated in our first hypothesis. The negative signal of the linear term and the positive 
signal of the squared term mean that our curve starts as a regular U-curve, but let’s analyze 
the following model to see if it sustains our hypothesis1.   
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TABLE 3.6 – OLS Regression (Averaged data from years 2001 to 2003). International diversification x Firm 
Performance (Linear, suared and cubic relation) 
 ROA Tobin's Q
Variables Linear Squared Cubic Linear Squared Cubic
 1  2  3  4  5  6  
_Intercept -4,103  2,991  8,483  -0,214  -0,133  0,413  
 -(0,860)  (0,580)  (1,470)  -(1,000)  -(0,600)  (1,250)  
GDP -2,576 *** -2,357 ** -2,507 *** -0,050  -0,049  -0,062  
 -(2,720)  -(2,550)  -(2,710)  -(1,000)  -(0,970)  -(1,270)  
R&D Intensity -0,190 ** -0,193 ** -0,196 *** 0,010 ** 0,010 ** 0,010 **
 -(2,120)  -(2,260)  -(2,270)  (2,320)  (2,340)  (2,300)  
Size 0,713 ** 0,736 ** 0,680 ** 0,093 *** 0,094 *** 0,087 ***
 (2,290)  (2,390)  (2,210)  (6,090)  (6,070)  (5,440)  
Leverage 0,078  0,068  0,075 ** -0,005  -0,005  -0,004  
 (0,860)  (0,770)  (0,860)  -(1,540)  -(1,580)  -(1,450)  
Growth 0,003 *** 0,003 *** 0,002 * 0,000 *** 0,000 *** 0,000 ***
 (5,220)  (5,280)  (5,060)  -(5,540)  -(5,580)  -(5,570)  
International Diversification -1,751  -21,943 *** -46,954 *** 0,100 ** -0,117  -2,542 **
 -(1,030)  -(3,350)  -(3,490)  (0,800)  -(0,370)  -(2,280)  
International Diversification Squared   10,817 *** 41,725 ***   0,115  3,094 **
   (3,350)  (2,980)    (0,710)  (2,290)  
International Diversification Cubed     -10,600 **     -1,017 **
     -(2,480)      -(2,290)  
             
Obs 500  500  500  488  488  488  
R Squared 26,50% 28,83% 29,73% 36,62% 36,68% 38,54%
Industry Sic Group yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
t-statistics in parentheses             
* p < .10             
** p < .05             
*** p < .01             
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The models 3 and 6 test the sigmoid curve, and in both models the quadratic term is 
significant, confirming this way our first hypothesis. The improving of the R-squared, 
observed from the first to the third model, corroborates our hypothesis that the sigmoid model 
is a more complete approach to explain the effect of firm international diversification on 
performance.  
TABLE 3.7 – Regression With Split Sample (Manufacturing and Service Firms) 
  ROS Tobin's Q 
Variables 7 8 9 10 
 Manufact. Service Manufact. Service
_Intercept 5,121  -0,395  -0,307 ** -0,248  
 (1,000)  -(0,030)  -(1,780)  -(0,470)  
GDP -2,501 *** -0,960  -0,154 *** 0,205  
 -(3,100)  -(0,380)  -(2,950)  (1,630)  
R&D Intensity -0,490 ** -0,140 * 0,038 *** 0,006  
 -(2,480)  -(1,910)  (2,970)  (1,580)  
Size 0,174  1,080 * 0,074 *** 0,157 ***
 (0,530)  (1,660)  (5,970)  (4,350)  
Leverage -0,025  0,157  -0,006 * -0,005  
 -(0,250)  (1,140)  -(1,910)  -(0,780)  
Growth 0,003 *** 0,004 *** 0,000 *** 0,000 ***
 (2,680)  (4,610)  -(3,870)  -(2,680)  
International Diversification -5,499  -48,200 *** 0,767 ** -2,456 **
 -(0,640)  -(3,240)  (2,450)  -(2,250)  
International Diversification Squared 3,684  25,575 *** -0,331 ** 1,818 **
 (1,000)  (2,710)  -(2,370)  (2,160)  
         
Obs 280  208  272  204  
R Squared 15,08%  43,84%  54,45%   44,39%  
Industry Sic Group yes  yes  yes   yes  
t-statistics in parentheses         
* p < .10         
** p < .05         
*** p < .01         
 
Based on past studies conflicts and to further investigate our first hypothesis, we 
performed other regressions, splitting our sample in manufacturing and service firms. In those 
regressions we examine whether the U-curve inflection is driven by certain effects such as 
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industry effects, since we believe there is an industry effect that conduced past researchers to 
conclude for a regular or inverted U-shape in the relation between international diversification 
and performance.  
As shown on Table 3.7, our results suggest an industry effect, as can be seen on 
regressions 8, 9 and 10 (on equation 9 the international diversification variables were not 
significant). The result indicates that manufacturing firms tend to present an inverted U 
configuration between international diversification and performance, and for service firms a 
regular U. This apparent conflicting result are in consonance with previous literature if we 
observe that the advocators of the inverted U-curve often deals with big manufacturing and 
well internationalized firms  (Geringer et al, 1989; Hitt et al, 1997). On the other hand, 
researches that advocate for a regular U generally works with service firms (Capar and 
Kotabe, 2003), or smaller and newly internationalized firms (Lu and Beamish, 2001).    
In order to evaluate the moderation effect of the firm’s regional orientation on the 
relation between international diversification and firm performance, we run the regressions 11 
to 14 (TABLE 3.8). As we can see, in the case of the ROA’s measure of performance, 
although the regional orientation is not significant by itself, it positively influences the effect 
of international diversification on performance. As regional diversification did not present a 
direct impact on performance, we cannot predict it will change the curve slope shown on 
FIGURE 3.2. However, as the interactive effect of regional diversification on international 
diversification is positive, we expect that it will alleviate the negative impact of international 
diversification in the first stages of internationalization (low level of internationalization).  
The same effect could not be confirmed by the Tobin’s Q regressions, since the 
coefficients of both regional diversification and the interactive term were not significant. That 
could be in part because the market does not recognize or does not distinguish the benefits of 
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the regional expansion and its positive impact on international diversification and 
performance, and does not reacts accordingly when a firm increases its regional expansion. 
Based on those evidences, we partially support our second hypothesis.     
TABLE 3.8 – OLS Regression. Moderation of Regional Diversification on the relation 
International Diversification x Firm Performance 
  ROA Tobin's Q 
Variables           
 11 12 13 14 
_Intercept 8,161  7,548  0,350   0,328  
 (1,420)  (1,300)  (0,266)  (1,040)  
GDP -2,451 *** -2,355 *** -0,053  -0,051  
 -(2,770)  -(2,690)  (0,286)  -(1,050)  
R&D Intensity -0,193 ** -0,192 ** 0,011 ** 0,011 **
 -(2,230)  -(2,230)  (2,380)  (2,380)  
Size 0,718 ** 0,776 ** 0,095 *** 0,097 ***
 (2,250)  (2,380)  (5,660)  (5,600)  
Leverage 0,077  0,071  -0,004  -0,004  
 (0,870)  (0,820)  -(1,360)  -(1,400)  
Growth 0,002 *** 0,002 *** 0,000 *** 0,000 ***
 (5,070)  (4,930)  -(5,610)  -(5,570)  
International Diversification -47,433 *** -46,504 *** -2,613 ** -2,590 **
 -(3,480)  -(3,390)  (0,022)  -(2,260)  
International Diversification Squared 40,799 *** 40,582 *** 2,908 ** 2,917 **
 (2,870)  (2,790)  (2,320)  (2,310)  
International Diversification Cubed -10,124 ** -11,253 ** -0,925 ** -0,971 **
 -(2,280)  -(2,350)  -(2,310)  -(2,360)  
Regional Diversification 2,330  -10,390  0,416  -0,043  
 (0,420)  -(1,080)  (1,150)  -(0,080)  
Regional x International Div.   16,339 **   0,583  
   (2,090)    (0,970)  
         
Obs 500  500  488  488  
R Squared 29,79%  30,72%  38,95%   39,21%  
Industry Sic Group yes  yes  Yes   yes  
t-statistics in parentheses         
* p < .10         
** p < .05         
*** p < .01         
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Table 3.9 shows regressions 15, 16, 17, and 18, where we test the impact of product 
diversification and also the interactive effects of both product and international diversification 
on firm performance.  
TABLE 3.9 – OLS Regression. Moderation of Product Diversification on the relation 
International Diversification x Firm Performance 
  ROA Tobin's Q 
Variables           
 15 16 17 18 
_Intercept 8,614  10,888 * 0,422   0,411   
 (1,490)  (1,710)  (1,270)  (1,260)  
GDP -2,875 *** -2,998 *** -0,072  -0,071  
 -(3,180)  -(3,340)  -(1,450)  -(1,460)  
R&D Intensity -0,191 ** -0,194 ** 0,010 ** 0,010 **
 -(2,320)  -(2,410)  (2,320)  (2,320)  
Size 1,084 *** 1,173 *** 0,098 *** 0,098 ***
 (3,180)  (3,370)  (5,620)  (5,180)  
Leverage 0,077  0,083  -0,004  -0,004  
 (0,910)  (0,980)  -(1,360)  -(1,390)  
Growth 0,002 *** 0,001  0,000 *** 0,000 ***
 (3,670)  (1,530)  -(5,450)  -(4,430)  
International Diversification -48,681 *** -51,957 *** -2,611 ** -2,594 **
 -(3,510)  -(3,440)  -(2,350)  -(2,300)  
International Diversification Squared 43,948 *** 45,003 *** 3,176 ** 3,170 **
 (3,060)  (2,970)  (2,370)  (2,360)  
International Diversification Cubed -11,189 ** -12,038 *** -1,039 ** -1,035 **
 -(2,570)  -(2,570)  -(2,350)  -(2,330)  
Product Diversification -3,254 *** -6,346 *** -0,089 * -0,076  
 -(3,740)  -(2,910)  -(1,750)  -(0,700)  
Product x International Div.   2,964 **   -0,013  
   (1,770)    -(0,120)  
         
Obs 500  500  488  488  
R Squared 32,45%  33,04%  39,00%   39,00%   
Industry Sic Group yes  yes  Yes   yes  
t-statistics in parentheses         
* p < .10         
** p < .05         
*** p < .01         
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As shown, on models 15 and 17 product diversification has a negative impact on firm 
performance. Regarding the interactive effect, it’s partially confirmed by the ROA model, 
with product diversification positively moderating the relation between international 
diversification and firm performance. In the market based model the effect could not be 
confirmed, because of the non significance of the coefficient. So, we can partially confirm our 
fourth hypothesis.    
Regarding our control variables, the Gross Domestic Product has an inverse impact of 
firm performance: this does not mean that big economies perform worse, but from the 
European Community view we can note that in the last years the growing of the smaller 
economies of the Eurozone are more expressive and can explain this negative factor.  
Investments on R&D are also negatively related to performance, especially to the 
account based measure, however positive to the market based performance. In the case of the 
negative signal in the ROA’s model, that can be easily explained because of the short time 
period of our study: R&D shall be fruitful to the companies’ results in the long run, but this 
we cannot infer from our results. Regarding our market based measure, the positive 
coefficient of the R&D variable indicate that the market evaluates positively R&D 
investments from the Eurozone firms.  
Firm size (measured as log of net sales) was positively related to performance to both 
ROA and Tobin’s Q models and that is not surprising, since large firms can benefit from its 
superior previous performance and its internal capital markets to reinvest in the 
internationalization process.  
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3.5 DISCUSSION 
Our main purpose in this chapter was to examine how the firm’s international 
diversification could affect the performance in the Eurozone context. To achieve this main 
purpose and based on past literature conflicts, we examined how behaves this relationship, 
particularly dealing with four conflicting approaches, that in different moments holds for the 
linear relation, U-model (regular and inverted) or the sigmoid form. To test it and advance a 
little forward a more complete understanding of this important strategic decision, we further 
examine the S-model in the presence of regional diversification and also worked with a split 
sample of manufacturing and service firms, having found amazing results.  
As we can see on figures 3.1 and 3.2, the linear relationship does not hold in any case.  
According to our empirical results, the S-curve seems to be a more appropriate and complete 
approach. Using this three stage theory of international diversification, we can see that at low 
levels of international diversification, in general, the extent of international diversification is 
negatively related to performance. That could be explained by the firm’ smaller ability to 
transfer knowledge, negotiate contracts, reduced knowledge of relevant cultural aspects, lack 
or reduced ability to handle with institutional practices in the host country and reduced or null 
experience in previous foreign operations.  
At moderate levels of geographic diversification, according to our results, firms tend 
to enjoy the benefits of diversification and consequently improve performance. At this stage, 
not only based on the knowledge theory, which says firms become more experienced with the 
evolution of the international operation process, but also from the transaction cost theory. 
From the TCE perspective, at medium stages of international diversification, firms experience 
an increasing of transaction costs, required to coordinate the different geographic units and 
benefit for example, from the economies of scope with internal resources.  
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However these benefits can only be achieved up to a certain point. When moving from 
moderate to high levels of international diversification, firms tend to experience an increasing 
of coordination costs that can be destructive to firm performance, explaining the negative 
tendency in the third stage of Figures 3.1 and 3.2. This is also confirmed if we analyze Table 
3.4: in the cubic models, the linear term of international diversification is negative, the 
quadratic term is positive (confirming the first stage regular U) and the cubic term is negative.  
FIGURE 3.1 – Trend Line of the relation International diversification x Tobin’s q 
 
FIGURE 3.2 – Trend Line of the relation International diversification x ROA 
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To further investigate the sigmoid model and because we believed there were some 
root causes to the conflicting past studies, especially those that found regular or inverted U 
relationship between international diversification and performance, we tested the quadratic 
model to samples of manufacturing and service firms independently. The results are 
interesting and can explain in part the previous mixing results in the literature (Table 3.7).  
To the service companies, we found a positive quadratic form and to the 
manufacturing ones, a negative quadratic or inverted U. From this we can infer that past 
studies are not conflicting but complementary. Past studies that found an inverted U, 
generally works with large manufacturing companies, commonly the most internationalized 
firms (Geringer et al, 1989; Hitt et al, 1997). Those firms normally have solid experience with 
foreign operations, presence on several countries, an important amount of developed 
capabilities, strong internal capital markets that support the entry costs, in resume, a solid 
background that offer the best conditions to a successful geographic diversification. Based on 
that, we conclude that the advocators of the inverted U-shape captured on their researches the 
mid-second and third stage of our model. 
On the other hand, the advocators of the regular U, working predominantly with 
service firms (generally smaller than manufacturing firms) (Capar and Kotabe, 2003), or 
smaller and newly internationalized firms (Lu and Beamish, 2001), captured the first stage 
and mid-second stage of our model.  
Regarding the interactive effect of regional diversification on international 
diversification, we partially confirm our second hypothesis (ROAs model), were regional 
diversification will positively moderate the international diversification effect on 
performance. Based on these results we expect that the regional orientation will shift upward 
the linear term of international diversification, and the consequence would be that at low to 
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moderate levels of internationalization, the regional orientation will smooth the negative 
impact of international diversification on performance and will enhance the firm performance 
at moderate to high levels of international diversification.  
Those results confirm our suspicious that the learning and adaptation process will be 
faster in the presence of a regional orientation. As a consequence, the costs derived from the 
liability of inter-regional foreignness will be reduced, compared to firms with lower regional 
expansions. It also confirms our expectation that the transference of FSAs is easier in the 
regional environment and positively affects the overall performance.  
This finding is supported by Li et al (2005), who affirm that high home-region 
orientation tends to shorten and alleviate a firms’ liability of foreignness (for them, liability of 
internationalization) and likely postpone the threshold of internationalization from the third 
stage. It also advocates in favor of Rugman and Verbeke’ (2005) suggestions that the 
international performance is constrained by the firm’s ability to successfully adapt its existing 
FSAs to the Country Specific Advantages (CSAs), and that many non-location bound FSAs 
can only be exploited efficiently in the home-region.  
Another conclusion extracted from that analysis is that if higher regional orientation 
alleviates the firm’s liability of foreignness, firms will more rapidly benefit from the scale and 
scope economies, bargaining power and can sooner configure and benefit from local key 
resources. In other words, the returns from firms’ international expansion might come earlier. 
We also investigated were product diversification can affect the relationship between 
international diversification and performance. The interaction of both product and 
international diversification was positive and statistically significant in the ROAs model, 
indicating that firms which are able to transfer skills across markets and products and gain 
 94 
 
from organizational learning will be more able to exploit synergies and achieve better 
performance. 
3.6 CONCLUSION 
This study investigates the impact of international diversification on firm performance, 
based on past conflicts in the literature addressing in our models the three principal divergent 
models in the literature (linear, squared and cubic models), with interesting findings. To the 
best understanding of this important relationship, we developed a framework that deals with 
important gaps of previous works and also incorporating on this discussion the recent debate 
of firm’s regional orientation and its effect on the relation between international 
diversification and performance.  
Another important contribution of this chapter is that we deal with two measures of 
performance: the market measure (Tobin’s Q) and the account measure ROA. The market 
measure offers us a long term view and greater consistence, since it’s free of the managerial 
manipulations often present on account based measures (Palich et al, 2000). Additionally, we 
work with a sample of multi country and multi industry European firms, adding a different 
standpoint to the common manufacturing-U.S. based studies.  
Our results show that previous works on the international diversification-performance 
arena are not concurrent, but complementary.  We find that the three stage model of 
international diversification (Contractor et al, 2003; Lu and Beamish, 2004; Chang and Wang, 
2007) is a more complete approach comparing to the regular or inverted U-model.  Our results 
are consistent in the two models (the Tobin’s Q and ROA), and reveals that at low stages of 
internationalization, partly due to its lower international experience and low developed 
capabilities, a firm’s international diversification can be harmful to performance. At moderate 
levels of geographic diversification, greater diversity conduces to a better performance, but at 
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the time the firm continues increasing its geographic diversification up to a threshold, high 
coordination costs and managerial complexity can conduce to a declining of firm 
performance. 
Our tests also show that both regular and inverted U from previous studies, that we 
integrate in our S-form to construct this integrative perspective, are industry specific: studies 
that deals only with big manufacturing firms tend to find an inverted U-form. The opposite 
occurs when one handle with service companies and a regular U is found. 
The regional debate is also incorporated in our discussion, in order to further 
investigate the S-curve hypothesis and its possible implications. From the positive interactive 
effect of regional orientation and international diversification on firm performance, we can 
infer that higher home triad-region orientation tends to abbreviate and alleviate the firm’s 
liability of foreigness, and also postpone the threshold of internationalization from the third 
stage (or high levels of internationalization). In other words, the European regional market 
might offer to the Eurozone firms better conditions to exploit the benefits of 
internationalization, like economies of scale, scope, learning and innovation opportunities, 
risk reduction and bargaining power.  
Those results, at the same time, suggest that the firm’s ability to link its FSAs with 
location advantages abroad will determine the scope of geographical expansion. In other 
words, the international performance is constrained by the firm’s ability to successfully adapt 
its existing FSAs to the Country Specific Advantages (CSAs) (Rugan and Verbeke, 2005). An 
important challenge for future researches is to identify the FSAs and industry characteristic 
that determine a firm tendency of moving mostly inside the home region, or to investigate if 
there is any other factor that constraint or influence the firm to expand at a regional basis. 
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Identification of the determinants of a firm's regional and global expansion will offer a better 
understanding of these performance patterns. 
In this chapter we control for several variables that are known to affect firm 
performance like size, leverage, R&D intensity and growth. Since we handle with a multi 
country sample, we incorporate in our regressions the Gross Domestic Product, to control the 
country effect. Another important variable controlled in our framework is the industry effect 
that can explain a lot of firm performance variable. 
We test on this research the effect of product diversification on performance, finding 
that product diversification has a negative direct effect on performance. The interaction of 
both product and international diversification for the ROAs case was positive, what means 
that the product diversified firms investing on international business can use their previous 
experience and managerial skills in handle multi-product business to overcome some 
liabilities in a new and foreign environment.  
To conclude, we call researches to think the international diversification-performance 
relationship with caution, as we can see that the performance behavior of a firm is dynamic, 
changing considerably from low stages to advanced stages of internationalization. A more 
complete approach can be developed with the inclusion of dynamic panel data models that 
can evaluate the firm during different steps of internationalization. The adoption of those 
models can best control also the possible endogeneity between the international 
diversification and performance variables.   
This study presents also important managerial implications. Comprehending that the 
relationship between international diversification and performance is dynamic, managers can 
best assess what resources and capabilities must be enhanced to reduce or overcome some of 
the costs that the fact of being new and foreign can suppose to the firm. Managers can as well 
 97 
 
control the limits of its diversification and the managerial and coordination implications of 
their expansions, in a way that the threshold of the third stage can be avoided.  
Similar conclusion can be taken from the regional expansion, since managers can best 
evaluate the effect of their expansion through regional or non-regional markets, and measure 
the balance of benefits and costs of those expansions. Apart from that, managers can better 
assess which kind of FSA their firms possess, and adjust their foreign destiny to its available 
resources (if their resources are more location bounded or non-location bounded resources). 
It’s another way to alleviate the negative impact of the liability or foreignness, and the firm 
can sooner star to benefit from the international expansion. 
This study is not free of limitations. Despite controlling that the companies’ 
international diversification profile remains unchanged during the period of this work, it could 
be interesting to work with a panel data, and observe if the main findings can be sustained. 
Further investigations are encouraged to address those issues, and also investigate other 
countries, especially on emerging economies, and see if our main findings can hold on 
different regional contexts. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
4. ENTRY MODE AND LOCATION DECISION: TOWARD AN 
INTERDEPENDENT MODEL 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the last years, foreign direct investments flow has increased in all the mayor country 
groups – developed countries, developing countries and the transition economies. This 
sustained growth of foreign direct investments (FDI) is partially due to the strong economic 
performance and increasing profits of many countries in the world, reduction of trade barriers, 
and other specific factors such as currency movements, stock exchange and financial market 
developments and high commodity prices (UNCTAD, 2007). Despite this increasing on cross 
borders investments, critical choices are to be made when a firm decides to internationalize, 
and the most prominent of those decisions are the entry mode strategy and in which markets 
(countries) the firms will make those investments.  
As one of the key decisions in the field of international business, studies on entry 
mode choice attempt to establish frameworks of the main factors influencing these decisions. 
Competing theories viz transactions cost approach (Anderson and Gattignon, 1986), the 
experiential learning (Johanson andVahlne, 1977), the eclectic framework (Dunning, 1980, 
1988), and the organizational capability (Madhok, 1997; Aulakh and Kotabe, 1997) offered 
different perspectives in the understanding of the foreign market entry mode. To Andersen 
(1997) the eclectic framework is like to be preferred, since it encompasses all the factors that 
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could influence foreign market entry: nevertheless the relationship between the explaining 
factors is still unclear.    
The second key decision when dealing with foreign direct investments got different 
names on the literature, like location decision, geographic scope or international market 
selection. Studies on geographic scope are generally focused in two key issues:  its 
relationship with firm performance (Tallman and Li, 1996; Goerzen and Beamish, 2003) and 
measurement issues (Vachani, 1991; Goerzen and Beamish, 2003). But, what are the 
constructs underlying such decisions? Recently, the interest on the factors underlying the 
location relatedness of a firm expansion is renewed, because of some studies that affirm the 
majority of the Fortune 500 firms operate in regional blocks (Rugman and Brain, 2003).  
Far from criticize the importance of those studies, one limitation of both research 
streams (entry mode and location decision) is that they examine the two decisions in isolation, 
and further, in fact, the literature of modes of entry decision assumes that the entering firm 
has the option to choose any entry mode in a given country (Andersen, 1997). Can a manager 
really decide which type of entry adopts without considering the relatedness of the location 
decision (related – to home-regional markets, and unrelated – to global markets) and its 
idiosyncrasies? Or thinking on another way, is it possible to a manager to opt for an 
international location without consider the constraints or underlying factors that leads a firms 
to choose this or that mode of foreign expansion? 
Taking this into account, the aim of this study is filling this gap and enriching the 
knowledge in the literature of both entry mode and geographic scope. For this purpose, we 
assume that both entry mode choice and location decision are driven by certain antecedent 
factors, such as firm level characteristics, and industry level characteristics, and based on this 
premise we develop our rationale of an interdependent relation between the two key 
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decisions. Recent studies on entry mode and product diversification have recognized the 
importance to analyze the type and mode of diversification via interdependent models, 
because of the endogeneity of those decisions (Chaterjee and Singh, 1999; Peinado and 
Boulard, 2006). So, there is a call in the literature to joint analyze strategic decisions that, in 
reality, are not independent of each other.      
In this study our intention is not focusing on markets per se, but on the strategy level 
of business internationalization. According to Melin (1992), the internationalization process is 
considered a major dimension of the ongoing strategy process of most business firms, 
determining the evolution in the international firm in terms of scope, business idea, action 
orientation, principles, values, and norms.  
The chapter is organized as follow: on the second section we review the literature of 
international diversification, entry mode and relatedness of location decision. On the 
following section, we identify the factors that underlie both entry mode choice and location 
decision and establish our hypothesis of an interdependent model. The fourth section 
introduces the methodology; section five presents and discusses our empirical results and 
main findings; and finally on the last section we provide a review of this chapter, commenting 
its main contributions, implications, limitations and possible future directions.   
4.2 THE INTERDEPENDENT DECISION FRAMEWORK 
Researches on entry mode and location decision tend to analyze both as independent 
decisions, taken in different moment as one could not affect the other. In spite of that, we can 
observe in the literature that many of the antecedent factors used to explain those strategic 
decisions are not specific to one or another. This led us to suspect that could exist some 
interdependence of entry mode and location relatedness decisions. Once again it is important 
to say that here, when we talk about location decision, we are not dealing with which country 
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the company is going, but further, evaluating the strategic decision of moving to a related or 
unrelated market.  
FIGURE 4.1 – The interdependence framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 synthesizes our model, where we capture the most relevant factors affecting 
both entry mode and location relatedness found on the literature: 
4.2.1 Reciprocal Influences:  
Literature on entry mode has long recognized the importance of moderators like 
culture distance, country of origin and location (Zhao et al, 2004) that affect the entry mode 
choice.  To Anand and Delios (1997), for example, firms opt for this or that entry strategy in 
response to the location-specific disadvantages. Dunning (1998), in turn, recognize that the 
geography of international business activity is not independent of its entry mode. 
Zhao et al (2004) performed a meta-analysis of the transaction cost determinants of 
ownership based entry modes, and conclude that country risk (as a proxy for external 
uncertainty) is one of the most influential determinant of entry choice. Environmental (or 
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external) uncertainty reflects the inability of an organization to predict future events 
(Milliken, 1987). Increases in the environment uncertainty raises transaction costs and 
therefore reduce the benefits.  
A number of factors can increase external uncertainty to companies moving abroad. 
Host government, for example, can restrict firm ownership via institutional barriers such as 
legal restriction (Brouthers, 2002; Delios and Beamish, 1999; Gomes-Casseres, 1990; 
Gatignon and Anderson, 1988), constraining the firm entry choice. Deeply appraising past 
research, we shall agree with Brouthers and Hennart’ (2007) review, whom suggest that as 
long as country (institutional) differences are included in the study, mode choice tend to 
follow the dictates of established entry mode theory, no matter what the origin or destination 
of the investment (for the Western economy). When the risk is high, existing works indicate 
that an MNC would do well to limit its exposure to such risk by restricting its resource 
commitments in that particular national domain (Kobrin 1983; Bradley 1977).  
Cultural distance indicates the difference in terms of culture, economic systems, and 
business practices between a home country and each individual target country (Kogut and 
Singh, 1988; Hofstede, 1989), acting to increase/decrease managerial effectiveness in using 
firm-specific advantages in a specific location (Brouthers and Brouthers, 2000; Hofstede, 
1989). 
Greenfield investments give the firms the possibility to implement its own corporate 
culture and practices.  If we assume a company makes a foreign entry to explore its excess 
physical and knowledge –based resources (FSA), we can expect that those resources can be 
best applied in related than unrelated markets. Differently from on unrelated markets, on 
related markets firms can best explore both location and non-location bound firm specific 
advantages (explained in detail in the following section). Since it’s a brand new facility, 
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planned from the scratch, greenfield ventures shall be recommended in the case where firms 
invest on related markets, with low levels of country risk and thus, can maximize firm-
specific advantages. Also, the more closely related the two markets are, the fewer the needed 
complements to the firm's own physical and knowledge-based resources (Chatterjee, 1990). 
Conversely, firms entering markets characterized by large cultural differences tend to 
perceive high levels of country risk and therefore prefer to use acquisitions, reducing the risks 
(Brouther and Brouthers, 2000; Chatterjee, 1990; Li, 1995; Hofstede, 1989; Yip, 1982). 
Acquisition will be costlier than internal developments, in the presence of greater cultural 
differences between home and host countries. In acquisitions, the investing firm receives an 
entity that is already in operation, with existing workers, corporate culture, and management 
practices. Additionally, the relatedness of the market offer no mayor benefits to acquisitive 
entries, comparatively to internal development, since the price for acquisition is defined by 
the market (Yip, 1982) and thus, an acquisitive entry in a related market is more likely to 
involve the purchase of unwanted assets (Chatterjee, 1990).  
Considering the arguments presented above, other things being equal, when expanding 
to unrelated markets, out of the Common European Market, the perceived distance between 
home and host country shall be higher for Eurozone firms, enhancing the external 
uncertainties and risk, and other externalities like trade barriers what, in sum, can be traduced 
in increased transaction costs. This being true, we can expect Eurozone MNCs expanding to 
unrelated markets will favor acquisitive entry modes, and internal development will be the 
preferred mode to access home-regional markets. 
Hypothesis 1: Eurozone firms expanding to unrelated (global) markets will favor 
acquisitive entry modes; Greenfield investments will be the preferred mode when 
Eurozone firms expand to related (home-regional) markets.  
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However, those assertions shall be analyzed with cautions, since it is stated assuming 
location as predefined. What happens for example in a context that the first decision is the 
entry choice? What about firm ownership preferences or managers discretion?  
Firm ownership preference can be understood as the process of weighing costs and 
benefits of various ownership structures (Gomes-Casseres, 1990). Several reasons can 
influence firm ownership preferences, and in such cases, the mode decision will dominate the 
type of market expansion.  
The first consideration rests on the stock of firm capabilities. Forlani et al (2008) 
suggests that the level of risk that managers associate with various international entry-mode 
strategies is influenced by their firms’ capabilities. Drawing on transaction costs, firms must 
make a tradeoff between the costs of using the market or internal channels for transferring 
organizational capabilities, and this distinction is critical to the transaction cost theory of 
multinational enterprise (Hennart, 1982).  
Based on that logic and the risks of dissemination of proprietary know-how due to 
opportunistic behavior, the greater the quasi-rents generated by a firm proprietary know-how, 
the greater the possibility that the MNE will prefer a higher control entry mode, to protect 
firm specific knowledge (Hill et al, 1990). At the same time, the knowledge transfer is an 
issue, since the more tacit/non-codifiable is the knowledge, more difficult and expensive to 
transfer it.  Empirical results show that the less codifiable and the harder to teach is the 
technology, the more likely the transfer will occur internally (Elango, 2005; Kogut and 
Zander, 1993).    
Another case where managers can be balanced for a special type of entry is in the case 
where accelerated internationalization is required. In such cases, acquisitions may confer 
special advantages not offered by greenfield entry, since building up a subsidiary from scratch 
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takes much more time (a problem in the case of high growth markets) and require a stock of 
knowledge in unrelated markets (location-bound) not always available to the firms.  
The last consideration is the direct impact of entry mode in the managers’ career; 
direct entry offers no guarantee of achieving an ongoing business of the required size or level 
of profitability, discouraging direct entries especially in higher barriers markets (Yip, 1982). 
Acquisitions, in turn, require different managerial abilities, such as to achieve rapid synergy 
or turnaround, what can be counterbalanced with managers’ experience.  
Analyzing from the Eurozone perspective, a common trade zone (with no barriers to 
trade, a standardized system of laws, and free movement of people, goods, services and 
capital) created a singular environment to MNE’s regional expansion, with less transaction 
costs, reduced culture distance and easier transfer of firm specific knowledge. These factors, 
in conjunction, offers to firms with preference for internal development, a unique ambient that 
cannot be achieved on unrelated markets. At the same time, when firm ownership preferences 
is constrained by managers preference or the need for a rapid growth market to the firm’s 
products/knowledge, the firm must expand wherever are the opportunities, augmenting the 
probability that it expands to unrelated markets by acquisitions. Hence:   
Hypothesis 2: Eurozone firms with preference for acquisitions are more likely to 
expand to unrelated (global) markets; firms with greater preference for internal 
development (greenfield), in turn, are more likely to expand to related (home-
regional) markets   
4.2.2 Firm Specific Advantages: 
 A Multinational enterprise, as a firm that has activities in more than one country, 
should be able to transfer its knowledge across those countries, if it wants to achieve a 
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satisfactory economic performance. In the international business literature, that kind of 
knowledge is known as ownership or firm specific advantages (FSA).  
The concept of FSA covers a broad set of unique company strengths (competencies 
and capabilities), (Rugman and Verbeke, 2001), and are important factors in determining the 
performance of MNEs (Dunning, 1981; Rugman, 1981b). The internalization theory holds 
that such kind of assets are, at least at some degree, public goods, and once a piece of 
knowledge has been developed and applied at a certain location, it could be applied elsewhere 
at little extra cost and no value loss (Caves, 2007). To Rugman and Verbeke (2003) FSAs 
should be viewed as knowledge bundles that can take the form of the intangible assets, 
learning capabilities, and even privileged relationships with outside actors. Because of the 
scope of this study, our analysis of FSAs will focus mainly on the intangible assets.  
The value of such intangible assets should increase in direct proportion to the scale of 
the firm’s markets. However, since they are also based on proprietary information, they 
cannot be exchanged at arm’s length because of reasons like the economics of information 
(the information cannot be revealed at all because of the risk of opportunism) as well as from 
the economics of public goods (intangible assets tend to be underprovided or to be priced 
inefficiently) (Caves, 2007; Mork and Yeung, 1992). However, do Eurozone firm’ FSA, as an 
antecedent of international expansion, favor regional or global expansions? It’s not a 
commonly addressed question in the literature, and that’s something we must investigate in 
this section.      
The FSAs can assume the forms of nonlocation-bound FSA and location-bound FSA. 
A nonlocation-bound FSA may reflect a functional, production-related proprietary asset, 
typically technological, manufacturing or marketing knowhow, or it may refer to an 
organizational capability to efficiently coordinate and control the MNE’s asset base (Rugman, 
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1981; Dunning and Rugman, 1985; Dunning, 1988; Rugman and Verbeke, 2001). 
Nonlocation-bound FSA typically lead to scope economies and can be transferred abroad at 
low marginal costs and used effectively in foreign operations without substantial adaptation 
(Rugman and Verbeke, 2001). There are also some kinds of FSA that can only be exploited 
by particular individual firms or group of firms in specific locations. Such advantage, referred 
as location-bound firm-specific advantages (LFSA), comes from firm-specific resources 
owned by firms operating in a particular location. 
Many empirical studies use various intangible assets as proxies for FSAs (Rugman and 
Sukpanich, 2006; Morck and Yeung, 1991; Hennart, 1986; Grubaugh, 1987; Rugman, 1981a), 
and usually include variables like technological know-how, marketing ability and related 
consumer goodwill, and effective and dedicated management (Morck and Yeung, 1992). 
Some studies incorporate firm size as one of the FSAs: according to Agarwal and Ramaswami 
(1992), a firm’s asset power could be partly reflected by firm size since resources are needed 
in absorbing the high costs of marketing, for enforcing patents and contracts, and for 
achieving economies of scale. 
Erramilli et al (1997) conduct an empirical study to examine the subsidiary ownership 
preferences among Korean MNEs, finding that the influence of three FSAs (technological 
intensity, product differentiation, and capital intensity) on subsidiary ownership levels 
depends on whether the subsidiary is located in a relatively less developed or more developed 
country than the home country. Despite not being a regional/global study, we can expect 
different influences of FSAs depending on the location.  
Rugman and Sukpanich (2006) addressed this issue in their study, and test whether 
each FSA (firm size, knowledge, marketing ability, and industry type) exhibits any region 
(home / non-home) geographic bias. They found that FSAs in R&D and service sector type 
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are best exploited within the home region, and that firm size is better exploited by global and 
bi-regional firms. Up to this date, it’s the only study that measures the regional/global reach 
of each FSA’s.  
Nevertheless, firms shall face some costs, when investing in different region markets. 
Hymer (1976) recognized that firms doing business abroad shall face location-specific 
disadvantages, and attributed much of the disadvantage to a lack of knowledge of host 
country political, economic and social conditions. Zaheer (1995) described those costs as 
“liability of foreignness”, and suggests that MNE must provide some firm-specific advantage 
to its foreign unit, as a way to overcome the liability of foreignness.  
However, not always the firm´s existing resource and capabilities is applicable to the 
host market requirements. Although some skills like technology is completely fungible across 
borders, being a global skill by nature, other skills have a restricted geographical scope 
because of intrinsic differences in host country markets (Anand and Delios, 1997; Buckley 
and Casson, 1996). To achieve successful entry, the foreign firm must overcome these 
location-specific disadvantages (Anand and Delios, 1997).  
To regionalist theorists like Rugman and Verbeke (2004), the lack of global market 
success could be due to limits to the joint transferability of those nonlocation-bound firm-
specific advantages and its acceptance by customers across regions. According to this view, 
firms trying to expand their sales from the home region to other regions may face “liabilities 
of inter-regional foreignness” (such as trade regulations, powerful foreign rivals in other 
regions, and local product preferences) so that they cannot repeat their home-region 
advantages in the non-regional markets (Rugman and Sukpanich, 2006).  
Scholars on market entry mode also stressed the importance of firm-specific 
advantages. TC / Internalization  theory, for example, suggests that international sales arise 
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because firms possess firm-specific advantages (FSAs), like proprietary knowledge, which 
can be exploited profitably across national borders, whether through exports, foreign direct 
investment, market contracts, or hybrid modes (Rugman and Verbeke, 2005). To TC theorists, 
firm-specific advantages, physical or human, are usually developed over time and are hard to 
replace (Anderson and Gatignon, 1986). In general, the literature based on TC relates higher 
levels of asset specificity to high-control entry modes, because it mitigates the hazards of 
opportunistic behaviour and appropriability (Hennart, 1991; Anderson and Gatignon, 1986; 
Willianson, 1985), being it, however, contingent to the influence of moderating factors like 
location or industry type (Zhao et al, 2004).   
The transfer of the FSA from a parent firm to its foreign affiliate located on different 
countries is, in general, difficult and costly (Makino et al, 2004). This difficulty in transferring 
knowledge across countries is due to the tacit element of the assets, the organizational 
barriers, and distance between home and host countries. That knowledge can be tacit has 
broad implications for understanding the difficulty of imitating and diffusing individual skills 
across the firms (Kogut and Zander, 1992). To Makino et al (2004), the capability to transfer 
efficiently that kind of knowledge to foreign affiliates in different institutional environments 
can contribute to variation on foreign affiliate performance.  
To Anand and Delios (1997), the transferability of FSA may be constrained by (1) the 
physical boundedness of firm-specific advantages and (2) by the applicability of firm-specific 
advantages in the host country environment. Thus, firms that does not possess existing FSA 
(compared to location-specific disadvantages) and need to acquire it, normally has the options 
of (a) invest in the development of location-bound FSAs in foreign markets to complement 
non-location-bound FSAs, or (b) invest in the development of new, non-location-bound FSAs 
in foreign subsidiaries (Rugman and Verbeke, 2005). Even if effective, develop such kind of 
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know-how is costly and time consuming, being acquisitive modes the recommended entry 
mode in the cases where firms need to acquire location-bound firm specific advantage. In host 
country which firms capabilities are transferable and applicable (compared to location-
specific disadvantages), the preferred entry mode will be greenfield ventures.  
Below we’ll explain in detail the expected effect of each FSA in the mode of entry and 
relatedness of firm geographic scope.      
Size 
The size of the firm is one of the most influential firm-specific advantages. To Horst 
(1972b), a firm investing abroad will incur in some fixed costs. Given those fixed costs, and 
taking into account that large firms are often considered better credit risks than small firms, he 
concludes that larger firms will have some advantages, when financing those fixed costs, 
comparatively with its smaller counterparts. Additionally, since foreign investments transmit 
an inherent risk to the investors, the perceived risk substantially increase from large to small 
firms. According to Agarwal and Ramaswami (1992), the size of the firm will reflect its 
capability to absorb the high costs of marketing, enforcing patents and contracts, and 
achieving economies of scale – resources needed to successfully compete on foreign markets. 
      Since larger size implies a higher availability of tangible assets for investment, mainly 
financial assets (Claver and Quer, 2005), we shall concur with the transaction cost approach, 
which predicts that a larger firm will tend toward acquisition, rather than greenfield 
investments, on the basis that acquisition generally requires more financial resources, and a 
larger firm is more likely to have access to such resources (Larimo, 2003; Hennart, 1982). 
That could be the reason why so many empirical studies have found a direct relation between 
firm size and acquisitive entry (Larimo, 1993, 2003; Andersson et al., 1992; Cho and 
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Padmanabhan, 1995; Andersson and Svensson, 1994; Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998; 
Harzing, 1998). Thus; 
Hypothesis 3: Larger sized Eurozone firms are more likely to expand via acquisitive 
modes. 
Technological Knowledge: 
As we mentioned before, Rugman and Sukpanich (2006) are the only authors that 
examined the regional/global reach of firm specific advantages until this date. Their finds are 
quite interesting. First they found that the FSA R&D intensity can be exploited more 
efficiently in the home-region area, characterizing this asset as a home-region bound FSA. 
However, despite indentifying this asset as a region bound FSA, their findings does not 
support the prediction that firms with higher R&D investments will expand intra-regionally. 
In fact, they found that firms with higher level of R&D intensity are less likely to be home-
region oriented. The interpretation of those findings is clear and we can find support to it on 
both product and international diversification literature.  
From product diversification literature, Montgomery and Hariharan (1991) found that 
the breadth of firm R&D intensity and advertising intensity are strong predictors of 
diversified expansion, and interpret this as evidence that R&D and marketing activity creates 
transferable resources that provide competitive advantage. Sivermann (1999) found positive 
and significant coefficients to R&D and advertising intensity (at industry and firm level), and 
suggest that a firm will more readily diversify into industries in which its portfolio of 
technological resources will confer competitive advantage.  
From international diversification literature, Tseng et al (2007) summarize in three 
reasons why technological resources fosters firm multinationality: first, in order to optimize 
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technology exploitation, firms need to go beyond domestic markets looking for markets 
where their proprietary knowhow can be best created and utilized; second, firms shall 
combine their technological resources with specific factors or market conditions in host 
countries, like labor availability, distribution channels, etc.; and third, since technological 
intensive firms generally put more effort into developing new ideas and innovating products, 
in order to reach the necessary sales volumes and prevent from imitation or obsolescence,  it’s 
essential a process of accelerated internationalization to access a wider market base. 
So, considering the evidence that managers do not recognize the location bound 
characteristic of the R&D asset, and combining the interpretations of previous works that 
suggest that firms tend to expand to multiple markets to exploit its technological advantages, 
we expect that higher investments in R&D from Eurozone firms will result in expansions 
through unrelated (global) markets. 
Hypothesis 4: The Eurozone firms with greater technological knowledge are more 
likely to expand to unrelated (global) markets. 
Research and development intensity, as a proxy for firm’s technological intensity is 
also a really important antecedent of firm international entry choice. Technological skill is 
related to invention and the ability to innovate with respect to investment in own R&D 
(Andersson and Svensson, 1994). It’s is often tacit by nature and costly to exchange through 
the market (Hennart, 1982). To Hennart and Park (1993), firm-specific advantages like 
technological knowledge is so tightly bound to organization that they cannot be combined 
with an acquired foreign unit and must instead be exploited by internal development, via 
greenfield ventures. Comparatively to acquisitions, the transaction costs associated with the 
exploitation of technological advantages will be lower, as greenfields enable MNEs to install 
their technologies from the outset and to transfer the accompanying skills to a carefully-
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selected workforce capable of and willing to absorb them (Slagen and Hennart, 2007; Hennart 
and Park, 1993).  For similar reasons, the transfer of such tacit knowledge in the case of 
acquisitions won’t be possible (at least so effectively), since acquired companies comes with 
its own workforce and different skills. Additionally, given imperfections in the external 
market for technology, a firm with high technological skills will prefer a new venture to an 
acquisition, in order to preserve and exploit its proprietary technology. In contrast, a firm with 
low technological knowledge may seek acquisitions to gain access to complementary 
knowledge held by other firms (Larimo, 2003). Thus; 
Hypothesis 5: The Eurozone firms with greater technological knowledge are more 
likely to make greenfield entries.  
Advertising Intensity: 
Another important firm-specific advantage that can ensure higher economic rent is the 
firm advertising intensity. Firm advertising intensity (or marketing resources) reflects the 
ability a firm has to differentiate its products, being an important component of creation of 
positive brand images through the marketing (Erramilli et al, 1997). Intangible assets like 
marketing resources tend to have 'softer' capacity constraints, comparing to physical 
resources. Literature on product diversification suggest that  brand name, for example, can be 
applied to several products with little or no adverse effects on existing applications 
(Chatterjee and Wernerfelt, 1991). Additionally, those researches suggest that knowledge-
based resources are quite specific to related markets (Teece 1982, Chatterjee and 
Wernerfelt1991). Should this indicate this antecedent will affect the firm propensity to invest 
on related or unrelated international markets?  
The application of marketing resources to a global setting has great potential to 
increase the strength of brand images, facilitate achievement of scale economies in marketing, 
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and enhance bargaining power with distributors and consumers. To Tseng et al (2007), these 
advantages shall encourage the brand owner to expand overseas. Lu and Beamish (2004) 
suggest that firms investing more heavily in intangible assets, such as technology and 
advertising, achieved greater profitability gains from growth in foreign direct investment. 
Chung (1988) argues that the worldwide marketplace has become so homogenized that 
now multinationals are better able to market its products and services in a national, regional, 
or worldwide basis. Additionally, he suggests that to achieve global marketing efficiency, the 
possession of marketing resources will drive firms to expand into more foreign markets. 
Firms with standardized marketing practices shall also provide more consistent offerings to 
their customers, and more uniform marketing planning and control procedures to their 
overseas. 
However, Rugman and Sukpanich (2006), when examining the regional/global reach 
of firm specific advantages, found no evidence that marketing knowledge can be best 
explored neither in the home-regional area nor in the global market. Further, they could not 
support the hypothesis that the effect of marketing knowledge on performance depends on 
whether a firm is home-region oriented or not.  
Based on previous arguments, there are clear evidences that advertising intensity is an 
important antecedent of firm growth in multinationality; nevertheless, resting on previous 
literature we cannot establish clear logic linking investments on advertising and firm’s greater 
tendency for expansions into related or unrelated markets. Thus, we do not expect a specific 
pattern, being advertising intensity an antecedent valuable for expansions in both home-
regional and global markets:  
Hypothesis 6: Eurozone firms with greater advertising intensity tend to use this FSA to 
expand to both related (home-regional) and unrelated (global) markets. 
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Similarly, we could not find in the literature a clear logic that establishes a causal link 
between advertising intensity and a specific entry mode, even recognizing the importance of 
such antecedent in the entry mode choice. Chatterjee and Singh (1999), for example, tested 
the effect of firm advertising intensity in a simultaneous framework between type (product 
related or unrelated) and mode (internal or acquisition) of diversification, finding no specific 
pattern between those variables. In other words, to them, advertising intensity is not specific 
to either internal or acquisitive mode expansion.  
Hennart and Park (1993), predicted a direct relation between advertising intensity and 
acquisition. According to them, acquisitions would make it possible for foreign entrants to 
acquire local brand names and to combine them with their firm-specific marketing skills, 
however no significant coefficients were found. Yip (1982) made no predictions of direction 
between those variables, arguing that advertising intensity can provide both attractions and 
deterrents to the direct entry mode. In line with previous studies, we expect advertising 
intensity can be a specific advantage efficiently exploited by both acquisitive and greenfield 
diversifiers. So, we propose: 
Hypothesis 7: Eurozone firms with greater advertising intensity tend to use this FSA to 
expand via acquisitive and greenfield entry modes. 
Product Diversity: 
 Literature on international diversification has long recognized the importance of firm 
product diversity – nevertheless most of the studies done up to date examined the product 
diversification as a moderator of the international diversification – performance relationship 
(Geringer et al, 2000; Hitt et al, 1997; Tallman and Li, 1996). On this study we have a 
different approach, since we believe there is an ex-ante effect of the firm product 
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diversification on the decision to expand to related or unrelated regional markets and we rest 
on similar literature to build our hypothesis.  
Drawing on organizational learning theory, Hitt et al (1997) suggest that experience 
gained from product diversification helps building managerial capabilities that allow more 
effective management of geographic diversification. Expansion into multiple regional markets 
by product diversified firm can generate greater opportunities to achieve synergies (Chang 
and Wang, 2007).  
Additionally, firms increase its knowledge with past experience on managing the 
complexity of product diversification, and can apply these structural mechanisms in dealing 
with diversified activities to facilitate transactions across geographic markets and reduce costs 
and time in the decision making process (Chang and Wang, 2007; Kogut & Zander, 1992). 
According to this view, the more product diversified a firm is, the better it will be to deal with 
some of the complex challenges posed by a greater geographical diversity. 
Product diversity offer the firm recognized benefits, like exploiting economies of 
scale, using excess resources and reducing transaction costs (Hitt et al, 2006). Similarly to 
portfolio diversification, geographical expansion provide firms the advantages of obtaining 
economies of scale, access to new resources, cost reduction, extension of innovative 
capabilities, knowledge acquisition, location advantages, and performance improvements 
(Hitt, Hoskisson, & Kim, 1997). If we consider a product line, the exploitation of the benefits 
mentioned above is dependent of the market size and demand for the firm’s products. So, a 
greater product diversified firm will have a greater amount of products to sell in the market.  
Considering the growth of demand for new products in host markets and the product 
life cycle in the home-regional markets, it will be more probable that the higher product 
diversified a firm is, the higher the propensity that some of its products will need a host 
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market to extend its life cycle (or to achieve economies of scale) and the higher the 
probability that host markets will demand some of its products.   
In line with the arguments posed above and considering that the more product 
diversified a firm is, the more the propensity that this firm will need a host market to sell its 
products, we can expect that previous experience on product diversification will endow 
Eurozone firms increased capabilities to enhance a firm's efficient structure, governance, 
managerial capabilities, and bargaining power, when geographic diversity is added, increasing 
the probability to expand to more unrelated markets.  
Hypothesis 8: Eurozone firms with greater product diversity are more likely to expand 
to unrelated (global) markets comparatively to lesser product diversified firms.  
 Regarding the effect of product diversity on entry mode choice, the literature lies on 
different predictions, and sometime different conclusions. Transaction costs/internalization 
theory scholars recognize the importance of product diversity on entry mode choice. To those 
theorists, product diversity yields management control skills, which are most efficiently 
exploited through acquisitions. To Hennart y Park (1993), product diversity offers the firm the 
possibility to develop sophisticated management control systems that can be best explored by 
quasi-independent subsidiaries managed by local personnel. In sum, to Hennart y Park, the 
organizational efficiency provided by product diversification will be best explored by foreign 
acquisitions.  
Wilson (1980), Yip (1982), Caves and Mehra (1986), and Zejan (1990) suggest that 
firms that have become diversified by acquiring other firms may have developed expertise in 
the negotiation behavior and in the process how to integrate acquired units. Firms with less 
previous product diversity may have not developed these acquisition and management control 
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skills, preferring, in such cases, greenfield ventures (Brouthers and Brouthers, 2000; Larimo, 
2003). 
 Organizational-learning scholars, in turn, argue that product diversity, endows MNEs 
with many technological skills, leading them to exploit these skills through greenfields (Cho 
and Padmanabhan, 1995; Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998), not distinguishing between the 
benefits of previous international experience from previous product diversity. These authors 
suggest that previous experience on product diversification increases the probability of a 
direct entry.  
Transaction cost/internalization, in turn, distinguish between different types of 
knowledge that accrue through international and product diversity: international diversity 
results in knowledge of how to operate internationally, thereby reducing the need to make 
acquisitions and hence encouraging greenfield entry, while product diversity yields 
management control skills, which are most efficiently exploited through acquisitions (Slagen 
and Hennart, 2007). 
So, in line with the arguments presented above and the theoretical development up to 
now, we suggest: 
Hypothesis 9: Eurozone firms with greater product diversity are more likely to make 
acquisitive entries.  
Market Share 
 According to Shepherd (1970:3) "Market power is the ability of a market participant 
or group of participants (persons, firms, partnerships, or others) to influence price, quality, 
and the nature of the product in the marketplace" (Montgomery, 1985). The literature on 
diversification asserts that diversified firms can employ a number of mechanisms to create 
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and exploit market power advantages, and that tools are rarely available for small competitor 
within an industry. The greater the share of market leaders, the more likely they are to react 
against entrants, using weapons like predatory pricing, reciprocal buying and selling, or other 
collusive practices to protect its market share.  
Horst (1972b) compared (U.S.) firms within industries to test which antecedents 
discriminate between those that go abroad and those not yet holding MNE status. The only 
significant difference he found was in the size (market share) each firm had already attained 
in the domestic market. He suggests that, within a given industry, firms with larger shares of 
the domestic market will gain a larger share of the foreign market. Rangan and Drummond 
(2004) also suggest that a strong domestic market presence is critical for foreign market 
success. 
Those results, in conjunction, sound interesting if we analyze them in the logic of the 
European Community. At the same time those studies find market share as an important 
predictor of firm multinationality, it is likely to support the hypothesis that the firm runs 
through its opportunities in the domestic market before incurring the transactions cost of 
going abroad (Caves, 2007). Concurrently, we expect that Eurozone firms with larger market 
shares within an industry will prefer exploit all benefits of its market power inside the 
European Community area, before going to unrelated markets.  
Hypothesis 10: Eurozone firms with higher market shares are more likely to expand to 
regional markets. 
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4.2.3 Industry-Level Characteristics: 
Global x Multidomestic 
 In order to analyze the impact of international competition on entry mode and the 
relatedness of location decision, its fundamental to the MNC consider the industry arena in 
which the company competes. The international competition differs enormously from 
industry to industry, if it’s global or multidomestic and the company must also decide if it 
adopts a global or a multidomestic strategy.  
Few studies on market entry incorporate the international strategy as one of its 
antecedents (some exceptions are Domke-Damonte, 2000; Aulakh and Kotabe, 1997; Kim 
and Hwang, 1992), and it can be one of the reasons of different results of the entry mode 
studies, especially the differences in significance and sign of key variables such as asset 
specificity and uncertainty (Brouthers and Hennart, 2007).  
In a multidomestic industry, the competition is essentially in a country basis or in a 
small number of countries, and occurs country by country, independently. A multidomestic 
strategy is based under the belief that national markets differ widely, regarding consumer 
tastes, political, legal and social structures, etc. (Hill et al, 1990).  
In a multidomestic industry, the transfer of know-how from home to foreign country 
will take place only one time, and the firm’s foreign subsidiaries become a collection of 
essentially domestic firms (Porter, 1986). Firms pursuing multidomestic strategies will assign 
key operating and strategic responsibilities to national subsidiaries, being each foreign 
subsidiary strategically independent. Multinational headquarters usually coordinate financial 
controls and general marketing policies (Hout et al, 1982).  In a multidomestic industry each 
unit is required to compete with other local or multinationals companies on a market-by-
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market basis, being responsible to succeed in the whole product line; no major strategic 
integration is required and each subsidiary is expect to work as autonomous business units. 
Since it must work like national business, the core capabilities of multidomestic companies 
rest on the exploitation of location bound FSAs, using host country specific advantages.  
Achieve such kind of embeddedness and alignment with host country conditions and 
requirements will be easier by acquiring an existing company, with a knowledgeable work-
force and good connections in the local market, than by setting up a new facility (Harzing, 
2002). 
On the other side, in many industries, modern communication system and transport 
technologies created the conditions to leverage consumers’ preferences and tastes (Hill et al, 
1990; Levitt, 1983), and thus, the international competition in those industries assume a 
global facet. In a global industry, a firm competitive position in one country is significantly 
affected by its position in another country, and the rivals in that kind of industries compete 
against a small number of competitors in the world market, integrating its activities to capture 
the linkage among countries.  
In a global company, the strategy is centralized, and the company seeks to respond to 
particular local market needs, while avoiding a compromise of efficiency of the overall global 
system, and can, for example, set prices in one country expecting real benefits in another 
(Porter,1986; Hout et al, 1982). A global company must create the conditions to realize 
substantial economies of scale, centralizing productions of part of a product line in specific 
subsidiaries (Hill et al, 1990; Porter, 1986; Hout et al, 1982), exploring to the utmost its 
efficiency at one location, and exchanging products among different nations.  
The marketing and R&D is also centralized, and a company can dedicate efforts in a 
R&D project that can compromise the results of a specific subsidiary in favor of the whole. 
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In a global industry, firms must explore its non-location bound FSAs to the utmost, 
what makes the knowledge transference a relevant issue. The following issue to global 
companies is to effectively achieve a strong strategic coordination among subsidiaries located 
in different nations, sometimes sacrificing the benefits of one unit in the benefit of the whole 
organization. In the last case, a high degree of control is required (Domke.Bamonte, 2000; 
Kim and Hwang, 1992; Hill et al, 1990).  
As already explained, one of the advantages of a greenfield venture is the possibility to 
incorporate the latest production technologies and the possibility to be built matching the 
company's exact production requirements. Transfer of knowledge in greenfield investments is 
also much more efficient, and the firm can best explore non-location advantages, like 
technological assets. Parent companies can also exercise a higher level of control over 
greenfield subsidiaries, since greenfield investments normally exhibit a higher level of 
expatriates. While incorporating a higher level of control, the presence of expatriates can also 
serve as the embodiment of the FSAs to be transferred (Harzing, 2002). 
Thus, in line with previous arguments, we propose that: 
Hypothesis 11: Eurozone firms competing on multidomestic industries are more likely 
to expand via acquisitive entry modes; internal development (greenfield) expansions 
will be preferred by firms competing on global industries.  
 As mentioned above, differently from global strategies, a multidomestic strategy does 
not require a tight coordination (what does not mean any coordination) between business 
units. Assuming that in a multidomestic industry the needs of customers are considered 
heterogeneous, it implies a certain customization of the firm’s outputs to individual 
marketplaces. Accordingly, it requires the business units adopting sometimes completely 
different product designs, brand names and other kind of customizations for each national 
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market, what drives the firm to implement different competitive strategies in different 
business units. Alternatively, in a global industry customer needs are predominantly 
homogeneous, and the firm strongly advantages from configuration and coordination.  
  However, the role that a particular country (and government policies) plays in the 
overall organizational strategy can influence and sometimes determine the scope of MNEs 
expansion across the globe (Doz, 1986; Mahini and Wells, 1986). Global strategy generally 
mean specialization (for full exploitation of economies of scale), and to a global company, the 
international strategy is more important than local needs. Those issues trigger in the host 
government a fear of dependency: each country depends on the others for a wide range of 
goods it does not produce any longer (Doz, 1986), and because of this, the host government 
can impose rules and restriction to foreign investment, in a way that can interfere in the MNC 
strategy. 
 Taking those arguments into account, we can assume that the firm bargaining power 
play an important role in a subsidiary location decision. According to Encarnation and Wells 
(1986), the firm’s bargaining power to the host government is not exclusive to, but is likely to 
increase, if the company is in a global industry. Additionally to the bargaining power, acting 
on different national contexts requires the firms a strong understanding of government 
policies, and much resources dedicated to fulfil this goal.  
Comparatively to multidomestic firms, companies from global industries benefit from 
increased bargaining power to host governments, and a move to an unrelated location will not 
be a barrier if it is in accordance to the firm’s global strategy: to a global company the 
expansion occurs accordingly to the strategic importance of the market (profits, blocking 
competitors, etc.) in the benefit of the global result of the company. This assumption, as a 
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result, suggests that Eurozone firms located in global industries are likely to expand wherever 
it is the strategic market, doesn’t matter if related or unrelated. Thus; 
  Hypothesis 12: Eurozone firms competing on global industries are likely to expand to 
both related (home-regional) and unrelated (global) markets.  
Industry Concentration   
 Industry structural factors highly affect the behavior and strategy of MNEs. 
Concentrates industries are characterized by few competitors with high market stakes and 
high entry barriers, which can assume the form of competitive retaliation (Chatterjee and 
Singh, 1999). In other words, the larger the share of market leaders the more likely they are to 
react against entrants, and the greater their market power to implement resistance (Yip, 1982). 
Caves (2007) identify some types of entry barriers that can limit the number of market 
occupants, like advertising intensity, capital-cost barriers, scale economies, R&D and 
organizational complexity. In fact, he affirms that each source of entry barriers to entry is 
linked to the reasons why MNEs exist, and because entry barriers mostly determine an 
industry’s level of seller concentration, FDI and seller concentration are closely linked.  
The mode of entry the firm adopts in the foreign market affects its competitive 
consequence (Caves, 2007) and the success of a firm's entry strategy depends to some extent 
on the reactions of the incumbent firms (Chatterjee, 1990) and its retaliatory moves (Porter, 
1980). Greenfield entry represents another seller in the market, and its expansion over the 
market (increasing market share) will occur in the expense of other participants. In other 
words, direct entry stimulates a competitive battle, raising costs, even for entrants with many 
transferable resources (Chatterjee, 1990). On the other hand, acquisitive entry will leave 
concentration unchanged, since it’s just a competitor substitution, neither introducing new 
incumbents on the market nor adding capacity in the concentrated. Probability of retaliation in 
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such cases is less likely since there is no (apparent) threat in the positions of the remaining 
incumbents, and the literature has long recognized the acquisitive mode as the most 
appropriate entry mode in presence of concentrated industries (Hennart and Park, 1993; 
Chatterjee, 1990; Yip, 1982). 
Based on the arguments above, we can expect that if a new subsidiary (greenfield 
entry) tends to reduce seller concentration and established competitors might retaliate 
elevating entry barriers, the acquisitive mode will be preferred entry when the industry 
concentration is high.   
Hypothesis 13: Eurozone firms placed on highly concentrated industries are more 
likely to expand via acquisitive modes.  
4.3 METHODOLOGY 
4.3.1 Sample 
Our hypotheses are tested using a sample of European firms, applying data from 
several Eurozone9 countries. Initially, our database was composed by 12 countries. Latter, 
Luxemburg and Portugal were removed from sample because of missing data. The source of 
our data comes from 2 databases: data of firm acquisitive deals were obtained from the 
Zephyr database. The rest of the firm and industry variables were used or calculated based on 
data from the Worldscope international database. The sample period ranges from 2003 to 
2007. To be included in our regressions, a firm must be already geographically diversified in 
2003, and the ones who performed any acquisitive entry, the transaction must represent more 
                                                 
 
9 In the period that comprises this study the Eurozone was composed by twelve countries: Austria, 
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Portugal, and 
Spain. From 2007 on, Slovenia, Slovakia, Malta and Cyprus were also included. 
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than 50% of total company share. The procedures cited above results in a sample of 259 
firms, from 10 European countries. 
4.3.2 Model Estimation 
 As mentioned in the literature review, the relationship between entry mode and its 
antecedent variables is usually approached with standard econometric techniques, 
predominantly ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis, considering the location 
decision as done, before the entry decision. The same can be told about the geographic 
diversification literature.  
However, as can be seen on Figure 4.1, apart from the direct effect of location decision 
on entry mode choice, the entry mode choice shall also impact the relatedness of the location 
decision, characterizing an interdependent system. In such cases, OLS estimations can offers 
inconsistent estimations, since it ignores the bidirectional relationship and the endogenous 
variables included in each equation shall be correlated with the disturbances. To overcome the 
endogeneity problem and take in account the reciprocal effects of the dependent variables, we 
test our model with a simultaneous equation model, using the 3SLS estimator.   
4.3.3 Dependent Endogenous Variables 
Entry mode choice 
 Studies on entry mode choice generally use dichotomous measures to define the entry 
choice, and that can sometimes represent a problem if a company is involved in more than 
one type of transaction in a period, what Chatterjee and Singh (1999) calls “all or nothing 
bias”. Another strategy used by researchers, is attributing a number 1 to n to each type of 
mode, and regress using probability models. That could be useful in this study, if our unit of 
analysis were the transaction.  
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In fact, in this study we analyze the company decision trend, in a certain period of time 
where this company carries out a series of diversification moves. To fulfill this goal, a 
continuous measure is required to capture the degree of emphasis a company gives to internal 
development or acquisitive entries, in the period of time comprehended between the years 
2003 and 2007. The only authors that applied up to this date a continuous measure to capture 
the firm entry mode choices are Chatterjee and Singh (1999). We adapted the measured 
developed by those authors, which capture the entry choices in product segment markets, to 
apply it to capture the transactions carried out on geographical segment markets (domestic, 
regional or global). 
The measure is defined as follow: if a firm j (j = 1 to J) undertakes n expansions 
between two time periods t1 and t2 in a specific geographic segment (domestic, regional or 
global), let’s assume that the n expansions result in ($X + $Y) increase in sales (from t1 to t2) 
of which $X is on account of k acquisitions and $Y is due to (n - k) internal expansions. The 
part of sales in the domestic, regional or global market that could be traced back to an 
acquisition was market as an increase in sales due to acquisitive activity. The increase in sales 
on the other geographic segments where marked as an internal development. 
Entry Mode = $X/($X + $Y) for all j, except when ($X + $Y) = 0. 
This way we have a continuous measure ranging from 0 to 1, where values close to 0 
means greater dominance of internal development expansion and values close to 1 represent 
dominance of acquisitive activity. Joint venture modes were excluded from our analysis, since 
we cannot differentiate partial joint ventures (that sometimes can be treated like a partial 
acquisition) from greenfield joint ventures (more similar to internal development 
investments). Yet, the basic definition of FDI refers to majority or wholly owned subsidiaries 
(Rugman and Oh, 2008). 
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The entry mode variable, when working as dependent variable, corresponds to the 
transactions performed between the years 2004-2007. When it works as independent 
endogenous variable, the transactions refers to the years 2003-2004 (lagged endogenous 
variable), since we will test the effect of entry mode on the relatedness of geographical 
expansion.    
Location Decision Relatedness  
What is the appropriate measure to capture the firm global orientation? Based on 
Ohmae’s (1985) ideas, Rugman (2005) and Rugman and Verbeke (2004, 2007) established a 
measure to the firm global orientation, by calculating the ratio of sales in each train region. By 
this way, they obtained a categorical measure, which define if the firm is home-regional 
(more than 50% of sales in the home region), bi-regional (less than 50% of sales in the home 
region and greater than 20% in another region of the triad), host-regional (more than 50% of 
sales in a triad region other than the home region) and global (less than 50% of sales in the 
home region and greater than 20% in each of the other two triad regions). This measure is not 
free of criticisms.  
To Osegowitsch and Sammartino (2008), no strong theoretical grounds are offered for 
the precedence of the home-region threshold in the classification system, other than an 
assertion that home-region sales in excess of 50% reflect and constrain decision priorities. 
Alternatively, Flores and Aguilera (2007) use a country scope metric in their study; the 
number of countries in which the firm has a foreign subsidiary. According to Rugman and Oh 
(2008), this country scope metric is a biased measure of FDI since it counts each country as of 
equal size, and overestimates the foreign involvement of large firms.   
Most of measures developed up to date suffer from some bias, when defining the firm 
global orientation (for an extensive review of the key measures, see Sullivan, 1994 and Oh, 
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2009). Additionally, those measures do not take into account that the sales distribution of a 
global firm must match the distribution of global GDP (Fisch and Oesterle, 2003), and that 
the sales distribution of a regional firm must mirror the regional GDP distribution (Asmussen, 
2006). In fact, Rugman’s measure considers that the three triad regions have similar 
distribution of the GDP: 
“The North American and European region of the broad triad are of approximate 
equal size, as measured by GDP. Asia is smaller than either as measured by GDP, but 
is nearly equal when taking into account purchasing power parity (PPP).” (Rugman 
and Verbeke, 2004:7) 
To overcome those liabilities, an alternative continuous measure was developed by 
Asmussen (2006), to capture the global orientation of the firm. We adapted this measure to 
capture the global orientation of the firm between two time periods t1 (2004) and t2 (2007). 
Below we explain how to calculate the indices: 
Assuming that: 
H= home country sales;  
E= sales in the rest of the home region (total home region sales minus home 
country sales);   
W= sales in the rest of the world;  
T=H+E+W = firm’s global revenue.  
The sales ratios can be calculated as: h=H/T, e=E/T, and w=W/T, with h+e+w=12. 
Comparing these ratios to similarly defined GDP ratios denoted hI, eI, and wI, where:  
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hI= GDP of the home country as a share of global GDP; 
eI= GDP share of rest of the home region; 
wI= GDP share of the rest of the world. 
The perfectly global firm would have h=hI, e=eI, and w=wI. 
Rti= (e/h)/(eI/ hI) = firm’s intra-regionalization (relative sales penetration of 
other home region countries, compared to the global firm) in year ti 
Gti= (w/h)/(wI/hI) = firm’s inter-regionalization (relative sales penetration 
outside the home region) in year ti. 
If Z<1, the firm is assumed to be oriented towards its home region.  Values of Z>1 
means that the firm’s intra-regional market penetration is lower than their inter-regional 
market penetration or, in other words, the firm is host-region oriented. Firms with Z=1 are 
region balanced, with similar presence in every region markets.  
Similarly to the entry mode variable, when the global orientation works as dependent 
variable, it refers to the trend of geographical relatedness decision between the years 2004-
2007. When it works as independent endogenous variable, it refers to the years 2003-2004 
(lagged endogenous variable), since we will test the effect this variable on the entry mode 
decision.    
4.3.4 Independent Variables  
Firm size is measured as firm’s the natural logarithm of total sales in the year 2003, to 
control for differences in size from our sample companies and capture its investment capacity, 
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credit taking and investors’ perceived risk in the year before the period accounted for the 
acquisitions and greenfield investments (2004 to 2007).  
Technological knowledge is measured by the firms´ research and development 
expenditures as a percentage of its domestic sales (R&D) for the year preceding the entries 
(2003) (Gatignon and Anderson, 1988; Hennart and Park, 1993; Erramilli et al., 1997; 
Rugman and Sukpanich, 2006).  
Advertising intensity was captured using the firms’ selling and general administrative 
expenses as a proportion of total sales in year 2003, in the absence of data relative of firms’ 
advertising expenditures in our database. Many authors have already efficiently used selling 
and general administrative expenses as a proportion of total sales as a proxy for marketing 
ability (Grubaugh, 1987; Rugman and Sukpanich, 2006; Sukpanich and Rugman, 2007). 
Product Diversity: following previous research (Grant et al, 1988; Tallaman and Li, 
1996; Geringer et al, 2000; Doukas and Lang, 2003), we adopted as our product 
diversification measure the sales based Herfindahl Index. This index was adapted by Berry 
(1971) to be applied to the firm’s industrial activity distribution. Berry’s index takes value 0 
when a company is active in only one industry and comes close to 1 when a company 
produces equally in a big amount of different industries (Ramírez, 1997). The index is 
calculated based on the share of a firm’s sales in each four digit SIC industry: Product 
Diversity = 1- ∑ Sj2, where Sj is the proportion of a firm’s sales reported in product group j.     
Global x Multidomestic variable: in order to capture the international arena the 
company is competing on, a dummy variable were attributed to each 3-digit SIC code, where 
1 is attributed to global industries and 0 if an industry is characterized as multidomestic. To 
establish whether an industry is global or multidomestic, we primarily used the Index of 
Transnational Integration, defined by Kobrin (1991). The following step was define a cut 
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point in Kobrin’s list, and to accomplish this objective we use the group references  created 
by Goshal and Nohria (1993) and also Hout et al (1982). Service firms in our sample are 
characterized as multidomestic, since competition in service industries generally occurs in a 
country basis, demanding firms to hardly incorporate local idiosyncrasies.   
Industry Concentration was captured by the four-firm concentration ratio. The 
concentration ratio is defined as C4 = ∑ C4*Pi, where C4 is the seller concentration ratio of 
the ith industry of the firm and Pi equals the fraction of the firm's sales that were in industry i. 
The change in concentration ratios between 2003 and 2007, C4 (2007) - C4(2003), captured 
the change in concentration ratios of firm 4-digit industry group.  
Market Share is defined by the share of sales in Europe, in the firms’ 4-digit industry 
group in the year 2003.  
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4.4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
First we performed a correlation analysis to check whether our sample presents some 
noteworthy problem of multicollinearity. High collinearity among variables implies on 
unstable and low efficient estimation parameters. Table 4.1 reports means, standard deviations 
and correlations among all variables used in the study.  
TABLE 4.1 – Means, Standard Deviations and Correlation Matrix 
Variable Mean S.D 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Location Rel. 0.25 0.33 1.00         
2. Modo de Entrada 0.33 0.40 0.12 1.00        
3. Size 6.85 2.23 0.11 0.30 1.00       
4. Tech. Knowledge 3.46 11.21 0.17 0.00 -0.29 1.00      
5. Adv. Intensity 0.24 0.28 0.09 -0.10 -0.32 0.63 1.00     
6. Product Div. 0.30 0.28 0.22 0.00 0.27 -0.10 -0.06 1.00    
7. Market Share 0.06 0.11 0.02 0.14 0.51 -0.08 -0.05 0.07 1.00   
8. Global/Multidom. 0.28 0.45 0.06 0.17 0.00 0.07 -0.08 -0.04 0.08 1.00  
9. Concentration -0.02 0.07 -0.08 -0.18 -0.06 -0.10 0.02 0.01 0.03 -0.31 1.00 
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TABLE 4.2 – OLS and 3SLS Regressions 
    Entry Mode Location Relatedness 
  
1       
OLS  
2   
3SLS  
3    
OLS  
4   
3SLS   
         
1. Location Relatedness 0.007 ** 0.008 **     
 0.003  0.003      
2. Entry Mode    0.073  0.099 ** 
    0.050  0.049  
3. Size 0.059 *** 0.060 ***    
 0.012  0.011      
4. Technological Knowledge 0.003  0.003  0.006 ** 0.006 ** 
 0.003  0.003  0.002  0.002  
5. Advertising Intensity -0.079  -0.077  -0.001  0.002  
 0.113  0.111  0.095  0.093  
6. Product Diversification -0.106  -0.109  0.267 *** 0.264 ***
 0.086  0.085  0.071  0.070  
7. Market Share     -0.022  -0.036  
     0.182  0.179  
8. Global/Multidomestic 0.132 ** 0.132 ** -0.016  -0.019  
 0.063  0.062  0.053  0.052  
9. Concentration -0.589 * -0.587 *     
 0.351  0.344      
10. Constant -0.123  -0.127  0.259 *** 0.257 ***
 0.121  0.119  0.084  0.083  
         
Obs. 259  259  259  259  
R Squared  15.83% 15.80% 10.30%  10.21%  
Industry Sic Group  Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes  
3SLS models: Chi2 "Entry Mode"= 50.62*** / Chi2 "Location Rel. Decision"=31.57*** 
t-statistics in parentheses         
* p <  .10 | ** p <  .05 | *** p < .01         
 
Table 4.2 reports both ordinary least squares and three-stage least squares regressions. 
As can be seen, the 3SlS estimations offer a strong support that there is an interdependent 
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effect between the entry mode choice and the relatedness of location decision. On equation 2, 
the positive and significant coefficient of location relatedness indicates that firms expanding 
into more unrelated markets will favor acquisitive modes of entry. Global expansion, in turn, 
would be performed by internal development, supporting our first hypothesis.  
Analyzing in terms of reciprocal effects, on equation 4 we also obtained a positive and 
significant coefficient for mode of entry. This result tells us that mode of entry is also an 
important predictor of location relatedness decision, supporting our second hypothesis that 
Eurozone firms with preference for acquisitions are more likely to expand to more unrelated 
geographic markets. Conversely, firms with preference for internal development might prefer 
expanding into home-regional markets. 
To further analyze the reciprocal effects between entry mode and location relatedness, 
we run two OLS regressions (equation 1 and 3), to confirm if our simultaneous model 
perform better or worse than single OLS. The results tend to be the same of that from three-
stage least squares to the antecedent factors in both equations. However, in terms of 
endogenous variables, when we test if entry mode is a predictor of location relatedness 
(equation 3), the result is not significant.  
This result offers us robust support that the two key decisions in the field of 
international business – entry mode and location decision – must not be analyzed in isolation, 
since there is a clear endogenous relation between them. Further it can also provide us some 
evidence of why single equations models from entry mode research treat the location decision 
as previously define, but in turn, location decision literature does not incorporate entry mode 
as one of its predictors.  
Those results shall be better understood if we further examine those regressions in 
terms of antecedent factors. Regarding the firms-specific advantages, the effect of firm size on 
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mode of entry was positive and statistically significant, what means that larger sized firms are 
more prone to expand via acquisitive expansions. This result is also in accordance with 
previous literature that identified firm size as a predictor of acquisitive expansion and also 
supports our third hypothesis. Larger Eurozone firms have the advantages of more credit 
availability and the capacity to face the higher costs of acquisitive expansions, comparing to 
its smaller counterparts.  
The significant coefficient in the second equation for technological intensity indicates 
that it is an important predictor of more unrelated expansion. Authors like Rugman and 
Sukpanich (2006) have also identified that firms will use its technological knowledge to 
increment its expansions through unrelated markets. Technological knowledge, as a non-
location bound FSA, can be transferred at low costs from one location to another, and can be 
explored profitably on distant markets out of the European Community. Another 
interpretation would be that firms must go wherever its technological resources can be best 
exploited: technological resources normally suffer from rapid obsolescence, and in order to 
optimize its exploitation, firms must access many markets as rapid as possible, favoring 
unrelated expansion.  
However, technological intensity, as a predictor of entry mode choice, was not 
statistically significant for the Eurozone sample. Based on those results, we confirm our 
Hypothesis 4 but cannot accept hypothesis 5, indicating that technological intensity is specific 
neither to acquisitive entry mode nor to internal development.  
The non-significance of advertising intensity on equation 6 provides support to our 
hypothesis 6, that marketing knowledge (or advertising intensity) is a valuable FSA to 
expansions to both related and unrelated markets. Similarly, the non-significant coefficient of 
advertising intensity on the location decision equation (equation 4) indicates that the 
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advertising intensity FSA is not specific to any entry choice, and will be used by Eurozone 
firms to expand by both internal development and acquisitions (H7). This result is in 
accordance with previous literature like Yip (1982) and Chatterjee and Singh (1999). In fact, 
similar to this study, Chatterjee and Singh, in a simultaneous equation model, predicted and 
found evidence that advertising intensity and technological intensity is not specific to a mode 
of expansion. 
Regarding the firm product diversity, we found no evidence that if could influence the 
firm entry mode choice to the Eurozone sample (no support for H8). These results could be 
due several reasons: first, we do not distinguish between related and unrelated product 
diversification, and the effects of each one on entry mode choice can be completely 
differently. In fact, to Hennart and Park (1993), a diversified Japanese investor does not have 
a greater tendency to enter through acquisitions than a less diversified one if it is entering the 
U.S. to manufacture the same products it manufactures in Japan. However, and contrary to 
current mergers and acquisitions theory, they found evidences that Japanese parents are more 
likely to enter the U.S. market through acquisition, if they intend to manufacture a different 
product than those they produce at home.  
Chatterjee and Singh (1999), in turn, suggest that the decision to diversify into less 
related markets is associated with an emphasis on internal mode of expansion. Second, the 
relation between entry mode and product diversity might not be linear to the Eurozone 
sample. Barkema and Vermeulen (1998) suggest that if the number of industries in which the 
MNE operates becomes very large, its preference for greenfields changes into one for 
acquisitions (inverted U-shape relation). Another possibility is that, since most of past studies 
use U.S. and Japanese sample, Eurozone firms can be less product diversified, comparatively 
to those from previous studies, and that can reduce the explicative power or the product 
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diversification variable. On the other hand, the effect of product diversification on the 
location relatedness decision was positive and statistically significant. This result supports our 
hypothesis 9, and indicates that product diversification will endow Eurozone firms increased 
capabilities to expand to more unrelated markets.  
Hypothesis 10 was not supported, since the market share variable was not statistically 
significant. This means that higher regional market shares from Eurozone does not appear to 
be a relevant predictor of relatedness of geographical expansion.    
Regarding the industry level characteristics, our regressions indicate that for the 
Eurozone sample the coefficient between the global x multidomestic variable and the entry 
mode contradicts the predicted sign of hypothesis 11. According to those results, Eurozone 
firms placed on global industries are more likely to expand via acquisitions. This in part can 
be explained by the higher home-regional dispersion of European firms. The transference of 
knowledge shall not be an insurmountable barrier in an integrated market with smaller 
cultural distance. 
Apart from that, because of the short distance between countries, it’s easier to the 
headquarters to exert a certain level of control over the acquired companies, and the firm 
overall strategy can be coordinated in a better manner than if the subsidiaries were all placed 
on overseas locations. Concerning the effect of the global x multidomestic variable on the 
relatedness of firm location decision, it seems to follow our prediction that global firms will 
expand wherever it is the strategic marketing, doesn’t matter if in a related or an unrelated 
location (Hypothesis 12).  
The change on concentration ratio seems to follow the predicted hypothesis (13), and 
indicates that acquisitions are the preferred entry mode when industry presents high 
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concentration indexes. Low concentrated industry, in turn, might be entered by internal 
development.   
Finally, based on the negative and significant size for the industry group on equations 
3 and 4, we can assume that manufacturing firms from Eurozone are more prone to incur on 
more unrelated geographical activities than service firms. This find is endorsed by finds from 
Rugman and Sukpanich (2006): they suggest that a service firm tends to be home-region 
oriented or tends to have higher proportion of intra-regional sales than a manufacturing firm. 
4.5 CONCLUSION   
This research explored the interrelationship between two of the most important 
decisions in the international business literature: the entry mode and the location decision. 
Specifically, the literature of entry mode assumes that when a firm decides to move out of its 
borders, the location decision is already taken. On the other side, literature of location 
decision has never identified the entry choice as one of its antecedents, just ignoring the 
relationship between both. So, this research responds for the necessity for an integrated 
approach, and this objective is achieved with our interdependent model.    
As we could see, single equation models offers a partial view of this interrelationship, 
since via OLS single equations, the entry mode seems not to affect the relatedness of location 
decision. However, the simultaneous 3SLS model supports our prediction that there is an 
endogenous relation between entry mode and location decision: acquisitive entry mode favors 
expansions to more unrelated markets, and conversely, firms expanding to more unrelated 
markets are more likely to expand through acquisitions. 
Additionally, this study is an advance in the actual regional/global international 
expansion discussion, mostly centered on how to capture the firm global orientation or if the 
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firms really operate at a regional or global basis. A recent advance on this literature was 
provided by Rugman and Sukpanich (2006), that investigate the regional/global reach of the 
FSAs and where each FSA can be best exploited. Here we move a step forward, identifying 
some antecedent factors of both location relatedness decision and entry mode, and the 
reciprocal effect between those variable – up to now neglected by the literature.  
Concerning the antecedent factors, it seems to be that the location relatedness decision 
and industry barriers are a more relevant determinant of firm’s decision to acquire or 
internally develop than firm-specific advantages. Firm size has a relevant impact on the 
decision to acquire, and was the only significant firm-specific advantage that affect the entry 
mode choice of Eurozone firms.  
One explanation can be that if the firms not possessing existing FSAs and need to 
acquire it abroad, normally has the options of (a) invest in the development of location-bound 
FSAs in foreign markets to complement non-location-bound FSAs, or (b) invest in the 
development of new, non-location-bound FSAs in foreign subsidiaries (Rugman and Verbeke, 
2005). If we consider that develop such kind of know-how is costly and time consuming, 
acquisitive modes will be preferred and the size of the firm will play an important role on this 
strategy (higher availability of financial assets, reduced investor’s perceived risk, etc.).  
Regarding the location decision relatedness, apart from the significant influence of 
entry mode, this decision is strongly influenced by FSAs like technological knowledge and 
product diversification. It seems to be that the possession of higher technological knowledge 
assets deeply influence the firms to expand out of its home-regional markets, whether to 
exploit is technological advantage and achieve economies of scale, or because it’s constrained 
to behave like this because of technologies’ rapid obsolescence. Product diversification will 
also increase the propensity to a more unrelated location decision: experience gained from 
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product diversification helps building managerial capabilities that allow more effective 
management of unrelated geographical expansion.  
From this research we can obtain interesting managerial implications. Knowing that 
the entry decision and the location relatedness are interdependent decisions offers a wider 
view for managers planning to undertake international expansions. More than just understand 
which antecedent factors will impact on the decision of entry or location relatedness when the 
other variable is considered (what is also really important to consider), those managers must 
assess the possibility to optimize both decisions, in accordance to our model. Coherent 
decisions accordingly to companies characteristics, industry barriers, firms own strategy and 
the competitive arena it intends or is compelled to compete in can contribute to increase firm 
performance and sustained growth.    
This study has also some limitations and opportunities for future studies. First, our 
sample is limited to Eurozone firms, and that could affect the applicability of this model in 
other environments. This is also a possible avenue for future extensions of this study. Second, 
we did not control for the regional/global reach of the antecedents. Knowing this can give us a 
stronger comprehension if, for example, some FSA is used by firms to move to unrelated 
markets but, in turn, this FSA offers more benefits if exploited in the home-regional market. 
Another opportunity for future studies is examining the performance implications of a joint 
optimization of the entry and location relatedness decisions. This could be an interesting 
future extension of the present research.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
5. ENTRY MODE, LOCATION RELATEDNESS AND PERFORMANCE: 
IS THERE ANY OPTIMIZED PATTERN? 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
One of the main objectives in the strategic management research is to identify firm 
strategies that will conduce to enhanced performance. That’s the case of international business 
research. Past empirical studies on entry mode, for example, demonstrated that the firm entry 
choice affects firms’ foreign direct investment performance (Li and Guisinger 1991, 
Woodcock et al. 1994, Li 1995).  
Concurrently to the entry mode, another important stream of research on international 
business is the location decision. Literature on location decision often accounts the relation 
between geographical diversity (number of countries, foreign sales, etc.) and firm 
performance, or the impact of moderators like product diversity or technological knowledge 
in this relation. Recently, the interest on the locational decision x performance has evolved to 
a new direction: researches start no analyze if the interaction between regional expansion and 
multinationality would positively affect firm performance (Li, 2005; Sukpanich and Rugman, 
2007), or if there is any performance superiority between regional and global expansions 
(Elango, 2004).   
Following Vachani’s (1997: 307) conceptualization of location (or geographical) 
relatedness, related geographical diversification is the dispersion of the multinational’s 
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activity across countries within a relatively homogeneous cluster of countries. Similarly, 
unrelated geographical diversification is the dispersion of the multinational’s activity across 
countries within a relatively heterogeneous cluster of countries. As in the last chapter, we will 
adopt this concept to differentiate the Eurozone firms’ expansions within the European 
Community (homogeneous, related or simply regional expansion) and outside de EC 
(unrelated, global or non-regional expansion).  
According to Dunning (1998), the OLI tripod (ownership, location and internalization) 
determining foreign direct investment (FDI) and MNE activity may be likened to a three-
legged stool; each leg is supportive of the other, and the stool is only functional if the three 
legs are evenly balanced. Assuming that the firm has already decided to internalize an activity 
and the intrinsic interdependence of the three pillars of the OLI framework, it’s to expect that 
the performance implication of the two remaining decisions shall not be treated in isolation.  
Considering Dunning’s proposition and the findings from the last Chapter, suggesting 
that there is an endogenous relation between entry mode and location relatedness, shall the 
performance implication of an entry mode or location decision be analyzed without 
considering the endogenous relation between entry mode and location relatedness (home-
regional or global markets)? That’s clearly an important question to the academic world. 
Managers, in turn, would question: “Is there any optimization pattern between location 
relatedness and entry mode (acquisition over internal development) decisions that conduces to 
enhanced performance? That’s also an interesting question, however not so clear to analyze. 
Neither a strategic mode itself, nor the combination of two strategies should conduce to 
enhanced performance, since diverse combinations of entry mode and location decision 
clearly profit and survive for extended periods within the same industry. In the literature this 
assertion received the name of fit and equifinality.  
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According to Doty et al (1993), the most consistent concept of fit comes from Drazin 
and Van de Ven (1985: 335) that define fit in terms of consistency across multiple dimensions 
of organizational design and context. According to this view, the higher the fit, the more 
similar is the organization to an ideal type along multiple dimensions, and the best will be the 
firm performance. The following conceptualization – equifinality – means that an 
organization can obtain the same final effectiveness (performance, for example) from 
differing initial conditions and by a variety of paths (Katz and Kahn, 1978: 30). So, 
considering both concepts, it’s to expect that a firm can profit from different arrangements of 
combined configurations of entry mode and location decision, depending of the firm 
underlying characteristics or the constraints it faces, in other words, its specific resources and 
the industry characteristics. That’s the starting point of this work.   
Considering the arguments presented above, this study investigates the performance 
implication of firm strategies, particularly firm international entry mode and location 
relatedness decisions, assuming firms decisions are constrained by its attributes and industry 
structure, looking for optimized patterns or specific tradeoffs between them. So, to capture 
this multiple “profitable” possibilities a firm has, a continuous measure were developed to 
evaluate the performance implication of firm’s decision coalignment.    
This chapter provides value to strategic management researchers and managers 
involved or wishing to be involved on international business in four ways. First, we developed 
a framework unexplored until now in the strategic management literature: the performance 
implication of the coalignment (or fit) of the two main decisions in the international 
expansion. Second, we explore those relations assuming that the implications of those 
decisions will be affected by the underlying factors of them. Third, we analyze this 
framework under the perspective of the Eurozone, until now rarely studied, comparatively to 
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US or Japanese MNEs, despite its enormous importance to the world economy. Finally, we 
develop a continuous measure of fit adapted to the reality of our study, offering a much more 
reliable measurement.       
This chapter is organized as follow: on the second and third sections we review some 
important findings of previous literature and present the hypothesis; section four introduces 
the methodology; section five presents our empirical results and main findings, and also 
discuss the results found on the empirical tests; finally, on section seven, we provide a review 
of this chapter, commenting its main contributions, implications, limitations and possible 
future directions.   
5.2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
5.2.1 Equifinality and Strategic Fit 
A conceptual framework is a logically developed, described, and elaborated network 
of associations among concepts that have been identified through theoretical and empirical 
research (Sekaran 1992). According to Andersen (1997: 30), a conceptual framework 
indicates how a researcher perceives the phenomena being investigated, and which factors and 
how they influence the phenomena. Further, a theory can be represented by various 
conceptual frameworks, and a conceptual framework can be based on more than one theory. 
To Kim (2005), a theoretical framework needs to provide better explanations of the 
motivations for firms’ behavior and the consequences for efficiency.  
In that sense, the international business literature, especially the foreign entry mode 
research, is really rich on different frameworks that offer explanations on how a firm makes 
its choice. However, the existent frameworks (like the eclectic framework or the TCA) deal 
with independent entry choices, unrelated from the location decisions or its underlying 
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factors. How to test the performance implication of a decision without considering its 
underlying factors?  
The immediate consequence of it is that the results will ignore the possibility that each 
firm can adequate the governance choice and location decision to its stock of resources and 
industry constraints, and each of those configurations can provide satisfactory performance to 
those firms. Veliyath and Srinivasan (1995) call to the importance of the multidimensionality 
and endogeneity of organizational performance. To them, the organizational performance 
cannot be dealt ignoring the prevailing set of external environmental conditions and internal 
organizational factors. Conversely, the organizational performance must be an outcome 
resulting from the match of the described set of variables and is endogenous to the gestalt. 
They still add that if the measure of performance is chosen exogenously (without account for 
the strategic fit), the results shall be logically incorrect.  
Coming back to the concept of equifinality, it is defined in most organizational 
research as the state of achieving a particular outcome (e.g., high levels of performance) 
through different types of organizational configurations (Gresov and Drazin 1997; Doty et al. 
1993; Van de Ven and Drazin 1985). According to this concept, a firm will be able to achieve 
equally high levels of performance adopting various forms of strategy or structure 
configurations, or both, despite common environmental contingencies (Payne, 2006). 
However, according to (Hambrick 2003, p. 116), in any given environment, there is “not an 
endless number of ways to prosper”. Rather, the discretionary range available to 
organizational managers varies from context to context (Hambrick and Abrahamson, 1995). 
When specifically considering a suboptimal equifinality situation, managerial discretion is 
considered to be relatively low because the environmental context restricts the organizational 
design options available to managers (Gresov 1989). In sum, there is a misfit penalty for 
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organizations that deviate from the environmentally preferred configurational design (Payne, 
2006), or restated as in his hypothesis “In a suboptimal equifinality situation, the more an 
individual firm’s configuration deviates from the preferred configuration type (i.e., the 
greater the misfit), the worse the firm’s financial performance” Payne (2006: 758) 
5.2.2 The Entry Mode Choice and Performance 
Despite the large amount of empirical research on entry mode choice, up to this date, 
most of them dedicate its efforts to explain how the firms make its choice. As a result, 
multiple theoretical perspectives and frameworks were applied in this research line, which 
provided an increased number of predictor variables, and, as a consequence, inconsistent 
findings (for a review, see Slangen and Hennart, 2007). However, regardless those advances 
in entry mode theory, little consideration has been given to the performance implications of 
those theories on the foreign market entry choices. 
Early works on entry mode x performance looked for simple comparisons between 
entry modes, looking for a pattern of superiority between one mode over the others. Distinct 
results from those researches are strong evidence that a mode itself shall not be the reason for 
a firm enhanced performance neither an indicative of mode superiority. If we consider each 
company is bounded with a certain amount of resources and idiosyncrasies and compete in 
specific markets, also with its particular competitive environment, it seems too simple to just 
make comparisons between entry modes.  
An evidence of this line of reasoning could be that diverse organizational forms 
clearly survive for extended periods within the same industry, as pointed out by Masten 
(1993). Additionally, if we consider managers learns over time, in case of specific entry mode 
superiority, we should have observed a tendency over the years for an entry pattern, and this, 
as one can see, doesn’t occur. An example of this kind of research was performed by Chan 
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(1995). Chan tested a sample of U.S. multinational looking for performance superiority from 
international joint ventures over wholly owned subsidiaries, and find no significant difference 
in the performance of the two groups of firms. Woodcock et al (1994) and Nitsch et al (1996) 
examined the performance difference between greenfields, joint ventures and acquired 
Japanese manufacturing subsidiaries in U.S. and Europe, respectively. Both studies suggest 
that the new venture mode outperforms the joint venture mode and the joint venture mode 
outperforms the acquisition mode. Simmonds (1990), in a domestic context, found no 
performance superiority between acquisitions and greenfield subsidiaries. Li and Guisinger 
(1991) examined differences in failure rates between all three ownership-based entry modes 
in the U.S. market, and found that new ventures would have the lowest failure rate and 
acquisitions the highest. However, the difference in failure rate of joint ventures over 
greenfields or acquisitions was not significant. 
Considering the several theories developed or extended to explain the entry mode 
choice underlying factors, the transaction cost/internalization theory and the resource based 
view are the most explored in this field. Those theories, in general, offers a comprehensible 
set of testable propositions relating those merits to attributes of transactions and the 
surrounding environment, what in sum, is a set of normative rules for choosing among 
alternative governance arrangements.  
Taking those theoretical perspectives into account, studies on entry mode x 
performance relationship moved a step forward, linking the firms’ decision to the theoretical 
reasoning underlying such decisions, specially dealing with the endogeneity problem: mode 
performance must be compared regarding the characteristics of a particular investment 
decision (underlying factors). In this line, Shaver (1998) empirically examines if entry mode 
choice (acquisition versus greenfield) influences foreign direct investment survival. This 
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study was one of the firsts to examine the endogeneity problem between mode decision and 
performance. His findings are quite interesting: he suggest that entry mode choice affects 
survival but that the effect depends on firm attributes and industry conditions: in some 
conditions new plants have performance advantages over acquisitions, but given different 
firm attributes and industry conditions, acquisitions have performance advantages over new 
plants. Additionally, Shaver reinforces the notion that firms with stronger sources of 
competitive advantage prefer new plants versus acquisitions. 
Previous from Shaver’s, Aulakh and Kotabe (1997) applied the eclectic approach to 
the foreign entry mode, proposed by Hill et al (1990) and Kim and Hwang (1992), to examine 
transaction-specific, organizational capability and strategic factors that influence channel 
choices in foreign markets. They also examined if the channel integration matching (fit) to the 
transaction specific, organizational capability and strategic factors is the critical determinant 
of channel performance. Regarding the theory fit x performance, they found strong support to 
their hypothesis, confirming that firms which conform to the theoretical prescriptions of the 
proposed model perform better than firms which do not conform to these prescriptions. 
Keith D. Brouthers (2002) investigated if European Union firms that select their entry 
mode based on transaction cost, institutional context, and cultural context variables perform 
better than firms that make other mode choices.  His findings indicate that firms using modes 
predicted by transaction cost and institutional theories performed significantly better than did 
firms using modes that did not conform to the theoretical predictions. 
Brouthers et al (2003) were the last to combine transaction costs variables to a set of 
variables previously used to predict firm mode choice (for them the choice between 
acquisitions or greenfield entries) and performance. They tested whether a firm selecting these 
“transaction costs-enhanced” international entry modes performs better than firms using other 
 174 
 
modes of entry. In a set of German, Dutch, and British firms entering Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEE) Brouthers et al. created a fit variable (firms using theoretically predicted modes 
vs. those using other modes), also including a correction for self-selection variable. Their 
results indicate that firms using mode choices predicted by transaction cost theory had 
significantly better performance than did firms using other mode types. 
As one can see, this stream of research clearly represents an advance from simple 
mode comparison studies, since it analyzes the mode fit in accordance to a selected theory, 
and whether this mode fit conduces to superior performance or not. However, as pointes out 
by Brouthers (2002), transactions costs theory ignores location specific costs (Tse, Pan and 
Au, 1997), and further, those studies presented above fail to address the endogeneity between 
the location relatedness decision and the entry mode choice, as suggested on chapter 4.  
5.2.3 Performance implication of locational relatedness 
As already discussed in the third chapter of this thesis, initial research on international 
diversification x performance relationship extensively examined the benefits and costs of 
international expansion, and its effect on firm performance, with interesting but conflicting 
results. Earlier studies demonstrated that firm’s international expansion could be positive, 
negative or non-related to firm performance. Advances on this research stream found U-
shaped (regular or inverted) or S-shaped relations between those variables, but the 
explanation runs basically on whether incremental costs from excessive expansion can 
surpass the benefits of internationalization, and in which stage it will happen.  
The main costs attributed to international expansions are derived from the liability of 
foreignness. Those costs basically arise from the distance (transportation, coordination over 
distance and time zones, and others), from the unfamiliarity of the company with the local 
idiosyncrasies or from establishing the companies legitimacy abroad (Zaheer, 1995). The 
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degree of those liabilities will vary depending in part of the structural dimension of the 
foreign location (cultural values, levels of development or institutions), and their skills in 
managing past entries and operations in foreign markets (Hill et al, 2006). Drawing on these 
conclusions we can also expect that the cost of adaptation in more homogeneous markets (like 
regional markets) will be lower than in non-regional markets.    
Moving a step forward on this discussion, Rugman (2000) and Rugman and Brain 
(2003) called for an advance in the international research agenda: according to them and their 
evidence that most of the Fortune 500 MNEs largely operate within their home-regional 
markets, the strategic management of MNEs must focus on the regional market, and not in the 
global. Earlier, some authors like Morrison and Roth (1992) already discussed about the best 
balance between local adaptation and global standardization, suggesting that regional 
strategies is a better approach to improving competitiveness.   
Based on this call, researchers start to investigate the factors which make a MNE 
choosing one investment location over another, and then a theoretical and conceptual 
perspective on the regional phenomenon started to be developed. To Rugman and Verbeke 
(2004), the lack of global market success could be due to limits to the joint transferability of 
nonlocation-bound firm-specific advantages (discussed in detail in the last chapter) and its 
acceptance by customers across regions.  
Resting on the transaction cost theory, Rugman and Verbeke (2005), suggest that 
MNEs expand within their home-region because of higher transaction costs arisen from the 
MNEs internal structure and from country-specific factors (or the liability of inter-regional 
foreignness). Rugman and Sukpanich (2006) also pointed out the liability of inter-regional 
foreignness (such as trade regulations, powerful foreign rivals in other regions, and local 
product preferences) as one of the reasons why firms will preferentially expand within their 
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home-region and cannot repeat their home-region advantages in the non-regional markets. 
Earlier to those investigations on regional expansion, Schlie and Yip (2000) in a study of the 
automotive industry, suggested that homogeneous market condition can reduce adaptation 
costs of firms, and so supporting the liability of inter-regional foreignness argument.   
The last and less explored research line on the regional internationalization, up to this 
moment, relates to the performance implications for regional expansions. Li (2005) examined 
in a sample of US service firms if the interaction between regional expansion and 
multinationality would positively affect firm performance. Further, they examined if the focus 
on the regionalization in the triad region would reduce the effects of the liability of 
foreignness (called by him “liability of internationalization”) and accelerate the realization of 
multinational benefits. He concludes that the regional orientation, per se10, will not affect the 
firm performance, however their interaction with the multinationality term adjust upward the 
S-curve slope. In other words, the US service firm that concentrate its operations in the home-
region will overcome the negative effects of the liability of foreignness earlier and will start to 
benefit from firm internationalization sooner and longer.  
Similar findings were suggested on chapter 3, when testing the interaction between 
firms’ regional orientation and international diversification. Sukpanich and Rugman (2007) 
suggest a positive relation between higher levels of intra-regional sales and firm performance. 
According to them, because of the costs generated by the liabilities of inter-regional 
expansion (such as coordination, management costs, and financial and political risks across 
regions), a firm will perform better if it keeps its sales within its home region of the triad. 
Delios and Beamish (2005), in turn, suggest that for the largest Japanese firms from their 
                                                 
 
10 home-region orientation is one of his independent variable, measured as foreign regional sales/total 
foreign sales 
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sample, bi-regional and global firms show better performance than home-region oriented 
firms. To Elango (2004), global (non-regional) MNEs performs better than regional 
multinationals.  
However, what could be the source of so divergent results? What about the underlying 
factor of those decisions? The main question here must run on managers’ perception of how 
ease will be an expansion over regional markets or non-regional markets. This perception can 
be in part due to managers’ previous experience on foreign markets, their expectation on 
generating faster incomes, the costs of adaptation, entry mode constraints, etc.  
Additionally, as previously discussed on chapter 4, each firm is bounded with its stock 
of resource and capabilities (FSAs), and surely it will be a constraint in the time of deciding 
where to expand. According to Milner (1988), each firm’s regional integration preferences 
and role will depend upon its FSA configuration, much in line with its preferences regarding 
trade and investment protection at the national level (Rugman, 2005). In other words, 
managers must take in account their resources availability and its applicability in the regional 
or global context (the location or non-location boundedness of its FSA) and also the industry 
conditions. As in the case of entry mode choice, the performance implication of firm 
locational decision shall be linked to the theoretical reasoning underlying such decisions, 
specially dealing with the endogeneity problem, without forgetting the existence of an 
endogenous relation between entry mode and locational decision. 
5.3 HYPOTHESIS 
On chapter 4 we found that there is an interdependent relation between location 
decision (regional within the European Community or non-regional through other regions). 
Specifically, we found that when expanding to non-regional markets, acquisitive entry will be 
the preferred mode for expansion; regional markets, in turn, is likely to be entered via internal 
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development. Firms with preference for acquisitive entry tend to expand to non-regional 
markets and firms with preference for internal development are more likely to expand to 
home-regional markets. We also discussed how those decisions are influenced by underlying 
factors such as firm specific advantages (FSAs) and industry characteristics.   
So, assuming that each firm is bounded with its stock or firm specific advantages and 
its strategic decisions must make a balance of this stock or firm advantages and also the 
surrounding industry conditions (underlying factors of both decisions), in the context of the 
framework proposed in the last chapter, we expect that different configurations of entry mode 
and location decision will provide satisfactory (or equivalent) performance outcomes for 
firms. However, expecting that exists optimal configurations, deviations from this optimal 
configurations (or misfit) will provide worse performance indicators for those firms.   
Thus;  
HIPOTHESIS 1: Firms which entry mode strategy and location relatedness decision 
are aligned will perform better than firms that deviate from the optimal configurations.  
5.4 METHODOLOGY 
5.4.1 Sample 
Our hypotheses are tested using a sample of European firms, applying data from 
several Eurozone11 countries. Initially, our database was composed by 12 countries. Latter, 
Luxemburg and Portugal were removed from sample because of missing data. The source of 
our data comes from 2 databases: data of firm acquisitive deals were obtained from the 
                                                 
 
11 In the period that comprises this study the Eurozone was composed by twelve countries: Austria, 
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Portugal, and 
Spain. From 2007 on, Slovenia, Slovakia, Malta and Cyprus were also included. 
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Zephyr database and used to compose the FIT index. The rest of the firm and industry 
variables were used or calculated based on data from the Worldscope international database. 
The sample period ranges from 2003 to 2007. To be included in our regressions, a firm must 
be already geographically diversified in 2003, and the ones who performed any acquisitive 
entry, the transaction must represent more than 50% of total company share. The procedures 
cited above results in a sample of 255 firms, from 10 European countries. 
5.4.2 Variables 
Independent Variable 
Initially, our first methodological concern was developing an appropriate measurement 
of fit that mathematically test what we proposed in the theoretical review and hypothesis. 
However it’s not an easy job, considering past investigations on strategy and fit. According to 
Venkatraman (1989), a major problem in this area of research is the lack of corresponding 
schemes by which fit has been tested, and a precise guideline for translating “fit” to the 
analytical level are seldom provided: a lack of correspondence between the concept and its 
mathematical formulation shall be the major reason for inconsistent research results. 
According to Venkatraman (1989), researchers are faced with two fundamental 
decisions when decide to use a specific concept of fit: the first is to choose the degree of 
specificity of the theoretical relationship(s), which indicates the level of precision in the 
functional form of fit, and the second is either to anchor the concept (and tests) of fit to a 
particular criterion or to adopt a criterion-free specification.  
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In that sense, and in line with the six perspectives of testing fit identified by 
Venkatraman12, we developed our measure adopting the perspective of profile-deviation. In 
the profile-deviation perspective, fit is the degree of adherence to an externally specified 
profile, and it is akin to Van de Ven and Drazin's (l985) usage of pattern analysis. Based on 
this perspective, an ideal strategy profile (ideal entry mode x location relatedness decision) is 
specified and a firm’s degree of adherence to such a multidimensional profile will be 
positively related to performance if both firm’s decision has a high level of coalignment.   
Conversely, deviation from this profile implies a weakness in entry mode – location 
relatedness decision coalignment, resulting in a negative effect on performance. 
So, based on the results from last chapter, the best configurations for the coalignment 
between entry mode and location relatedness would be: 
 Eurozone firms expanding to unrelated (global) markets will favor acquisitive 
entry modes;  
 Greenfield investments will be the preferred mode when Eurozone firms 
expand to related (home-regional) markets.  
 Eurozone firms with preference for acquisitions are more likely to expand to 
unrelated (global) markets;  
 Firms with greater preference for internal development (greenfield), in turn, 
are more likely to expand to related (home-regional)  
                                                 
 
12 Venkatraman (1989) identified six perspectives of fit, as (a) moderation, (b) mediation, (c) 
matching, (d) gestalts, (e) profile deviation, and (f) covariation, based on the dimensions of specificity 
and anchoring. 
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 Defined the profile benchmark for what we’ll test the fit deviation, the following issue
 Defined the profile benchmark for what we’ll test the fit deviation, the following issue 
concerns developing a multidimensional profile by using equal weights for the dimensions or 
by differentially weighting the dimensions, based on their relative importance to the context. 
In that sense we start using the two main variables from last chapter (the entry mode choice 
and the location decision) to develop a deviation variable to measure the firm’s decision 
alignment (or just fit). 
 As detailed in the last chapter, the entry mode variable was defined as a continuous 
variable ranging from 0 to 1, where values close to 0 means greater dominance of internal 
development expansion and values close to 1 represent dominance of acquisitive activity, 
corresponding to the transactions performed between the years 2003-2007. 
Entry Mode = $X/($X + $Y) for all j, except when ($X + $Y) = 0. 
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The Location Decision Relatedness13 capture the firm’s global orientation between the 
years 2003 and 2007 (both included), and is defined as: 
Where,  
Rti= (e/h)/(eI/ hI) = firm’s intra-regionalization (relative sales penetration of 
other home region countries, compared to the global firm) in year ti 
Gti= (w/h)/(wI/hI) = firm’s inter-regionalization (relative sales penetration 
outside the home region) in year ti. 
The values of Z will range from 0 to +∞. However, to a best construction of the 
independent variable (named FIT), the values of Z where normalized to range from 0 to 1. So, 
the closest Z is to 0, the most the firm is home-regional (related) oriented.  
Considering the scheme presented on Figure 5.1, we developed a continuous measure 
to capture the alignment/misalignment of both entry mode – location relatedness decision. 
Assuming that: 
 The entry mode choice ranges from 0 to 1, being 0 corresponding to greenfield 
entries and 1 corresponding to acquisitive entries. Values in between indicates 
that a firm is more likely to pursue one of the entry modes, depending if it is 
closer to 0 or to 1;  
 The location relatedness choice also ranges from 0 to 1, being 0 corresponding 
to related (home-regional) expansions and 1 corresponding to unrelated 
                                                 
 
13 For a detailed explanation, see chapter 4 
 183 
 
(global) expansions. Values in between indicates that a firm is more likely to 
pursue one of the location decisions, depending if it is closer to 0 or to 1; 
 Based on the findings from the last chapter, the optimal decision configuration 
will occur when entry mode and location decision represent the Cartesian 
coordinate (0,0) – greenfield entry x related location, or when the coordinate is 
(1,1) – acquisitive entry x unrelated location.  
Every point located in the first or in the third quadrant of Figure 5.1 represents an 
optimal or close to the optimal decision, depending on if it’s close of far to the optimal 
coordinates (0,0), (1,1), and shall confer the best financial performance to the company. 
Conversely, the more an individual firm’s configuration deviates from the preferred 
configuration type (the greater the misfit), the worse the firm’s financial performance.               
  Taking this into account, our fit/misfit variable is defined as: 
ܶܫܨ ൌ ݔ כ ݕ ൅ ሺ1 െ ݔሻ כ ሺ1 െ ݕሻ, ݎ݋ 
ܶܫܨ ൌ ݈݊݋݅ݐܽܿ݋ כ ݁݊ݕݎݐ ൅ ሺ1 െ ݈݊݋݅ݐܽܿ݋ሻ כ ሺ1 െ ݁݊ݕݎݐሻ 
FIT ranges from 0 to 1, where values close to 1 indicate a best fit between the entry 
mode and location relatedness variables, and conversely, the closest the fit variable is to zero 
(0), the worse is the adjustment between both decisions.  
The configurational matrix (Figure 5.1) could also be made by the combination of the 
two dummy variables (0 – greenfield / 0 – related / 1 – acquisition / 1 – unrelated), however 
the use of a continuous index presents some advantages over the dummy variable. The main 
advantage of the continuous measure of FIT developed in this work over the combinations of 
dummy variables is that a company very often undertakes different entry modes and move to 
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different locations in the same period of time.  Adopting a dummy variable when a firm takes 
more the one decision at a time means assigning (arbitrarily) all entry moves/location decision 
of a firm exactly to the combinations acquisition/unrelated or acquisition/unrelated or 
greenfield/related or greenfield/unrelated. On the other hand, the continuous measure provide 
the most likely configuration a firm have adopted in the period of the study, or in other words, 
the degree of emphasis a firm gives to each configuration. So, values on between the optimal 
configurations represent the more likely firm option in a period of time.    
Performance Variables  
 As our performance variable we applied the three most used accounting measures of 
performance employed in the literature: Return on Sales (ROS), Return on Assets (ROA) and 
Return on Equity (ROE). As in our study the objective is to identify if the alignment of the 
entry mode and location relatedness decision provides the best performance to the firms 
undertaking FDI, and the decisions are undertaken in the period of 2003 to 2007, the 
performance variable shall capture the differential performance in that period. So, our 
measure of performance is the differential performance between the years 2007 and 2003 
(Performance2007 – Performance2003).  
The first benefit of the differential performance is that it will capture the performance 
variation of the total amount of firm decisions in a period of time. Additionally, if we consider 
a manager learns over time with each expansion decision, if he considers he made a “bad” 
movement or suboptimal decision (expanding with a not so favored combination of entry 
mode x location decision), the next movement he makes is expected to be adjusted to a 
“better” or “different” configuration. So, if we use a measure of performance in a point of 
time (normally the last year of the period or a year after), and the last decisions this manager 
makes is close to the optimal decision, the performance of the firm shall go high because of 
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this specific decision and this measure of performance will not capture the tendencies over the 
years.    
Control Variables  
As the decisions a firm makes is constrained by its stock of firm specific advantages 
and also by the entry barriers, it’s expected that each firm can adequate the entry mode choice 
and location relatedness decision to its stock of resources and industry barriers, and each of 
those configurations can provide satisfactory performance to those firms. That’s why it would 
be a mistake to measure the organizational performance ignoring the prevailing set of external 
environmental conditions and internal organizational factors (Veliyath and Srinivasan, 1995).  
Taking those arguments into account, we applied some firm specific an industry 
variables recognized in the literature to affect the entry mode choice and location decision (for 
a review, see Chapter 4), viz Firm Size, Technological Knowledge, Advertising Intensity, 
Product Diversity, Global vs. Multidomestic Industry, Industry Concentration, and Market 
Share, all of them measured in the first year period (2003) to reflect the initial conditions 
when the firm undertook the entry x location decisions.     
Firm size is measured as firm’s the natural logarithm of total sales;  
Technological knowledge is measured by the firms´ research and development 
expenditures as a percentage of its domestic sales (R&D);  
Advertising intensity is captured using the firms’ selling and general administrative 
expenses as a proportion of total sales;  
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Product Diversity is defined as the sales based Herfindahl Index14, taking value 0 
when a company is active in only one industry and comes close to 1 when a company 
produces equally in a big amount of different industries;  
The Global x Multidomestic variable15 is defined as a dummy variable attributed to 
each 3-digit SIC code, where 1 is attributed to global industries and 0 if an industry is 
characterized as multidomestic.  
The Industry Concentration was captured by the four-firm concentration ratio, defined 
as C4 = ∑ C4*Pi, where C4 is the seller concentration ratio of the ith industry of the firm and 
Pi equals the fraction of the firm's sales that were in industry i; 
Market Share is defined by the share of sales in Europe, in the firms’ 4-digit industry 
group.  
Industry Group is measured by 2-digit industry sic group, assuming value 1 to 
manufacturing firms, 2 to service firms and 3 to others.  
So, our regression model will be: 
ܲ݁݁ܿ݊ܽ݉ݎ݋݂ݎ௜ ൌ  ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵ כ ܫܨ ௜ܶ  ൅  ߚଶ כ ܵܧܼܫ௜ ൅ ߚଷ כ ܶܧܩܦܧܮܹܱܰܭ.ܪܥܧ௜ ൅ ߚସ כ ܸܦܣ. ܶܫܵܰܧܶܰܫ ௜ܻ
൅ ߚହ כ ܴܱܲܶܫܴܵܧܸܫܦ ܶܥܷܦ ௜ܻ  ൅ ߚ଺ כ ܮܷܯ.ܤܱܮܩ ௜ܶ  ൅ ߚ଻ כ ܱܫܶܣܴܶܰܧܥܱܰܥ ௜ܰ ൅ ଼ߚ
כ ܧܴܣܪܵ ܶܭܯ௜ ൅ ߚଽ כ ܦܰܫ. ܷܱܴܩ ௜ܲ   
                                                 
 
14 The index is calculated based on the share of a firm’s sales in each four digit SIC industry: Product 
Diversity = 1- ∑ Sj2, where Sj is the proportion of a firm’s sales reported in product group j.     
 
15 To establish whether an industry is global or multidomestic, we primarily used the Index of 
Transnational Integration, defined by Kobrin (1991). The following step was define a cut point in 
Kobrin’s list, and to accomplish this objective we use the group references  created by Goshal and 
Nohria (1993) and also Hout et al (1982). Service firms in our sample are characterized as 
multidomestic, since competition in service industries generally occurs in a country basis, demanding 
firms to hardly incorporate local idiosyncrasies. 
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5.5 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Initially we performed a correlation analysis to check whether our sample presents 
some noteworthy problem of multicollinearity. High collinearity among variables implies on 
unstable and low efficient estimation parameters. Table 5.1 reports means, standard deviations 
and correlations among all variables used in the study. As can be seen, no major problems of 
collinearity were found. 
The following step was performing OLS regressions, to test our hypothesis. Table 5.2 
reports our main results, where we test for the impact of firm’s decision coalignment (FIT) 
between the entry mode and the location relatedness decisions on performance. Regressions 
were performed to three measures of performance (ROA, ROE and ROS) however, because 
of the non-significance of the results, regressions on ROS are not shown. Multicollinearity 
was not a problem, as the greatest Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) statistic in the model was 
1,85 – substantially less than the conservative cut-off of 10 suggested by Hair et al. (1998).
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TABLE 5.1 – Means, Standard Deviations and Correlations Matrix 
Variable Mean S.D 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. ROA   3.612    
     
7.015             1                               
2. ROE   9.962    
   
24.815     0.613***            1               
3. FIT   0.639    
     
0.334      0.069     0.076            1               
4. Size   6.951    
     
2.161    - 0.141***   - 0.019   - 0.290***            1              
5. Tech. Knowledge   2.592    
     
5.633      0.255***   
  
0.152***  - 0.014   - 0.217***       1           
6. Adv. Intensity   0.231    
     
0.239      0.300***     0.113     0.087    - 0.252***  
  
0.373***           1        
7. Product Div.   0.296    
     
0.281    - 0.040     0.006   - 0.087*     0.199***  - 0.041   - 0.030            1       
8. Global/Multidom.   0.271    
     
0.445      0.006   - 0.034   - 0.094**   - 0.002    
  
0.242***  - 0.066     0.005           1        
9. Concentration   0.372    
     
0.170    - 0.035   - 0.058     0.003    - 0.025    
  
0.138***    0.033     0.065    0.300***           1       
10. Industry Group   1.482    
     
0.531      0.033   - 0.024     0.052      0.119***  
- 
0.149***    0.023   - 0.067  - 0.420***  - 0.437***            1     
11. Market Share   0.064    
     
0.112      0.009     0.002   - 0.102**     0.453***  - 0.050   - 0.040   
  
0.105**    0.077     0.362***   - 0.075*   
   
1   
t-statistics in parentheses                                 
* p < .10                                    
** p < .05                                    
*** p < .01                                    
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 As shown on Table 5.2, both models (equation 1 to ROA and equation 2 to ROE) 
seems to be consistent to our prediction that the greatest the fit between firm’s entry mode and 
location decision, the greatest is the firm performance. The coefficient of the FIT variable was 
positive and significant (P<0,05) to the ROAs model and also positive and significant 
(P<0,001) to the ROEs model. Interpreting in terms of ROA, this result also means that firms 
that decisions are close to the optimal configuration (first and third quadrant on Figure 5.1) – 
for example, when expanding through acquisitions, have preference for unrelated (global) 
locations or when expanding to global locations is more likely to expand through acquisitions 
– generates more money with less investment on assets. From the ROE perspective, the same 
firms will generate much more assets with less shareholders’ investments.  
The results also show that the entry mode decision and the location decision are not 
independent in the sense that managers must take both elections as an interdependent choice, 
highlighting the importance of the coalignment of them. Apart from that, assuming that the 
entry and location decisions are constrained by firm’s stock of FSA and industry conditions, 
there is no superiority between entry modes themselves or between location relatedness’, 
being the decisions also subject of managerial discretion and limited by managers’ bounded 
rationality. It shall be difficult to conciliate and take into account every parameter that 
influences the entry choice and location relatedness, especially if they are interdependent 
decisions. However in a general manner, Eurozone firms must adjust their decisions in a way 
that it is as close as possible from the optimized configurations since, as our empirical test 
indicates, there might be a penalty to firms that deviate from those optimal configurations. 
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TABLE 5.2 – OLS Regresion: impact of FIT on firm performance 
       Performance  
Variables ROA ROE 
  1 2 
1. FIT 2,916 ** 13,761 *** 
  (0,03)  (0,01)   
2. Size -0,529 ** -0,219   
  (0,04)  (0,82)   
3. Technological Knowledge 0,224 *** 0,635 ** 
  (0,01)  (0,04)   
4. Advertising Intensity 5,637 *** 3,519   
  (0,00)  (0,63)   
5. Product Diversification 0,859  8,144   
   (0,57)  (0,15)   
6. Global vs. Multidomestic 0,099  -0,500   
   (0,93)  (0,90)   
7. Concentration -3,910  -13,835   
   (0,19)  (0,22)   
8. Industry Group 0,493  -3,624   
   (0,62)  (0,33)   
9. Market Share 12,169 *** 16,316   
   (0,01)  (0,36)   
10. Constant 3,215  7,432   
  (0,30)  (0,53)   
Obs. 255 255 
R Squared 16,9%  7,1%   
t-statistics in parentheses      
* p < .10      
** p < .05      
*** p < .01      
 
Regarding our control variables, the ROAs model presents most of the significant 
results – Firm Size (P<0,05), Technological Knowledge (P<0,001), Advertising Intensity 
(P<0,001) and Market Share (P<0,001). Regarding the Firm Size, the negative coefficient 
indicates that during the period of the study, smaller firms presented the best performance 
evolution in terms of Return on Assets. It seems to be that the smaller Eurozone’s firms 
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involved on FDI present better performance indicators than their bigger counterparts. That 
could be in part because of the greatest stimuli to the smaller companies from the Eurozone to 
diversify its activities out of its domestic markets: because of the regional market integration 
and increasing of domestic and home-regional competence, those firms were compelled to 
operate with higher efficiency to survive in this bigger market.    
Technological Knowledge is positively related to performance, what means that firms 
intensive in research and development from the Eurozone streamline its investments in assets, 
and generates more profits with fewer investments in assets. Another interpretation could be 
that those R&D investments from the Eurozone firms are acting as effective rent generator, 
since investments in R&D are risk, time taking and involve high investments in sunk costs, 
what could result in bad performance if the investments were not effective and generating 
profits to those firms. Technological Knowledge was as well the only control variable 
significant in the ROEs model. This positive effect might be the result of the effectiveness of 
the investments on R&D of Eurozone firms involved on FDI on generating firm assets with 
less shareholders investments. That could be a good indicator for shareholders to quickly 
gauge whether a company investment on R&D is really creating assets to the company creator 
or if those investments are just cash consumers.  
Advertising Intensity is also positively related to performance, suggesting the high 
importance of investments on marketing and advertising when involved in a process of FDI.  
Investments on marketing and advertising must be an important component of creation of 
positive brand images through the marketing (Erramilli et al, 1997), especially when entering 
foreign countries. It reflects the firm’s ability to differentiate its products, and has great 
potential to increase the strength of brand images, facilitate achievement of scale economies 
in marketing, and enhance bargaining power with distributors and consumers.   
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Finally, the greater the Market Share, the greatest the profitability of the Eurozone 
firms involved on Foreign Direct Investment. Market power provides firms the ability to 
influence price, quality, and the nature of the product in the marketplace (Shepherd, 1970). 
So, the greater the share of market leaders, the more likely they are to react against entrants, 
using weapons like predatory pricing, reciprocal buying and selling, or other collusive 
practices to protect its market share, and it seems to result on firm’s greater profits.  
5.6 CONCLUSION    
One of the principal aims of this study was to evaluate the impact on performance of 
the fit/misfit between the two main pillars of the international diversification literature: the 
entry mode and the location relatedness decisions. The reasons why misfit occurs or under 
what conditions it is likely to occur have gone largely unexamined in the literature, and 
researchers have implicitly assumed that misfit is the result of misperceptions of context, 
incompetence, or other non-rational determinants (Gresov, 1989).  
In a certain way, the complete picture of why the misfit occurs, especially in the case 
of the entry mode choice and the location decision is far to be determined. Certainly many 
misfits might justifiably be explained because of the reasons mentioned by Gresov, and also 
because of managerial perceptions, bounded rationality, agency problems, or another set of 
motives associated with managerial discretion. Apart from that, many underlying factors 
might influence the entry and location choice, specially the firm’s stock of firm specific 
advantages and the industry barriers. Those factors might also influence or determine those 
choices, as shown on the last chapter.  
In a general manner, the importance of this study results relies on two main 
conclusions. The first is that managers deciding to expand overseas via FDI must take into 
account the balance between both entry mode choice (acquisitions or greenfield ventures) and 
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location decision relatedness (home-regional or global expansions), and their interdependence 
(as shown on Figure 5.1). Considering altogether, each of those specific choice is bounded 
with its specificities. However, as shown, there might exists optimal configurations that 
provide better results to the firms involved in those expansions, and from that comes the 
second conclusion of this study. Based on that premise, we evaluated the impact of the 
coalignment of both decisions in a set of Eurozone firms involved on FDI between the years 
2003 and 2007 (both inclusive).  
The results sound interesting, and corroborate our hypothesis: firms that take decisions 
that draw near to the optimal configurations (as detailed in the fourth chapter) might present 
better results than firms that draw away from those configurations. In that sense, the 
acquisitive mode is close related to the global (or unrelated) expansion, and the greenfield 
entry is close related to the home-regional (or related) expansion. Additionally, from those 
results we can infer that there might be a performance penalty for firms that in a general 
manner do not take into account the endogenous character of those decisions (misfit penalty).   
Another contribution from this chapter is that we developed a continuous measure of 
FIT, to take into account the reciprocal character of the entry and location decisions, and also 
the fact that the firms usually make several entry and locations decisions in a short period of 
time (and those decisions vary both in nature and in effectiveness). So, in the real business 
world it is not so common to dichotomize the decisions between black or white or yes or no, 
but between decisions close to the effectiveness and far from that. Our continuous measure of 
FIT and also the performance variable (measured as differential performance in the period of 
the study) takes also into account that managers revise their decisions overtime, and can 
adjust their strategies if perceives a not so effective movement. 
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Regarding the study limitations we identify as the main one the fact that we could not 
investigate why the misfit occurs in such cases, being our study limited to identify its impact 
on performance. A case study (or a combination of multiple case studies) including managers 
interview could offer a wider picture of the reasons why the misfit occurs, and that could also 
unveil another set or underlying factors involved in this interdependent decision, different 
from the underlying factors of each decision independently. That could be an important 
extension of this study. 
Apart from the suggestions for future studies presented with the study limitations, 
another extension of this study could be the incorporation of different measures of 
performance, like business survival, for example, or another measure of business integration 
in the new environment or other that capture the managerial effectiveness rather than business 
efficiency. Finally, longitudinal studies could be an alternative to test the effectiveness of the 
fit of these interdependent decisions, and could capture the performance effect of the 
decisions adjustments made by the firm during the time.   
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CHAPTER 6 
 
6.1 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The objective of this thesis was deeply investigate the international diversification 
phenomenon and its main pillars – the entry mode choice and the location decision – from its 
antecedents to outcomes, dealing with past conflicting relations, assessing the effect of new 
moderators (like the regional diversification) and proposing new frameworks. 
The study of international diversification comprehends a complex job, because of the 
international diversification complexity itself, but also because of the large number of factors 
that can influence the firm’s decision. That’s one of the reasons of so much effort made by 
researchers all around the world to comprehend this phenomenon. At the same time the 
increasing market globalization and the new perspectives and opportunities offered by the 
global markets are pushing the firms to expose themselves to the international competition 
and also to investments in foreign direct operations, frequently managers are unaware of the 
main factors that must be considered when taking those kinds of decisions.  
Further, even in situations where managers have more control or knowledge of the 
underlying factors of those decisions, a strong knowledge of the foreign market, and the belief 
their decisions were taken considering all factors involved in those decisions, their assessment 
capacity is bounded by their rationality: it would be impossible to simultaneously control for 
all parameters. That might be the reason of why Strategic Management Researchers are 
always trying to establish new and simplified frameworks that can support the firm’s decision 
makers. 
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So, the role played by Strategic Management researchers is fundamental to the 
business world. As researchers on International business, we must understand and offer to the 
companies and its managers/directors/investors explanations of why some companies succeed 
and others fail when investing in foreign countries, and also offer new frameworks and 
explanations on how internationalization strategies can improve the companies’ performance.  
Taking those arguments into account, we have structured this thesis in three 
interrelated parts: the first, we generally asked “Does the international diversification provide 
better results for firms? How?” and also based on past conflicting results, we looked for the 
possible source of diverging results, specially touching the regionalization debate recently 
raised in the IB literature.  
In the second part we have decomposed the international strategy into two 
fundamental decisions: the first, Where to Expand or the location relatedness decision, and the 
second, How to Expand or the entry mode decision. I this part we started the construction of a 
new framework in the international business by asking two questions: “Can a manager decide 
Where to expand without taking into account How to expand?” and also “Can a manager 
decide How to expand without taking into account Where to expand?, and analyzed this 
interdependent relation considering that both decisions are constrained by underlying factors 
like firms specific advantages and industry characteristic.  
Finally, in the last part we asked the question: “If they are interdependent decisions, is 
there any optimized pattern of entry and location joint decisions that provide better results to 
firms involved in FDI?”. Answering all those questions we might, at least partially, address 
the main challenges posed by the IB literature: we answer the question on why some 
companies succeed and others fail when investing in foreign countries, we offer a new 
simplified framework to help the firm’s decision makers when investing in a foreign location, 
 203 
 
and finally test the effectiveness of this framework and offer explanations on how the 
internationalization strategies can improve the companies’ performance.   
One of the first contributions of this thesis is that it’s all developed under the 
perspective of the European market, and particularly the Eurozone firms. Apart from the 
relevant economic position in the world economy, the successful regional integration carried 
out by the European Union (EU) represents an exceptional environment developed for trade, 
and that shall not be neglected by IB researchers. The IB literature was developed 
predominantly based on evidences from the US market, and that’s justifiable because of its 
great relevance in the world economy, unique environment for trade, low government 
interference, and great availability of data. Nevertheless, the growing importance of the EU 
economy and the Euro currency reinforce the need to review the theories of the international 
business under the perspective of the European Union.    
Regarding the three essays developed in this thesis, Table 6.1 resumes our main 
findings. As shown, the third chapter can be considered as an introductory chapter, dedicated 
to further investigate the impact of firm’s international diversification on performance. The 
discussion on this chapter represents an advance from previous discussion on international 
diversification/performance, since we not only test all the conflicting relations found in the 
literature (linear, U-curve and S-curve), but also look for explanations for previous conflicting 
results.  
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TABLE 6.1 – Resume of Tested Hypothesis 
  Main Relations Exp. Rel. Accepted
Chapter 3
     
H1 International Diversification  Firm Performance ~ Yes 
      
H2 Regional x International Div.  Firm Performance + Yes 
Chapter 4
     
H1 Location Relatedness  Entry Mode + Yes 
      
H2 Entry Mode  Location Relatedness + Yes 
      
H3 Size  Entry Mode + Yes 
      
H4 Technological Knowledge  Location Relatedness + Yes 
      
H5 Technological Knowledge  Entry Mode – No 
      
H6 Adversiting Intensity  Location Relatedness ? Yes 
      
H7 Adversiting Intensity  Entry Mode ? Yes 
      
H8 Product Diversity  Location Relatedness + Yes 
      
H9 Product Diversity  Entry Mode + No  
      
H10 Market Share  Location Relatedness – No 
      
H11 Global vs. Multidomestic Ind.  Entry Mode – No 
      
H12 Global vs. Multidomestic Ind.  Location Relatedness ? Yes 
      
H13 Industry Concentration  Entry Mode +  No  
Chapter 5
          
H1 FIT (Entry Mode/Location Rel.)  Performance + Yes 
 
The main finding from this chapter is that the cubic or S-curved configuration is the 
more appropriated approach (first hypothesis) to study this important relation. Apart from 
that, we found that the configuration of the relation between those variables depends on which 
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industry a firm is located or, in other words, is industry specific. Based on that we offer the 
first explanation of past empirical conflicting findings: studies that deal only with big 
manufacturing firms tend to find an inverted U-form between international diversification and 
performance, while the opposite occurs when one handle with service companies and a 
regular U is found. In resume, they are not concurrent views, but complementary results.  
In this chapter we also incorporate the regional debate, aiming to further investigate 
the S-curve hypothesis and its possible implications. From our second hypothesis (the 
moderation effect of regional diversification in the relation between international 
diversification and performance) we suggest that the European regional market might offer to 
the Eurozone firms better conditions to exploit the benefits of internationalization, alleviating 
the effect of the liability of foreignness. Additionally, those results imply that the international 
performance is constrained by the firm’s ability to successfully adapt its existing FSAs to the 
Country Specific Advantages. 
As already commented, one of the purposes of an IB researcher is proposing new 
frameworks that contributes on the managerial decisions. That’s the main objective of chapter 
four. Based on the assumption that most of the antecedent factors of both entry mode and 
location decisions are similar, we question the fact that previous literature assumes both 
decisions are independent, ignoring that fact that both are taken in the moment a firm decides 
to make a FDI. So, if it shares antecedent factors and are taken together, we investigated if 
one decision are constrained by the other, or in other words, if they are interdependent. 
Aside from confirming our first and second hypothesis (the endogenous relation, 
where we confirm that acquisitive entry mode favors expansions to more unrelated markets, 
greenfield entries favors regional expansions and conversely, firms expanding to more 
unrelated markets are more likely to expand through acquisitions and firms expanding to 
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more related markets are more prone to expand through greenfield ventures), we applied some 
novelties in the way we measure those relations.  
First of all, we observed that in the period of the study (years 2003 to 2007, both 
inclusive) most of the firms in the sample had performed many entries by FDI, and that could 
not be perfectly captured by dummy variables, commonly used in entry mode studies, since 
we were analyzing the firms’ strategy in a period of time, and not the firms’ individual 
decisions. Additionally, for the same reason, the firms’ global orientation (the location 
relatedness variable) could not be perfectly captured by most of the measures found in the 
literature, like the Ohmae’s or Rugman’s triad classification (more details on chapter 4). 
Further, those measures do not take into account that the sales distribution of a global firm 
must match the distribution of global GDP (Fisch and Oesterle, 2003), and that the sales 
distribution of a regional firm must mirror the regional GDP distribution (Asmussen, 2006).  
To solve those methodological issues, we used continuous measures to both variables, 
and could capture the most common decisions firm had taken in the period of the study, 
avoiding this way the “yes or no” bias.. So, an advantage of our hypothesis 1 and 2 from 
chapter four is that we capture the firms most likely entry and location joint decision, since in 
the managerial world the decisions are dynamic, adapted to the moment and context. 
In this chapter we also could see that single equation models offers a partial view of 
the interrelationship from entry and location relatedness decisions, since via OLS single 
equations, the entry mode seems not to affect the relatedness of location decision. 
Nevertheless, simultaneous 3SLS model supports the endogenous relation between those 
variables.  
Chapter four represents also an advance in the current regional/global 
internationalization debate since we explore how some antecedent factors (firm-specific 
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advantages and industry characteristics) influence the decision of moving to a regional or 
global market and discuss some implications. The most important findings concerning the 
antecedent factors is that it seems to be that the location relatedness decision and industry 
barriers are a more relevant determinant of firm’s decision to acquire or internally develop 
than firm-specific advantages. Regarding the location decision relatedness, apart from the 
significant influence of entry mode, this decision is strongly influenced by FSAs like 
technological knowledge and product diversification. With those contributions we believe this 
chapter offers a wider view and a simplified framework to Eurozone firms wishing to expand 
via FDI. 
Nevertheless, knowing that the endogenous relation exists shall not be enough for 
firms, if we cannot test the effectiveness of the presented framework. Further, the question 
must evolve from if there is an endogenous relation to if the “optimized” configurations 
proposed by this framework will really provide better results for firms involved in those 
decisions. That’s why chapter five is dedicated to evaluate the impact on performance of the 
fit/misfit between the entry mode and the location relatedness decisions.  
In that sense, and following the optimized configurations, we corroborate our 
hypothesis that firms that take decisions that draw near to the optimal configurations might 
present better results than firms that draw away from those configurations. Apart from testing 
the findings from chapter four, chapter five suggest that the proposed framework is effective 
in the sense that there might be a performance penalty for firms that does not align the entry 
mode choice and the location relatedness decisions. The results are also supported by the 
Dunning’s OLI tripod (ownership, location and internalization): once the internalization 
decision is taken, it’s to expect that the performance implication of the two remaining legs 
(ownership and location) shall not be treated in isolation. 
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This chapter have also faced and presented a solution to a methodological issue, since 
a continuous measure of FIT was developed to take into account the reciprocal character of 
the entry and location decisions, and also the fact that the firms usually make several entry 
and locations decisions in a short period of time. As in the previous chapter (chapter four), 
with this continuous measured we could consider the dynamic nature of firms’ strategy and 
managerial decisions, and evaluate how close or far those decisions were from the optimal 
configurations. 
In sum, this doctoral thesis sheds light in the international diversification debate in a 
pioneering way. With a special focus on the Eurozone firms’ foreign expansion, we explore 
past conflicts, propose a new framework and test it under the perspective of the regional 
debate. Despite apparently independents, our chapters are theory related, and its contributions 
complement each other in order to improve our knowledge of the important relations of the 
main pillars of the international diversification literature: the entry mode choice, the location 
decision. Finally, the constructs presented in this thesis were tested under a strong 
methodological rigor, in order to overcome past study limitations and properly test the 
questions being examined.  
This study is not free of limitations. Apart from the limitations mentioned in each 
chapter, an important opportunity for future improvement is the fact that, despite the dynamic 
nature of firms’ strategy, due to data and methodological issues we have used cross-sectional 
data to test our main hypothesis. Because of this, we have a limited view of how changes in 
the attributes examined jointly influence mode choice and location decisions, or how a change 
in the firm’s strategy will affect the financial performance throughout the time, or how 
knowledge accumulation and learning influence firm’s decisions. Those limitations could be 
diminished or overcame by the use of panel data.  
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Another limitation faced on this study is that because of data limitations we could not 
identify each specific country the Eurozone firms realized a FDI. Knowing that would make it 
feasible to investigate the firms behavior when moving to each specific market or region, and 
provide a better view of firm’s diversification to global markets. That’s a possible extension 
of this study. 
As a final point, since our focus is on the European Market and the Eurozone firms, 
the results presented here might not be generalizable to other regional contexts. Researchers 
are invited to replicate our study, and specially the endogenous framework, in other regional 
contexts, and see if our main conclusions can be sustained in those new environments.     
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